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Abstract 
This research study aimed to examine how the identity of ‗Muslim‘ people is constructed in 
British print media today, and whether or not these constructions promote or undermine a 
xeno-racist project. The research draws on the idea that identity is partly constructed through 
representation, with an emphasis on how language can be used to construct and position 
people in different ways. Using a social constructionist paradigm, the study further considers 
the role that print media has in providing a discursive field within which the construction and 
reproduction of racist attitudes and ideologies in contemporary global society can take place. 
Sixty-five newspaper articles were selected from the online archives of British newspapers, 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph using systematic random sampling. These were 
analysed using the six stages of Foucauldian discourse analysis outlined by Carla Willig. To 
provide a more fruitful account, the analysis also incorporated the methods of Potter and 
Wetherell whose focus is on the function of discourse, as well as van L ngenhove  nd 
H rr ‘s focus on subject positioning,  nd P rker‘s use of Foucauldian analysis which looks at 
power distributions. The analysis revealed that Muslims are discursively constructed as a 
direct politicised or terror threat, often drawing on discourses of sharia law, and Muslim-
Christian relationships. They are also constructed as a cultural threat, drawing on discourses 
of isolation, oppressed women, the veil/headscarf, identity, visibility and integration. The 
analysis also showed some variation in constructions, and these extended from the 
racialization of Muslims to showing the compatibility between Islamic and western values. 
This study discusses the form these different constructions take and the possible implications 
these constructions might have in contributing toward a prejudiced and largely negative 
image of Islam and Muslims. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For Muslims living in the West today, it can be said th t their ‗Muslim‘ religious identity h s 
been racialised as an essential category of difference and inferiority (Bleich, 2009). This 
racialisation of Muslims indicates a shift from more traditional, obvious markers of 
difference, i.e. race or ethnicity, to newer, more prevalent markers of a cultural or socio-
religious nature (Allen, 2005). This shift from race to religion is understood as a response to 
key political and social events where notions of a Muslim identity are brought to the fore. Of 
more importance though, is the ide  th t this ‗shift‘ indic tes the soci lly constructed, 
discursive nature of identity categories. Concurrent with this has been a shift in social 
psychological theory from conceptualising racial prejudice as a cognitive process to a social 
practice (Verkuyten, 2003). As a social practice, racial prejudice is seen to perform a 
function; that function often being the legitimation of unequal patterns of power between 
social groups (Verkuyten, 2003). As such the construction of identity categories is believed to 
be imbued with power differentials. This research study therefore concerns itself with the 
socially constructed nature of identity categories, and considers how these categories are 
constructed through the use of power to legitimise social divisions.  
 
More specifically, this study focuses on how ‗Muslim‘ identity categories are discursively 
constructed in British newspapers. The assumption is that Muslims, a minority religious 
group in Britain, are subjected to the same processes of prejudice and inequality as minority 
ethnic and racial groups. This racial prejudice based on cultural and/or religious difference is 
called ―cultur l essenti lism‖ (Verkuyten, 2003, p. 376), ―new r cism‖ (Verkuyten, 2003, p. 
379),  nd/or ―xeno-r cism‖ (Fekete, 2004, p. 4). The socially constructed nature of identity 
means that these racisms are often effected through talk, text or representation. Subsequently 
the media, as a key site of representation, is seen to have an implicit role in identity 
construction and the production and reproduction of discursive racism (Said, 1981; van Dijk, 
1992). In the Literature Review chapter that follows, I discuss these concepts and issues of 
identity in more depth.  
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1.1 Outline of report 
Chapter two of this report includes a brief historical/social context of the notion of a Muslim 
identity in Britain. I provide an in-depth discussion of the postmodern theoretical approach 
used here, and situate my theory and research within a social constructionist paradigm. This 
is followed by a discussion on the processes of identity construction, theories of discursive 
racism, and the role of print media. I then situate the research within existing research 
literature, and outline my research question and aims. Chapter three provides an in-depth 
discussion of my methodology and how the research was carried out. This includes a more 
comprehensive discussion of the social constructionist paradigm used, and looks more closely 
at discourse analysis as a theory and method. In chapter four, the analysis and discussion of 
the research data is presented. Chapter five contains a concluding overview of the findings 
and further discussion. Chapter six looks at the limitations of the research, considers 
implications for further research, and the importance of reflexivity in social constructionist 
research.  
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2. Context and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Muslims in Britain  
Although no reliable statistics for religious affiliation exist at the national level, estimates put 
the number of Muslims living in Britain at around two million (Ansari, 2002; Bleich, 2009). 
This means that after Christianity, Islam is the second largest religion and Muslims the fastest 
growing religious population (Peach, 2006). The Muslim population in Britain represents a 
wide range of racial and ethnic diversity. The largest group of British Muslims are of South 
Asian origin, predominantly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent, but Muslims have also 
migrated from regions including Africa, Cyprus, Malaysia, the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe (Ansari, 2002). Additionally there are also many white British converts (Ansari, 
2002). Until recently, migrant Muslims have mostly been considered in terms of these 
cultural or ethnic backgrounds without their religious identity having much resonance 
(Adamson, 2011). Over the l st two dec des, however, ‗Isl m‘ h s t ken on ―more 
signific nce  s  n identity c tegory‖ in Brit in  nd other Europe n/Western countries 
(Adamson, 2011, p. 902). This means that Muslim individuals are increasingly identified by 
their religious affiliation over racial, ethnic or national identity categories (Adamson, 2011; 
Bleich, 2009).  
 
The emergence of religion as a salient identity category is believed to have occurred in 
response to key social and political events involving Muslims. One such event was the 
‗Rushdie  ff ir‘ where Muslims were enr ged by the public tion of The Satanic Verses, a 
book containing what were seen as blasphemous, negative images of Islam. The violent, 
angry backlash by certain Muslim groups across the world resulted in a media bolstered 
image of Muslims as homogenous, violent, backward and opposed to Western liberal ideals 
such as freedom of speech and human rights (Hellyer, 2007). This characterisation of 
Muslims later intensified in Britain during other key political events like the Gulf War in 
1991, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States in 2001, riots involving Muslim youth in the 
north of England in 2001, and the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 (Hellyer, 2007). The 7/7 
bombings were particularly influential in bringing forth the idea of religion as a salient 
identity category in Britain. This is because the perpetrators shared the same national identity 
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in that they were British born citizens, university educated, with middle class characteristics, 
but they were distinguishable by their ‗Muslim‘ identity (Ali, 2008).  
 
2.2 Identifying Islam and Muslims 
To spe k of   ‗Muslim‘ identity presents some difficulty though, bec use   Muslim religious 
identity could range from ―devout  dherence to orthodox Isl mic practice, to nominal 
affiliation, and [this] is negotiated in complex, shifting and multi-f ceted w ys‖ (Ans ri, 
2002, p. 12).  To begin with though,   tr dition l or liter l underst nding of   ‗Muslim‘ is one 
who follows the religion of Islam. The word Islam originates from the Arabic root word 
salaam which me ns ‗pe ce‘,  nd the liter l tr nsl tion of Islam, from Arabic to English, is 
‗surrender‘ (Ali, Liu & Humedi n, 2004). The word Muslim tr nsl tes  s ‗one who submits to 
the will of All h (God)‘. Therefore, to be a Muslim is to submit voluntarily to the will of God 
 nd to ―seek pe ce on the b sis of this submission‖ (In y tull h & Boxwell, 2003, p.7). This 
pe ce is pursued within   p r meter of concepts  nd v lues provided by the Qur‘ n  nd the 
Sunnah (sayings and actions/the example of the Prophet Muhammad) (Inayatullah & 
Boxwell, 2003, p. 7). Muslims also refer to ―  universe of me ning‖ constructed  round   
number of fundamental principles (Ramadan, 2004, p. 9). These principles are faith, prayer, 
charity, fasting, and pilgrimage, and with rare exception, are recognised by Muslims 
everywhere (Ramadan, 2004).  
 
The  bove definition of   ‗Muslim‘ refers to those who h ve  ccepted Isl m  s   religion  nd 
integrative worldview that provides a moral perspective on every aspect of human endeavour, 
according to Inayatullah and Boxwell (2003) citing S rd r (1991). The term ‗Muslim‘ tod y 
however, is applied as an objective and subjective category used to identify a group of 
people. As a social category, the term ‗Muslim‘ h s become l rgely  mbiguous  s it is often 
used in reference to both religion and culture (Eastmond, 1998). It is necessary, therefore, to 
underst nd th t the term ―Muslim‖, in itself, does not indic te  nything  bout how the 
religion Islam is understood; neither does it refer to the religious ideas or values held by a 
particular person (Carlbom, 2003). This presents a postmodern shift from a literal meaning of 
wh t it me ns to be ‗Muslim‘ – th t of being one who submits completely to God‘s will, to a 
more symbolic, ambiguous term where meaning is replaced with representation. 
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As indicated above, Muslims in Western countries are of varied ethnicities, cultures, and have 
diverse historical experiences that have contributed to their existence as minority groups (Ben 
Moussa, 2004). Along with this national or ethnic heterogeneity, Muslims are also different 
in terms of education and social class (Carlbom, 2003). Broad Islamic traditions further 
construct difference: there are Sunni, Shia and Sufi Muslims (Carlbom, 2003). This 
heterogeneity influences how individuals interpret, practice and incorporate religion into their 
daily lives (Ben Moussa, 2004). Sanders (1997), cited in Carlbom (2003), identified four 
groups: ethnic, cultural, religious, and political Muslims. An ethnic Muslim is one who does 
not necessarily practice Islam, but who was born in a context where there is a predominant 
Islamic tradition. A cultural Muslim internalises Muslim cultural traditions, and thinks with 
the help of Islamic categories. A religious Muslim has certain religious beliefs and practices, 
and a political Muslim believes that Islam is an all-embracing system for society. 
 
The groups identified above reflect a trend whereby attempts are made to categorise Muslims. 
In reality however, classifying such a heterogeneous grouping into simple categories is not so 
easy. The diversity among Muslims makes it difficult to define them as a group officially 
(Ansari, 2002). In Ansari (2002, p. 12) three definitions are cited: For Kettani (1986), 
Muslims ― ffirm Muh mmed to be the l st messenger of All h  nd hold his te chings to be 
true, irrespective of the extent to which they know about his teachings, or the extent to which 
they  re  ble to live  ccording to them‖. For Nielsen (1987) Muslims are those for whom 
Isl m h s signific nce in the ordering of their d ily lives but ―it is necess ry to be  w re of 
the differing factors (social, economic, cultural and generational) which may contribute to 
vary the application of ideas of Isl m …  t both the individu l  nd the collective level‖. 
L stly, for H llid y (1999) ―Isl m m y, in some contexts, be the prime form of politic l  nd 
social identity, but it is never the sole form and is often not the primary one‖. Given the 
diverse, complex nature of identity all three definitions are drawn on in this study. 
 
Notwithstanding the complex nature of religious identity, and their diverse 
racial/ethnic/national backgrounds, the experience of British Muslims for the most part is that 
they need to negotiate living with a minority identity in a non-Muslim state (Ansari, 2002). 
And following the events of 9/11 and 7/7, Muslim religious identities have increasingly been 
subjected to extern l soci l constructions  nd ―used to org nise soci l inequ lities normally 
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 ssoci ted with r ci l minorities‖ (Byng, 2008, cited in N gr , 2011, p. 427). As with r ce, 
class and ethnicity, religion is now used as a means for social stratification (Viswanthan, 
1998, cited in Nagra, 2011). Religious minority identity can therefore be understood as 
susceptible to the s me ―soci l processes of system tic inequ lity, extern l l belling,  nd 
otherness  s other ethnic  nd r ci l groups‖ (N gr , 2011, p. 427). These soci l inequ lities 
and external labelling are often manifest in forms of racial prejudice and cultural 
essentialism.  
 
2.3 Identity categories: Race, culture, ethnicity, and religion 
Before looking more closely at the complex nature of identity construction and how this can 
lead to racial prejudice and cultural essentialism, the relevant identity categories drawn on in 
this study are discussed below. These include race, culture, ethnicity and religion. 
 
2.3.1 Race. Race as an identity category is generally defined in terms of physical 
characteristics like skin colour, facial features and hair type (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). 
These characteristics are understood as hereditary and common to particular populations 
(Bet ncourt & Lopez, 1993). The term ‗r ce‘ is thus often used in reference to the specific 
way in which collective differences are constructed and understood (Anthias, 1990). This is 
because identity is constructed through difference, and involves the categorisation of 
individuals into those who are similar and those who are not (Anthias, 1990; Hall, 2000). 
Race is therefore   ―p rticul r  rticul tion of where  nd how the bound ry‖ of those 
categories are constructed (Anthias, 1990, p. 22). These boundaries are considered to be 
based on immutable, fixed biological differences (Anthias, 1990).  
 
Historically, people have commonly been divided into four main racial groups, but the view 
on ‗r ce‘ used here, is b sed on that of Eriksen (1996) who comments on the ―dubious 
descriptive v lue‖ (p.29) of the term. He explains that there has been so much interbreeding 
between human populations that to speak of fixed boundaries between races is meaningless. 
Moreover, drawing on modern genetics since race is seen as biologically based, Eriksen 
(1996) argues that the distribution of hereditary characteristics does not follow clear 
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bound ries. This me ns th t there would be more v ri tion within   ‗r ci l‘ group th n 
between groups. Accordingly, race is understood as a social construct with no objective 
existence. As a concept though, race is important to the extent that it influences social 
actions. But soci l scientists studying r ce rel tions ―need not themselves believe in the 
existence of r ce‖ since their interest is in ―the soci l  nd cultur l relev nce of the notion that 
r ce exists‖ (Eriksen, 1996, p. 29). 
 
2.3.2 Culture. Culture is understood  s ―  soci l system of sh red symbols, 
meanings, perspectives, and social actions that are mutually negotiated by people in their 
rel tionships with others‖ (Ste d, 2004, p. 392). These social systems are highly variable, 
learned, shared, and passed on generationally by particular social groups (Betancourt & 
Lopez, 1993). The term ‗culture‘ is consequently used to identify the historic l n ture of 
social groups and reflects their norms, beliefs, symbols and traditions (Bauman, 1999, cited 
in Stead, 2004). Culture is not a given though, nor is it passively assumed (Stead, 2004). It is 
a fluid phenomenon that transforms with increasing contact with other cultures (Stead, 2004). 
In a rapidly changing environment like the postmodern climate in which we find ourselves 
now, contact between cultures is increasingly possible through economic trade, migration, the 
Internet and media. As such, cultures are rapidly changing as people interact and adopt 
elements of other cultures, absorb new traditions and discard old ones, and adapt to 
accommodate social developments (Stead, 2004). 
 
2.3.3 Ethnicity. Ethnicity is closely associated with culture and race and is 
sometimes used interchangeably with both. This is because it is often used in reference to 
groups characterised by a common nationality, culture or language (Betancourt & Lopez, 
1993). While ethnicity seems similar to culture, it differs in that it contains commonalities 
rooted in ancestry (Roosens, 1995). Culture consists of shared practices and beliefs which are 
learnt, and these are not predetermined or fixed (Smith, 1996). Ethnicity consists of shared 
history and experience and these are acquired through birth and kinship, and are therefore 
fixed in that there is historical continuity (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). The acquisition of 
fixed characteristics through kinship would suggest that ethnicity as a concept is closer to 
race. Race, however, suggests genetic inheritance and is deterministic, whereas ethnicity does 
not automatically determine future characteristics (Fishman, 1996). Ethnicity can therefore be 
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understood as more flexible than race in that it contains culture, but it is less deterministic 
because it does not involve genetic determinism (Meehan, 2009). 
 
2.3.4 Religion. Compared to race, culture, and ethnicity, religion as an identity 
category has largely been overlooked (Peek, 2005). This could be because religious practices 
are usually thought of as belonging to the private sphere, and religious social actions are 
considered less visible and identifiable than social actions linked with formal structures in the 
public sphere (Jeldtoft, 2011). Moreover, religion is often characterised as closely linked to 
spirituality, where spirituality is seen as individualistic, with an emphasis on personal 
autonomy and experience (Jeldtoft, 2011). Religion, however, can be perceived as an 
important meaning system that enables people to make sense of their existence (Verkuyten & 
Yildiz, 2007). It can have central importance for individuals, and their identity can often be 
deeply rooted within religion (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). For those observant of religion, 
their lives would be organised around religious beliefs, values and practices as these offer 
certainty and meaning to their existence (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Religious beliefs can 
also come to be expressed through organised and institutionalised frameworks, and adherents 
to those religions are much more visible (Jeldtoft, 2011). For this reason, it can be argued that 
religious practice is not confined to the private sphere, but contributes to the construction of 
people‘s m nifest identities (Jeldtoft, 2011). 
 
Since religion is not consigned to the private sphere, identification with a particular faith 
enables people to belong to a religious community (Kundnani, 2007). Faith identities are 
complex, however, operating on different levels of belief, practice and affiliation (Kundnani, 
2007). Globalisation and processes of migration have also resulted in religion becoming 
transnational with membership spanning a multitude of different ethnicities, nationalities and 
cultures (Kundnani, 2007). As such, religious groups cannot be taken as monolithic with a 
shared culture or origin. 
 
When looking at race, culture, ethnicity and religion today, it can be argued that these identity 
categories have been destabilised by postmodernism leading to much more complex 
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constructions of identity. To comprehend contemporary processes of identity formation, an 
understanding of postmodernism is therefore useful. 
 
2.4 Theoretical orientation: Postmodernism 
‗Postmodernism‘ is   key term th t is  pplied to the world tod y (S rd r, 1998). It c n be 
understood as an ideology that emerged in reaction to modernism (de Vries, Visscher & 
Gerritsen, 2005). Modernism, as a cultural movement that originated in the late nineteenth 
century, encouraged the re-examining of every aspect of existence (de Vries et al., 2005). 
With industrialisation, capitalism, the aggressive advance of colonialism and imperialism, 
and the First World War forming the backdrop, the modernist movement sought to order the 
social world through the power of science, rationality and industry (de Vries et al., 2005). 
Modernism is thus characterised by a belief in science, planning, secularism and progress, 
and typically involves the subordination of tradition with modern thought (Ahmed, 1992). It 
is also characterised by symmetry and order, balance and authority, linear progress, and belief 
in the possibility of a utopian society (Ahmed, 1992).  
 
Modernity‘s r tion lity  nd its ― lien ting ide  of perpetu l, line r progress  nd elitist notions 
of culture‖ resulted in postmodernism - a response against notions of European superiority 
(Sard r, 1998, p. 6). For B um n, postmodernism is ―modernity conscious of its true n ture‖ 
(de Vries et al., 2005, p. 7). He conceptualises postmodernity as a reflexive enterprise by 
intellectuals whereby existing structures are deconstructed making way for characteristics 
such as pluralism, variety, contingency and ambivalence (de Vries et al., 2005).  Although 
paradigmatically different, postmodernism should not be taken as simply the opposite of 
modernism (Hoffman, Stewart, Warren & Meek, 2009). The difference between the two has 
to do with epistemology, and modernity is even embraced by postmodernism as one of many 
ways of knowing, rather than the only way (Hoffman et al., 2009).  
 
With modernism it is believed th t there is ―  know ble  bsolute truth‖ th t is discernible 
through science and reason (Hoffman et al., 2009, p. 7). Postmodernism on the other hand 
rejects all truth claims and is instead committed to relativism (Sardar, 1998). As such what 
was valid in modernity is taken as obsolete in postmodernity (Sardar, 1998). Modernity was 
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framed by grand narratives of truth, reason, morality, God, tradition, and history (Sardar, 
1998). These notions which were believed to give sense and direction to life are taken as 
meaningless, artificial constructions that are oppressive by nature (Sardar, 1998). 
 
Doubt is taken as the postmodern condition (Sardar, 1998). All theory, experience, truths and 
absolutes are doubted (Sardar, 1998). This doubt can be seen as a positive characteristic in 
that no single culture, civilisation or truth claim is privileged (Sardar, 1998). In fact 
postmodernism‘s ―defining ch r cteristic‖ is its concern with v riety  nd multiplicities  nd  s 
such it places emphasis on the plurality of ethnicities, cultures, genders, truths and argues for 
more equal representations (Sardar, 1998, p. 10). Postmodernism is therefore taken as 
standing against the superiority of European culture and civilisation that modernism tried to 
posit (Sardar, 1998). 
 
As happened with modernity, social processes influenced the development of postmodernism, 
and globalisation is considered a key social process (Kinnvall, 2004). Globalisation has 
brought about changes in communication and cultural production and consumption, and this 
has produced new forms of self-consciousness and reflexivity (Hall, 1996). In an interview 
with Grossberg (1996), Hall explains that when faced with new ways of being and reading 
things, the issue of representation is brought up (Grossberg, 1996). With postmodernism, 
multiplicity leaves no room for an absolute truth, and because there are multiple ways of 
representing things, we face the collapse of meaning (Grossberg, 1996). Hall contests this 
view and points out that there is a considerable difference between asserting on the one hand 
that there is no single, absolute truth – only endless means of signification, and asserting on 
the other hand that meaning does not exist. He explains that because there is no longer an 
 bsolute truth, we h ve to find me ning without ―the sol ce of closure‖ (Grossberg, 1996, p. 
137). Faced with fragments of truth or multiple codes of meaning, meaning is in fact enriched 
(Grossberg, 1996). This is because meaning is understood as a subjective act, what Hall terms 
―the intervention of ideology into l ngu ge‖ (Grossberg, 1996, p. 137). As such 
representation, how we present or interpret phenomena, does not reach an end but rather 
becomes a more problematic process (Grossberg, 1996). This relationship between language, 
meaning and representation can be looked at more closely through a social constructionist 
lens. 
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2.5 Social constructionism  
Social constructionism can be understood as a theory underpinned by the postmodern 
principles outlined above. Social constructionism relativizes truth claims and emphasises the 
socially constructed nature of knowledge (Stead, 2004). This does not mean that truth is non-
existent. It means that the concern with a final truth or reality is replaced with plural views 
and understandings which are always understood as contextual and relational (Gemignani & 
Peña, 2007). Like postmodernism, which says that reality is a simulacrum, social 
constructionism also sees reality as unknowable except through language (Gemignani & 
Peña, 2007). The importance of language is thus brought to the fore, and this emphasis on 
language as constitutive of reality relates to the postmodern area of discourse (Gemignani & 
Peña, 2007). 
 
Discourse can be understood as the uses of language that, within a specific context, 
systematically construct the objects of which they speak (Gemignani & Peña, 2007). Drawing 
on the work of Foucault, social constructionists examine the relationship between social 
practices and discourses and how these both contribute to the construction of reality 
(Gemignani & Peña, 2007). Of particular interest to discursive psychologists is how language 
is used to construct knowledge about phenomena, and how this knowledge, once applied to 
the social world, has real effects (Hall, 2001). This constructed nature of knowledge means 
that social constructionists adopt an anti-essentialist approach (Stead, 2004). An anti-
essentialist view means that people are not seen as possessing predetermined, intrinsic 
qualities, instead they are seen as the product of social processes (Stead, 2004). 
Consequently, social constructionists are wary of categories and dichotomies as these do not 
reflect reality (Stead, 2004). They are instead seen as political in nature, and used to serve the 
interests of various power groups (Stead, 2004). Social constructionism is therefore an 
approach that attempts to deconstruct prevailing views and structures (Stead, 2004). 
 
2.6 Processes of identity formation 
Taking the above discussions into consideration, postmodernity is understood as the current 
context in which identity is formed (Schachter, 2005). It is also understood here as a broad 
theory of knowledge enlisted to critically examine existing theories which discuss identity 
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(Schachter, 2005). Social constructionism is the specific postmodern approach used to 
discuss the discursive n ture of identity.  Within the field of soci l psychology ‗identity‘ is   
keyword around which there is much theorising and research (Howard, 2000). During 
previous historical periods, when societies were conceived of as stable, identity was to a large 
extent assigned rather than selected and therefore not such an issue as it is today (Howard, 
2000). In the present soci l clim te of r pid ch nge, ch nge is occurring in ―the groups  nd 
networks in which people and their identities are embedded and in the societal structures and 
pr ctices in which those networks  re themselves embedded‖ (How rd, 2000, p. 367-368). 
Thus the concept of identity tod y is imbued with the ―need for   sense of who one is‖ in   
constantly evolving context (Abes, Jones & McEwen, 2007; Howard, 2000, p. 367). 
 
2.6.1 Identity as fluid. In order to fully explore the whole range of being, social 
constructionists do not conceptualise identity as a stable, unifying core of the self (Hall, 
1996). There is no intrinsic, essential nature, or even a common origin or structure of 
experience to identities (Hall, 1996; Howard, 2000). Instead, identity is considered a fluid, 
fractured construction subject to discursive formations and practices (Hall, 1996). Identity is 
further understood as relational, defined by difference, multiple and fluid (Howard, 2000). 
Identities are also always in a process of formation, and as such are never taken as complete 
(Hall, 1996). For soci l constructionists it is  lso import nt to consider the ―specific historic l 
and institution l sites‖ in which these identities  re produced (Hall, 1996, p. 4). Consideration 
is also given to how identities are discursively formed (Hall, 1996). Furthermore, because 
identities are produced through difference, they are seen as emerging out of ―the pl y of 
specific mod lities of power‖ (Hall, 1996, p. 4). 
 
2.6.2 Identity as relational. 
2.6.2.1 Othering. In order to indic te how identity c n be s id to be ―rel tion lly 
constructed‖ (H nsen, 2006, p. 17), three m in ide s of the self  s rel tion l  re dr wn on. 
Firstly, it is thought that individuals construct a sense of self through distinguishing other 
individuals as different (Sampson, 1993). People are believed to have always split the world 
up into p rts th t h ve ―re l or im gined distinction from e ch other‖ (S id, 1978, p. 39). This 
process of distinguishing ‗us‘ from ‗them‘ is  lso known  s ‗othering‘, whereby we construct 
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our sense of self by recognising what we are not in relation to the ‗other‘ (H ll, 1996; Said, 
1978). At the level of the individu l, the self thus needs  n ‗other‘ to exist. This rel tion l 
construction can also be extended to groups and leads to in-group/out-group distinctions 
(Sampson, 1993). Generally, this process of othering is understood to result in unequal 
self/other relationships.  
 
2.6.2.1.1 Serviceable other/Supplement. S mpson‘s (1993) concept of the 
serviceable other provides a useful elaboration of how relational constructions of identity can 
lead to unequal relationships. A serviceable other is when someone else has to exist in order 
for an individual to demarcate a sense of self. For example, in order for a man to construct an 
identity of protector and provider, there has to be serviceable others such as a wife and 
children (Sampson, 1993). Derrid ‘s supplement operates similarly (Hansen, 2006). Using 
the example of the dominant male, Derrida explains that women are seen as secondary, but at 
the s me time vit l for ―societ l completion  nd surviv l‖ (Hansen, 2006, p. 21). The 
service ble other or supplement is second ry to the privileged subject, but the ―l tter would 
not be complete without the former‖ (H nsen, 2006, p. 21). The ‗other‘ is therefore 
understood as lesser than, but a necessary requirement for the demarcation and construction 
of the self. 
 
2.6.2.2 Constitutive outside. Another way in which we construct a sense of self is 
through identifying a threatening outside other (De Vos, 2003). Following the social 
constructionist approach used here, our knowledge and interpretation of the world is 
understood as socially constructed, and limited, by discourse (De Vos, 2003). Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) explain that when using language to construct meaning around an object or 
element we are establishing a discourse. This discourse is articulated through nodal points or 
master signifiers which partially affix meaning (De Vos, 2003). The fixation of meaning is 
partial because discourses are socially constructed and therefore not fully sutured (De Vos, 
2003). As such, discourses are incomplete and can be penetrated by elements of other 
discourses or have elements withdrawn (De Vos, 2003). This allows for a permanent 
renegotiation of meaning (De Vos, 2003). When looking at the social construction of identity 
then, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) assert that it is an antagonistic process because individuals 
 re never  ble to  tt in   closed identity. They emph sise th t the ―presence of the ‗Other‘ 
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prevents [one] from being tot lly [one‘s self]‖ (L cl u & Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). To  ccount 
for this thre t to identity from the outside, the Derride n notion of   ―constitutive outside‖ is 
drawn on (De Vos, 2003, p. 165). Identities are discursively constructed in relation to a 
threatening outside, but this outside blocks the establishment of a unified inside (De Vos, 
2003). The ‗constitutive outside‘ is thus simil r to the ‗supplement‘ or ‗service ble other‘ in 
that it is necessary for the construction of the self, but it is also threatening because it enables 
a destabilising and renegotiation of identity (De Vos, 2003). 
 
2.6.2.3 Linking and differentiation. A third way in which we construct our sense 
of self is through processes of linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006). Hansen (2006), to 
indic te how identity c n be s id to be ―rel tion lly constructed‖ (p. 17), gives the example 
of a woman juxtaposed to a man and constructed as that which a man is not: maternal, 
emotional and simple. A wom n is  ccordingly defined through   ―positive process of 
linking‖ to  ttributes such  s m tern l, emotion l  nd simple (H nsen, 2006, p. 19). A m n 
would be linked to qualities such as rationality, intelligence, independence and complexity 
(Hansen, 2006). The female series of links is juxtaposed to the male series of links through a 
―neg tive process of differentiation‖ (H nsen, 2006, p. 19). Although the two processes can 
be analysed separately, when it comes to identity construction both are carried out 
simultaneously (Hansen, 2006). 
 
2.6.3 Identity as multiple and contextual.  While group belonging is relational, it 
is not exclusivist, meaning that we can belong to multiple groups (Anthias, 2009). For 
example an individual can be a British citizen, of Indian origin, a Christian, a woman, a 
vegetarian, and an anthropologist (Sardar, 2005). Multiple identities thus co-exist within a 
single person, but we draw on these different identities depending on the context (Anthias, 
2009; Sardar, 2005). Identity is therefore seen as a process whereby we take up positions 
depending on ―context, me ning, interest, v lues, go ls  nd projects‖,  nd this brings up the 
concept of identity salience (Anthias, 2009, p. 10). This means that depending on the context, 
we will give saliency to a particular identity. For instance, at work you might draw on your 
professional identity, in a restaurant your vegetarian identity, at church your Christian 
identity, and at home your Indian identity. Each identity is varyingly important to differing 
contexts (Sardar, 2005). 
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2.6.4 Identity and agency. Although we are able to assume different identities, 
social constraints, reason and choice mean that we cannot choose any identity at whim 
(Sardar, 2005). What it suggests is that we usually have the choice of alternative identities, 
the choice of multiple identities, and the freedom to give priority to any of the identities we 
simultaneously hold (Sardar, 2005). That said it is possible th t our ‗choice‘ or ‗freedom‘ of 
identity is limited by the perceptions and representations of others, and by larger ideological 
processes and material structures that we interact with (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Since 
identity is understood as relationally constructed and multiple it is taken as partial, and 
consideration needs to be given to how social contexts and ideologies inform our 
―configur tions of self  nd other‖ (Bucholtz & H ll, 2005, p. 605). Bucholtz and Hall (2005) 
sum this up with the following: 
Any given construction of identity may be in part deliberate and intentional, in part 
habitual and hence often less than fully conscious, in part an outcome of interactional 
negoti tion  nd contest tion, in p rt  n outcome of others‘ perceptions and 
representations, and in part an effect of larger ideological processes and material 
structures that may become relevant to interaction. It is therefore constantly shifting 
both as interaction unfolds and across discourse contexts (p. 606). 
 
The above articulation raises the issue of agency when it comes to identity construction 
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). From a social constructionist approach, human agency is influenced 
by historical contexts and structural constraints. Accordingly it is not possible to construct or 
― uthor‖ your own or others‘ identities without being influenced by existing soci l structures 
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 306). Of particular interest to social constructionists is how these 
social structures come to be, and how they in turn function to produce social phenomena. 
This is believed to be done through l ngu ge. With reg rd to identity, H ll‘s (1996) 
discussion of identity as constructed within representation is useful in explaining how 
identities are discursively constructed for us. 
 
2.6.5 Identity and power. Hall (1996) speaks about the ―n rr tiviz tion of the self‖ 
(p. 4), and this refers to how, when we speak about a person, we use language to offer an 
image or representation of his/her identity. This use of language typically involves a process 
of representation and consequent interpretation, and as a result, identity is understood as 
discursively constructed (Hall, 1996). Furthermore, these discursive constructions take place 
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in ―specific historic l  nd institution l sites within specific discursive form tions  nd 
pr ctices‖ (H ll, 1996, p. 4). Going b ck to the ide  th t identity is constructed through 
difference, Hall (1996) explains that positive constructions are only possible through 
exclusion, through leaving out something. This means that at the boundary of every identity 
lies an excess, or something more (Hall, 1996). As such the unity that the term identity elicits 
is not n tur l, it is   ―constructed form of closure‖, requiring  n ‗other‘ (H ll, 1996, p. 5).  
 
This dependence on  n ‗other‘ usu lly le ds to the est blishment of   ―hier rchy between two 
poles‖, for example man/woman, black/white (Hall, 1996, p. 5). This means that the 
construction of identities can be understood as an act of power, and a strategic and positional 
process (Hall, 1996, p.5). Identity categories are often organised into dualistic, contrasting 
divisions such as male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, black/white, as well as other racial 
and ethnic divisions (Sampson, 1993). These divisions are not natural categories based on 
biology or genetics - although these have been drawn on to legitimise social divisions 
(Sampson, 1993). Rather, these divisions are taken as the effects of discursive processes 
involving power (Sampson, 1993). For social constructionists the concern is with how these 
divisions are constructed, and what the consequences of such constructions are (Sampson, 
1993). They also consider the power that some groups have to manage the discursive 
practices by which their own identity is constructed, as well as the power that they have to 
manage the identity of others (Sampson, 1993). This leads to looking at how dominant groups 
in society attempt to control how other groups are known, constructing a reality that fits in 
with an image they desire (Sampson, 1993).  
 
2.7 The orientalised other 
S id‘s (1978) discussion of Orient lism provides a useful example of how dominant groups 
can influence the way in which other social groups are known in terms of race, ethnicity 
and/or culture. His discussion also indicates how identity is relationally constructed, how 
processes of identity construction are imbued with power differentials, and how they can be 
contingent upon historical developments. Said (1978) explains that in the late eighteenth 
century, developing academic sciences and a sizeable body of literature began to take an 
interest in the alien and unusual, and the Orient or the East, being poorly known, became a 
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subject of scholarship (Said, 1978). Although the Orient/East encompasses many non-
Western n tions, prim rily those found in Asi , S id‘s Orient lism ―focuses n rrowly on 
conceptions of the Lev nt  nd  dj cent  re s‖ (Lewis & Wigen, 1997, p. 47). This  re  is 
what is known as the Middle East today wherein there is a predominant Muslim culture. The 
scholarly interest in the East coincided with the period of European expansion, marking a 
shift of the Orient from ― n  lien to   coloni l sp ce‖ (S id, 1978; Young, 1990, p. 130).  
 
During colonialism, European nations coming from a position of power and dominance, used 
their own cultural categories, languages, images, and ideas to describe and represent the 
nations they came to occupy (Hall, 1997). The basis of orientalist discourse was thus an 
imaginative and drastic geographical division of the world into two unequal parts – the larger, 
‗different‘ Orient,  nd the f mili r Occident or West (Said, 1981). The world was thus 
structured between the familiar, which was the West or ‗us‘,  nd the str nge, which w s the 
Orient or ‗them‘ (S id, 1978). This reflects the process of ‗othering‘ whereby we form our 
identity by distinguishing ‗us‘ from ‗them‘ (Said, 1978). The construction of other nations 
was also done through processes of linking and differentiation. With Orientalism, the West 
was positively linked to qualities such as rationality, virtuousness, and modernity (Said, 
1978). The Orient in contrast was regarded as irrational, depraved, childlike, and backward 
(Said, 1978). The Orient was thus negatively differentiated from the West.  
 
The Orient can also be understood as constructed as a serviceable other, or supplement. For 
the West to be perceived as superior, the Orient had to be constructed as backward and 
inferior. The Orient was also seen as   ‗constitutive outside‘ for the West. Said (1981) 
interestingly notes that even though the Orient was considered an inferior part of the world, it 
has always been perceived as greater in size and usually with a greater potential for 
destructive power than the West. Particularly when looking at Islam, which has always been 
seen as belonging to the Orient, Said (1981) explains that it is regarded with hostility and fear 
bec use it is considered ―  formid ble competitor‖ (p. 4) to the West, and also a late-coming 
challenge to Christianity. The Orient and Islam are therefore regarded as a threatening other 
which poses a threat to the stability and identity of the West.  
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2.8 Nation state and identity 
The construction of the Orient and Islam in this way can be taken as indicative of how 
processes of identity construction are inherently strategic and linked to acts of power. If the 
Orient and Islam are seen as a threat, then Western states have justifiable reasons for 
colonising, increasing militarisation and invading these states. From a political perspective, 
the construction of identities can thus be reg rded  s ―  product of and justification for 
foreign policies‖ (H nsen, 2006, p. 26). Mouffe (1991) further explains that political life 
concerns collective, public  ction  nd therefore  ims to construct   ‗we‘ in   context of 
diversity  nd conflict. Constructing   ‗we‘ requires establishing a border, but a fully 
inclusive, unified political community can never be realised since there is always a 
‗constitutive outside‘, or enemy thre t, th t m kes its existence possible (Mouffe, 1991). 
 
Looked at another way, constructing a nation l ‗we‘ me ns n tion-states can be conceived of 
 s ―r ci l st tes‖ where the objective is to construct homogeneity (Goldberg, 2002, cited in 
Lentin, 2003, p. 306). ‗R ce‘  nd ‗st te‘  re thereby defined in terms of e ch other, me ning 
that groups/individuals that are identified as racially different from the dominant group are 
excluded (Lentin, 2003). This drive towards homogeneity also means that there are attempts 
to cont in the ‗other‘ within the n tion st te, through policies  nd pr ctices such  s 
immigration laws, multiculturalism and assimilation (Lentin, 2003). According to Lentin 
(2007), these policies and practices, used to regulate the other, mean that states move from 
being ‗r ci l‘ to ‗r cist‘. In   postmodern, incre singly glob lised world, constructing a 
politic l ‗we‘, however, becomes more complic ted. Movement  nd communic tion  cross 
borders means that the idea of using stable identity categories such as race, ethnicity and 
culture to reflect the nation state is no longer sustainable. 
 
2.9 Hybridity and Diaspora 
When looking at identity categories today, the social constructionist concepts of hybridity 
and diaspora are useful (Howard, 2000). These principles lead to a conceptualisation of 
identity that link to conditions of postmodernity (Howard, 2000). The concept of hybridity 
argues against a static, essentialised view of culture and ethnicity (Anthias, 2002). Hybridity 
is linked to the ide  of ―cultur l syncretism‖ (Anthi s, 2001, p. 621). It refers to the w y in 
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which individuals develop identities that combine characteristics from their native culture 
with features from the local culture to which they have immigrated, as well as with features 
from a global culture (Arnett, 2002). This leads to a fragmented, complex hybrid identity 
(Arnett, 2002). This choosing and mixing of cultural elements does not necessarily mean a 
shift in identity, or an end to identity politics (Anthias, 2002). It can however lead to the 
meaning of different cultural elements being transformed when they are combined together 
(Anthias, 2002). For example, individuals living in a host culture often come to adopt aspects 
from the immigr nts‘ culture, fusing them into their own identities (Arnett, 2002). These new 
cultural forms are often visible in music, dress, inter-racial friendship networks and social 
practices, but the original meaning has often transformed.  
 
Diaspora is another principle related to geography and identity (Howard, 2000). Howard 
(2000) explains that the principle of diaspora considers the political struggles to define 
identity in a historical context of displacement. Previously the term was used in reference to 
forced migration or displacement, for example Africans during the slave trade, or the Jewish 
dispersion (Akyeampong, 2000). Today the term encompasses alien residents, expellees, 
political refugees, expatriates, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities, and it refers to 
movement from an ancestral land to settlement in a new land (Akyeampong, 2000; Palmer, 
2000). Diasporic communities are imagined, symbolic communities that are characterised by 
an emotional attachment to their original homeland and are conscious of their oppression or 
alienation in their new country of residence (Palmer, 2000). Usually these communities also 
have a sense of ethnic or religious identity that surpasses geographic borders, sharing broad 
cultural similarities (Palmer, 2000). 
 
2.10 Translocational positionality  
For Anthias (2002), concepts like hybridity and diaspora do not fully capture aspects of the 
present world. She proposes that instead of looking at identity and belonging in terms of 
groups or divisions, we should rather look at social location. As the concept of diaspora 
indicates, if dislocated at the level of the nation, an individual will find that he/she still exists 
within the boundaries of gender, ethnicity or religion (Anthias, 2002). For example if a 
Muslim woman moves from Pakistan to France she will remain female, South Asian, and 
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Muslim. What changes are her location and her experience of each identity. She might 
experience more freedom as a female, but less acceptance as a Muslim, whereas in Pakistan 
the reverse would h ve been true. As such, the ide  of ‗loc tion‘ emph sises the import nce 
of context  nd ―the situ ted n ture of [identity] cl ims  nd  ttributions and their production in 
complex  nd shifting loc les‖ (Anthi s, 2009, p. 12). Soci l loc tions c n therefore be 
thought of as social spaces that are defined by both boundaries and hierarchies (Anthias, 
2009). We are then forced to think about boundaries and hierarchies in relation to each other, 
and also the contradictions we might encounter through our differential location within these 
boundaries and hierarchies (Anthias, 2009). 
 
Anthias (2009) uses the term ‗tr nsloc tion l position lity‘ to explain how different locations 
relate to identity categories such as gender, ethnicity and race, and how the interplay between 
loc tion  nd identity c n h ve contr dictory effects. ‗Position lity‘ is used in reference to 
social position (outcome) and social positioning (process) (Anthias, 2009). This means that 
positionality is at the intersection of structure (social position) and agency (social positioning) 
(Anthias, 2009). ‗Loc tion‘ refers to context  nd the ―situ ted n ture of cl ims  nd 
 ttributions‖ surrounding identity (Anthias, 2009, p. 12). And the term ‗tr nsloc tion l‘ is 
used in reference to the intersection of identity categories within a range of social boundaries 
and hierarchies. 
 
Translocational positionality is therefore a term that enables us to think of our identities as 
relational to our location (Anthias, 2009). We would therefore consider our identity in terms 
of context and the categorical organisation of boundaries and hierarchies (Anthias, 2009). 
Such an approach shows how the privileging of any identity category is a social process and 
not based on any essential, possessive characteristics (Anthias, 2009). To think of identity 
categories as based on essential characteristics can result in prejudice and social inequalities.  
 
2.11 Racial prejudice/Racism and Cultural essentialism 
Sampson (1999), dr wing from the work of Allport (1954), defines prejudice  s ― n 
unjustified, usually negative attitude directed towards others because of their social category 
or group membership‖ (p. 4). This prejudice is often based on difference (Sampson, 1999). 
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Racial prejudice occurs when prejudice is directed toward people because of their racial or 
ethnic categories (Verkuyten, 2003). These racial or ethnic categories are formed based on 
essential properties that members are deemed to have. These categories are taken as natural 
and fixed, and consequently members of those categories are judged to be a certain way 
(Verkuyten, 2003). Categorising people into groups based on the idea of difference does not 
necessarily create a hierarchy of groups (Anthias, 1990). Rather, it is the culturally 
constructed ideas and beliefs about these differences that lead to the hierarchy of groups 
(Smedley & Smedley, 2005, p. 20). We can therefore speak about racial prejudice when the 
concept of r ce is  ccomp nied by ―discourses  nd pr ctices of inferioris tion  nd 
subordin tion‖ of others (Anthias, 1990, p. 22). 
 
Mainstream social psychological research has traditionally assumed racial prejudice to be 
part of a natural human cognitive tendency to categorise people into groups (Ahmed, 
Nicolson & Spencer, 2000). Thus stereotyping w s seen  s   consequence of people‘s  ttempt 
to cope and deal effectively with incoming information (Ahmed et al., 2000). This approach 
can be understood as providing an excuse for racism, because by attributing it to cognitive 
processes, it is seen as inevitable and anyone can be racist (Ahmed et al., 2000). Ahmed et al. 
(2000) suggest that such an approach only reinforces and perpetuates unequal social relations. 
 
Categorising groups is now seen by discursive psychologists as a social practice; as 
something people do, rather than as an individual perceptual process (Verkuyten, 2003). This 
marks a shift in focus from cognition and perception to action and interaction (Verkuyten, 
2003). Using discursive psychology, ‗r ce‘ is t ken  s   rhetoric l construction (Billig, 1985) 
and racial prejudice is studied in terms of how people use various linguistic devices and 
specific constructions to essentialise and legitimate patterns of social power and racial 
dominance (Verkuyten, 2003). 
 
‗R ce‘  s   rhetoric l construction  llows for  n underst nding of how r cism h s t ken on   
different form, that of ―cultur l essenti lism‖ (Verkuyten, 2003, p. 376). Where previously 
racist discourses were based on biological traits, the focus today has shifted to cultural 
differences (Verkuyten, 2003). Culture is presumed to be distinct to different racial/ethnic 
groupings, and as such it is possible to construct essentialist beliefs about particular cultural 
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groupings (Verkuyten, 2003). In addition, it can be argued that the idea of genetic lineage, 
once encoded  s ‗r ce‘, h s now been recoded  s primordi l ethnicity  nd inv ri nt cultur l 
difference, and this gives culture an immutable, natural character enabling it to be used as a 
homologue for race (Malik, 1996, cited in Richardson, 2004). Cultural essentialism is thus 
taken as a ―new r cism‖  s cultur l groups  re believed to h ve   distinct underlying essence 
which is used to construct difference and legitimise patterns of social dominance (Verkuyten, 
2003, p. 379).  
 
This new r cism results in the limit tion of rights b sed on the ide  th t   cultur l group‘s 
way of life is reprehensible and does not fit within a particular society (Dunn, Klocker & 
Salabay, 2007). Old types of racism were premised on the idea of racial supremacy and 
separatism, while new racisms function to reinforce cultural privilege (Dunn et al., 2007). 
Although distinctions  re dr wn between ‗old‘  nd ‗new‘ r cisms, Dunn et  l. (2007) find 
that there are several similarities between the two. For one, new forms of racism also result in 
structures of inferiority and differentiation or exclusion. Another similarity is the dependence 
on generalisations and stereotypes. New racisms also find continuity in drawing on the 
physical features of targets, be they phenotypical, clothing, or place of residence. Dunn et al. 
(2007), citing Hopkins (2004), give the example of young Muslims in Scotland who 
experienced marginalisation either because of the way they dressed, or through having a 
beard, or through skin colour.  
 
2.11.1 Religion as a social signifier. In addition to differences constructed along 
cultural lines, there is now an obscuring between faith and race/ethnicity, so that religious 
belonging has also become a symbol of racial/ethnic difference (Abbas, 2007; Kundnani, 
2007). Faith, like race/ethnicity, is largely considered to be set at birth, and involves 
belonging to a community, often with distinctive dress codes and practices, which makes it 
observable from appearance (Kundnani, 2007).  Kundnani (2007) finds European anti-
Semitism illustrative of the racialization of religious groups. In twentieth-century Europe 
despite Jewish integration into society they were still regarded as a threat to a unified national 
identity because they affiliated with a trans-national religious identity (Kundnani, 2007). 
Their Jewish identity was taken as a marker of racial difference (Kundnani, 2007). Today a 
similar racialization of Muslims is taking place. Kundnani (2007) explains how an Islamic 
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religious identity is now divided from a modern British culture, and this dividing of 
communities into fixed identities is a hallmark of the process of racism. He gives the example 
of people living in Britain who are of Pakistani ethnicity. Where once they would have been 
 bused  s ‗P kis‘, they  re now  lso  bused  s ‗Muslims‘. Thus r ce/ethnicity is often 
conflated with religious identity. Fekete (2004) suggests that such prejudice directed towards 
religious groups tod y c n be seen  s ―xeno-r cism‖ (p. 4). It is ‗xeno-‘ in th t it is a form of 
xenophobia directed against foreigners irrespective of colour, and racism in substance in that 
it still contains the same features of demonisation and exclusion that the old types of racism 
did (Fekete, 2004).  
 
2.12 Modern racism 
The constructed nature of racism is also evident when considering how racism manifests 
itself today. In the past, blatant racism was based on the idea of racial superiority and 
opposition to racial equality (Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley, 1999). During systems of 
apartheid and other legal forms of segregation, power differences and inequalities were 
clearly defined and as such resistance and opposition was directed toward an easily identified 
system (van Dijk, 1992). In contemporary, pluralist societies there are laws and widespread 
norms against blatant racism, prejudice and forms of discrimination (van Dijk, 1992). Most 
Western countries therefore share the belief that racism is no longer a structural characteristic 
of the society and institutional or systemic racism is denied (van Dijk, 1992). When racial 
prejudice occurs, it is usually attributed and punished at the level of the individual, or at the 
very least met with disdain and public reproach (Richardson, 2004; van Dijk, 1992). Racism 
today is thus less blatant and more subtle than it used to be (Ahmed et al., 2000). It is also 
r rely ch r cterised  s ‗r cism‘, but is inste d conceptu lised  s xenophobi   nd often  s 
legitimate cultural self-defence (van Dijk, 1992).  
 
Van Dijk (1992) believes this denial of racism to be part of a strategy of positive self-
presentation. The in-group is constructed as tolerant and this can be seen as a way of subtly 
expressing negative other-presentation (van Dijk, 1992). If tolerance is promoted, it makes it 
more difficult for minority groups to credibly challenge inequalities (van Dijk, 1992). The 
denial of racism, however, only serves to reproduce racism. Van Dijk (1992) explains how in 
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order to resist racism, there would need to be recognition of the problem, public attention and 
media coverage. If politicians and the media refuse to acknowledge the issue, then there will 
be no public debate, no change in opinion, and no change to the system of social inequality 
(van Dijk, 1992). Denial of racism is thus seen as a management strategy (van Dijk, 1992). 
 
2.13 Racism as discourse 
The new forms of racism are subtle because of their discursive nature (van Dijk, 2000). 
Where old forms of racism were openly violent and involved forceful segregation, racism 
today is expressed and enacted through text and talk (van Dijk, 2000). Appearing as mere 
talk, racism seems less threatening, but may really be just as powerful at marginalising 
minorities (van Dijk, 2000). Hall (1990) similarly asserts that racism appearing in this way is 
much more insidious, especially since it may even be invisible to those who are 
communicating it. As mentioned, when racist ideologies are normalised and taken as 
nonracist, their contestation by minority groups is more difficult. But while the form of 
racism may be discursive, it has real effects or consequences for those social groups 
subjected to racial prejudice (van Dijk, 2000).  
 
Discourses govern the way in which a topic can be meaningfully spoken about (Hall, 1997). 
They also influence the way in which ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the 
bearing of others (Hall, 1997). Foucault argued that a discourse never consists of a single 
statement, text, action or source (Hall, 1997). Rather, the same discourse will appear across a 
multitude of texts, and at a number of institutional sites within a society (Hall, 1997). Said‘s 
theory of Orientalism for example looks at how the West constructed the Orient using a 
complex set of representations, where those writing about it used a particular narrative voice, 
structure, and a selection of themes, images and motifs – all of which added up to provide a 
deliber te w y of ― ddressing the re der, cont ining the Orient,  nd fin lly, representing or 
spe king in its beh lf‖ (S id, 1978, p. 20).  
 
Discourses such as Orientalism can become established to the extent that texts no longer need 
to construct detailed representations of identity as when it first emerged (Hansen, 2006). For 
Said (1988) this discourse became established to the extent that terrorism is now permanently 
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and subliminally associated with the Orient and Islam. For many, Islam brings up images of 
―be rded clerics  nd m d suicid l bombers, of unrelenting Ir ni n mull hs, f n tic l 
fundamentalists, and kidnappers, remorseless turbaned crowds who chant hatred of the US, 
‗the gre t devil‘,  nd  ll its w ys‖ (S id, 1988, p. 2). Even in comic strips, films, c rtoons  nd 
other media the iconography of Islam is the same: Muslims are portrayed as oil suppliers, 
terrorists and often violent. They are also almost never portrayed in a sympathetic light (Said, 
1981). Prejudice toward Muslims is thus reflected in the discursive way that they are 
essentialised or reduced to oil suppliers or potential terrorists and there is no attempt to 
capture the detail or density of the Muslim world (Said, 1981). 
 
2.14 The media’s legitimation of Western hegemony/facilitation of Orientalism  
S id‘s theory of Orientalism is therefore important to our understanding of the discursive 
conditions of knowledge (Young, 1990). For Richardson (2004), knowledge of Orientalist 
scholarship, past and present, is also critical to an understanding of the context and 
significance of present-day representations of Muslims across a wide range of social/political 
discourses, including mass communicated media and academic research. This is because 
Orientalism is seen as ―retentive  nd extensive, old  nd f mili r‖  nd e sily revised to fit 
present circumstances (Sardar, 1999, p. 114). There is coherence because the stereotypes used 
are interrelated, and since the Orient is taken as monolithic, the lack of specificity allows 
dominant ideas about one Orient to be applied to another (Sardar, 1999). With 
postmodernism the Orient has also acquired a global presence; it is located everywhere and 
can be subjected to Orientalisation (Sardar, 1999). This accounts for how Muslim groups 
found within the West itself are Orientalised. Oriental stereotypes are also easily reinforced 
through postmodern means of communication. Television, films and other media resources 
distribute information through increasingly standardised moulds (Said, 1978). 
 
The media is considered a critical space when it comes to the representation of identity 
(Pietikäinen, 2003). This is because identity formation partly consists of the ways in which 
we are represented (Hall, 1997). Additionally, what is known about ‗others‘ does not often 
originate from personal experience or direct contact (van Dijk, 1992). It is news 
representations which contribute to how people regard their own identities and those of 
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others,  nd how people view the rel tionship between ‗us‘  nd ‗them‘ (Pietikäinen, 2003). As 
such, van Dijk (2000) explains that media discourses are often ―the m in source of people‘s 
knowledge,  ttitudes  nd ideologies‖ (p. 36). The media provide people with a representation 
of events that occur beyond their immediate social experience (Abbas, 2001). The influence 
of media institutions in modern information societies is thus paramount (van Dijk, 2000). 
News media is considered an elite institution and occupies a powerful position in society in 
the way it is able to include or exclude social content (Abbas, 2001). It is able to shape 
information and can both limit and enable the representations of identities (Pietikäinen, 
2003). 
 
2.15 Journalistic practices 
Pietikäinen (2003) consequently emphasises that news is made and not merely reported. It 
has a constructed quality to it. News is seen as the end-product of a complex process 
involving a systematic sorting and selecting of events (Abbas, 2001). It is through these 
practices of mainstream journalism that the news media has been shown to be blameworthy 
of creating and maintaining racist sentiment and prejudice toward minority groups 
(Richardson, 2004).  When faced with a large flow of information about events occurring in 
the world, in order to compile comprehensible reports, journalists need to have clear-cut 
routines so that they can meet deadlines and work with available resources (Pietikäinen, 
2003). Added to that, journalists need to maximise savings in terms of costs, time, and effort, 
and this further requires a streamlining of journalistic practice (Pietikäinen, 2003). What this 
results in then is a heavy dependence on ready-made material. Journalists will often use 
stories that have already been covered in other news outlets, press releases and agency reports 
(Pietikäinen, 2003). This reliance on ready-made material means that those groups or 
individuals who are able to provide information requiring little groundwork or in-house 
editing will have a greater chance of making it into the news than others (Allan, 1999, cited 
in Pietikäinen, 2003). These individuals or groups also usually have good public relation 
services managing information for them. Ethnic minorities are seldom able to produce their 
own public relation services and this means that for journalists, obtaining minority voices in 
the news about ethnic issues would require more time and effort (Pietikäinen, 2003). This 
characteristic of news making brings up the issue of who has access to the news and how this 
shapes news discourses. 
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2.15.1 Minority access to media. Van Dijk (1996) explains that dominant groups 
are able to maintain hegemony because they have preferential access to the media. This 
access depends on economic and political structures however (Pietikäinen, 2003), and it is 
found that the dissemin tion of inform tion by the medi  is often done in ―joint production‖ 
with other elites such as politicians, professionals and academics.  What this results in then is 
 n ―elite ideologic l domin nce‖ (Rich rdson, 2007, p. 36). This ideologic l domin nce is 
further sustained by media capital and control over the production and distribution of ideas 
resting in the hands of a few (Abbas, 2001). In contrast, minority groups are disadvantaged 
by their limited social and economic power, and lack customary types of organised media 
access such as press conferences, press releases and public relation departments (Fedler, 
1973, cited in van Dijk, 1996) which would otherwise allow them to bring attention to issues 
that are important to them (Pietikäinen, 2003). This unequal access to the media results in 
differential access to the structure and/or content of news reports (van Dijk, 1996).  
 
2.15.2 Representing difference. When looking at what social content is included in 
the news, research has shown that events related to the economy, government politics, foreign 
affairs, and crime are deemed newsworthy (Pietikäinen, 2003). When reporting on ethnic 
minorities then, this often translates into topics such as the cost of immigration policies, 
legislation, unemployment, and refugee aid (Pietikäinen, 2003). Press accounts will often 
highlight the problems that minorities have such as unemployment, crime, violence and 
discrimination (van Dijk, 1992). Positive topics routinely used in the coverage of white 
people are not extended towards minorities (van Dijk, 1992). This trend of positive in-group 
and negative out-group depictions is captured by v n Dijk‘s (1998) theoretical concept called 
the ―ideologic l squ re‖ (p. 148). The ideological square refers to binary oppositions that are 
constructed in discourse through the use of lexical choice and other linguistic features (van 
Dijk, 1998). 
 
Hall‘s (1997) discussion of representing difference expands on this. He explains that we use 
binary oppositions to capture difference, and difference is important because it is how we 
make meaning. For example we know what black means because we can contrast it to white. 
It is the ‗difference‘ between ‗bl ck‘  nd ‗white‘ th t signifies, or c rries me ning. Through 
binary oppositions we are thus able to illustrate the diversity of the world. Hall (1997) adds 
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though that binary oppositions present a crude, over-simplified and reductionist way of 
expressing difference. Hall (1997), citing Derrida (1974), further argues that binary 
oppositions are seldom neutral. There is usually a relation of power between the poles of a 
binary opposition with one end being more dominant (Hall, 1997). In discussing people who 
 re different or ‗other‘ we often use binary forms of representation. This is evident in the use 
of ―sh rply opposed, pol rised, bin ry extremes [such  s] good/b d civilised/primitive, 
ugly/excessively attractive, repelling-because-different/compelling because strange and 
exotic‖ (H ll, 1997, p. 229). 
 
2.16 Drawing on available discourses 
This use of language to construct difference means that dominant ideologies are easily 
perpetuated through discursive practices. It is not implied, however, that newspapers 
deliberately produce prejudiced discourses. Rather they draw on available cultural discourses, 
and reproduce them (Willig, 2008). Indeed Foucaudian discourse analysts look at the 
availability of discursive resources within a culture, what Willig (2008) likens to a 
―discursive economy‖ (p. 112). Therefore newspaper journalists will, to some extent, draw on 
existing available discourses for their definition of minority group situations (Abbas, 2001). 
Moreover negative representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain today are not a recent 
occurrence, but  re inste d   ―v ri nt of existing historic l discourses‖ (Abbas, 2001, p. 249) 
as determined by the discussion of Orientalism. Discourses related to Islam and Muslims 
have thus formed over centuries of contact and are still drawn on today (Abbas, 2001).  
 
2.17 Islamophobia 
The xenophobia directed towards Muslims and/or Islam today is referred to ‗Isl mophobi ‘ 
(Abbas, 2001). Islamophobia refers to a dread or hatred of Islam, and thus a fear or dislike of 
Muslims (Sheridan, 2006). While the term has been coined recently, the idea has had a long 
established history with representations of Muslims being constructed over centuries of 
contact (Abbas, 2001). As evidenced by Orientalism, negative representations of Muslims as 
barbaric, violent, intolerant, ignorant and backward are not new, and Islamophobia in present 
times depends on this history to fill the substance of its stereotypes today (Abbas, 2001). At 
the same time though, the fe r of Muslims tod y h s ―its own contempor ry idiosyncr tic 
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fe tures‖ rel ted to recent historic processes (Abb s, 2001, p. 249). Recent historic events 
such as the Gulf War, the Satanic Verses controversy, and terrorist attacks in New York, 
London and Madrid have attracted press and media attention toward Muslims and Islam 
(Abbas, 2001). These events, while condemned by large sections of Islamic communities 
worldwide, have impacted on perceptions of Muslims in the West (Matthes, 2011). Matthes 
(2011) suggests that these incidents have reactivated a particular Western image of Islam as a 
d ngerous ‗other‘  nd   thre t to Western civilis tion. The narratives surrounding these 
events have resulted in Islamophobia.  
 
According to the Runnymede Trust seven main features of Islamophobia can be identified 
(Abbas, 2001): Muslim cultures are taken as monolithic; Islamic cultures are significantly 
different to other cultures; Islam is relentlessly threatening; Islamic faith is used for political 
or military advantage; Muslim criticism of Western cultures and societies is rejected; Fear of 
Islam is associated with racist hostility toward immigration; Islamophobia is taken as natural 
and unproblematic.  
 
While not discounting the unfair or incorrect nature of Islamophobia, Halliday (1999) finds 
the term ‗Isl mophobi ‘ inaccurate. Halliday (1999) argues that in the past, during the 
Crusades for example, Islam as a religion was taken as the enemy. Today though, the attack 
is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, or against states such as Iraq. 
Moreover, ―wh t is presented  s the Isl mic critique of the West h s little or nothing to do 
with religion‖ (H llid y, 1999, p. 899). The critique is often   v lid, secul r, n tion list 
protest. Halliday (1999) provides examples such as support for Palestine, condemnation of 
cultural imperialism, and protests at the double standards on human rights – none of which 
are necessarily religious in content or exclusive to the Muslim world. It has less to do with 
belief and more to do with political power. Halliday (1999) suggests that it would be more 
 ccur te to spe k of ‗ nti-Muslimism‘ r ther th n ‗Isl mophobi ‘. 
 
Richardson (2004) disagrees with Halliday, and argues that many Muslims, particularly 
women, face more discrimination when they are noticeably a Muslim than when they are not. 
He argues that following September 11, 2001, people were increasingly attacked due to their 
perceived religiosity. This was evident from reports by Sikhs who reported attacks because 
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they were mistakenly identified as Muslim. Furthermore, it is not just Muslims who are 
attacked for their faith, but the religion itself is condemned. Saleh (2009) explains that in the 
media Islam is associated with brutality and backwardness, and is presented as an 
antagonistic religion at odds with the West. Isl m‘s theocr tic system is presented  s 
incomp tible with the West‘s secul r democr tic politic l system (S leh, 2009). As such, 
Islam is perceived as threatening to free thought, civil liberties, world peace and stability 
(Saleh, 2009). This hostile, threatening image of Islam supports the accuracy of the term 
‗Isl mophobi ‘. I will therefore be using ‗Isl mophobi ‘ in reference to the prejudice/xeno-
racism directed at Muslims today. 
 
2.18 Islamophobia in the media 
Existing research shows that Islamophobia is implicit in media discourses. Prevalent themes 
in the media are the association of Muslims with terrorism, and religious and cultural 
difference (Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009).  
 
2.18.1 Terrorism/extremism.  Terrorism c n be defined  s ―  premedit ted use or 
threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social 
objective through intimid tion of   l rge  udience beyond th t of the immedi te victims‖ 
(Enders & Sander, 2005, p. 260). Enders and Sander (2005) explain that terrorism can be 
domestic or transnational in nature. Domestic terrorism is confined within a host country, 
where the perpetrators and targets are homegrown, and terrorist incidents have consequences 
for the host country alone. Transnational terrorism is when a terrorist incident in one country 
involves victims, targets, institutions or citizens of another country. The 9/11 hijackings in 
Americ  were   tr nsn tion l terrorist event bec use ―the incidents were planned abroad, the 
terrorists came from outside the United States, support came from abroad, victims were from 
more than eighty countries, and the incidents had economic and security implications 
worldwide‖ (Enders & Sander, 2005, p. 261).  
 
When it came to documenting the terror attacks of 9/11, media globalisation played a pivotal 
role. The attacks were claimed to be the most documented in history, resulting in reams of 
discourses, reflections and writings (Kellner, 2004). Of particular interest to this study is the 
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‗w r on terror‘ discourse  dvocated by the Bush doctrine, and perpetrated by the media 
shortly  fter. Decl ring, ―You‘re either with us, or  g inst us‖, Bush‘s w r on terror resulted 
in a Manichean binary between good and evil, us and them, civilisation and barbarism 
(Kellner, 2004). This bin ry discourse of good versus evil gener ted  n  ssumption th t ‗we‘ 
 re good  nd the ‗Other‘ is evil (Kellner, 2004). The problem with this discourse of good 
versus evil is that it is totalising, absolutist  nd reductive (Kellner, 2004). ‗We‘  re  ssociated 
with good,  nd ‗they‘  re  ssoci ted with  ll th t is neg tive (Kellner, 2004). This 
constitution of the ‗other‘ using tot lising  ssoci tions with neg tive tr its legitim tes  ny 
action that is taken under the guise of attacking evil (Kellner, 2004). Notably, terrorists 
themselves use a similar simplistic binary discourse to project evil onto the other and 
legitimate their acts of terrorism. The events of 9/11 appeared to espouse this binary thinking 
le ding to the complete dehum nising of the ‗enemy‘, evident in the killing of innocent 
citizens too (Kellner, 2004). 
 
2.18.2 Racialising the terrorist ‘Other.’ When looking more closely at the 
construction of the terrorist/evil ‗Other‘, however, the construction is  morphous, without   
specific country or military target (Kellner, 2004). The terrorist is instead seen as part of an 
invisible network supported by multiple groups and states (Kellner, 2004). Such a 
conceptualisation allows the supporter of good to attack any country or group that supports 
terrorism, thus providing a foundation for a doctrine of pre-emptive strikes (Kellner, 2004). 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are an example of this doctrine. Although Kellner (2004) 
states that the terrorist other was amorphous, without belonging to a specific country, the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the contemporary terrorist enemy is explicitly 
associated with a racialised other (Featherstone, Holohan & Poole, 2010). The racialised 
other being Muslims and/or Islam. Moreover, Islam is seen as belonging to the East, and as 
such ‗Isl mic terrorism‘ is often discussed within specific E stern cultur l contexts. While it 
has been made clear th t the ‗w r on terror‘ is not   w r on Isl m, Poole (2002) expl ins th t 
the meanings and values attached to Islam in the past, i.e. Orientalism, are still in operation. 
Moreover, this is compounded by the terrorists themselves cl iming ‗Isl mic‘ motivations 
behind their actions (Poole, 2002). As such, even where distinctions are made between 
‗terrorists‘  nd ‗Muslims‘, reference is still m de to ‗Isl mic  nd Muslim terrorists‘ or 
‗Isl mists‘ where the terrorists  re seen  s   product of   f n tic l strain of Islam (Poole, 
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2002). The result of this is that the associated negative behaviour of terrorism is seen as 
originating out of something inherent in the religion of Islam (Poole, 2002). 
 
Citing Li (2007), Eid and Karim (2011) suggest that following the fear produced by the 9/11 
attacks, the use of race, and the attribution of negative connotations to race by politicians and 
the media, becomes socially acceptable as long as this takes place within a context of 
preventing public danger. When looking at media coverage of Muslims and Islam, there is 
common use of stereotypes and discriminatory rhetoric (Eid & Karim, 2011). The association 
between Isl m  nd terrorism h s become  ccepted to the extent th t the terms ‗Muslim‘  nd 
‗terrorist‘  re  lmost t ken  s synonymous (Coleman & Ross, 2010; Eid & Karim, 2011). 
Themes of violence and militancy are often associated with Muslims, and the teachings of 
Islam are often linked to terrorism, destruction and conflict (Eid & Karim, 2011). 
 
2.18.2.1 The terrorist ‘other’ in Britain.  In Britain, this construction of terrorists 
as a foreign racial/ethnic other has become difficult to reconcile (Featherstone et al., 2010). 
As discussed earlier, the construction of identity is historically and socially situated, and an 
on-going, fluid process. The construction of Muslim terrorists in the British media reflects 
this. Following the 7/7 terror attacks, it became evident that terrorists were not always a 
foreign other, in this case they were British born (Featherstone et al., 2010). Within the 
British national context, in order to maintain good social relations and an idea of inclusion, 
constructions of Muslims have been more diverse (Poole, 2002). Featherstone et al. (2010) 
conducted a qualitative analysis of 61 newspaper articles from The Guardian, The Times, The 
Daily Mail, The Sun and their sister Sunday newspapers to look at the reporting of Islam after 
7/7. Their study indicated that after 7/7, the construction of Muslims was a complex process, 
and necessitated the use of altern tive str tegies for ‗othering‘ (Fe therstone et  l., 2010). 
 
Featherstone et al. (2010) found that discourses on terror often include p rticul r ―storybook‖ 
(p. 176) characterisations. There are usually the respectable Muslim, friends and family of the 
 ccused, the misguided loner (the  ccused)  nd the evil mentor. The construction of the ‗evil 
mentor‘ follows the Orient list discourse of the foreign extremist other. This characterisation 
is straightforward and one-dimensional, where practitioners of the Islamic faith are 
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implic ted  s centr l sources of extremist ideologies. When it comes to the ‗centr l  ctor‘ 
(the  ccused) though, the complex construction of the ‗other‘ becomes evident. The centr l 
actor is constructed using inclusive characteristics such as British citizenship and/or middle 
class attributes. This character is also usually developed along a narrative of a previously 
ordinary, non-practising individual who lost direction and was misguided by a radical 
ideology. The inclusion of positive middle class attributes such as education and a respectable 
family background, and the framing of the central actor as a misguided loner function to 
separate the individual from the collective, wider Muslim community which is depicted as 
expressing despair at the path chosen by the individual.  
 
From these constructions, Featherstone et al. (2010) identified a discursive struggle in the 
negotiation between the British-born Islamist and the foreign other. The central actor is often 
discussed in terms of  n individu l p thology. He/she is commonly described  s ‗fix ted‘, 
‗obsessed‘,  nd   ‗loner‘, with identity issues, l ck of direction  nd person l f ilings. This 
individual is always linked back to a wider terror network though, which legitimises the 
political discourse on the war on terror. As a result, the mosques and their foreign clerics are 
constructed as importing a foreign extremist ideology. And this ideology is represented as an 
irrational religious one, rather than political. Presenting it as a religious ideology suggests 
that any Muslim could be radicalised. Featherstone et al. (2010) thus identify two main ideas 
within the discourse on terror: individual pathology and outside influence. The effect of these 
two ideas is that accusations of racism can be dismissed and the Muslim community is 
pl c ted through ―  discourse of individu lism, irr tion lity  nd psychosis‖ (p. 177).  
 
2.18.3 Religious/cultural difference. Oftentimes, the images constructed by the 
media form p rt of   bro der tr dition of depicting Isl m  s something different or ‗other‘ 
(Christensen, 2006). Here Muslims‘ religious  nd cultur l pr ctices  re dr wn on, usu lly to 
show how Islamic values are incompatible with Western values. These constructions are 
often evident in discussions around integration and/or assimilation. Integration and 
assimilation debates can be reduced to a simple dichotomy between the superiority of British 
values and the alien threat of Muslim values (Kundnani, 2007). Acceptance into British 
society becomes conditional upon the acceptance of British values (Kundnani, 2007). This 
sort of thinking has resulted in a hierarchical ranking of communities according to their 
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distance from British norms of civility (Kundnani, 2007). For example, British values with 
reg rd to women  re considered ‗modern‘ where s Muslim v lues  re b ckw rd – Islam is 
often singled out for its negative treatment of women (Kundnani, 2007). The veil is seen as a 
symbol of women‘s oppression,  nd is   reflection of this dichotomy – British society is 
naturally liberal and Muslims naturally sexist. Those arguing for integration assume that there 
is a simple link between Islam and the oppression of women, overlooking the complexities of 
culture, underdevelopment and migration (Kundnani, 2007).  
 
This overlooking of the complexities of culture and context, leads Saleh (2009) to note that 
the traditional polarisation of Islam and the West is odd. He observes that it is difficult to 
identify what exactly is being comp red,  nd questions whether ―it is possible to handle 
 dherents to Isl m  nd residents of the ‗West‘, with  ll their v rying cultur l, politic l, 
sectarian, and ideological differences, as two monoliths?‖ (p. 206). 
 
A consequence of the medi ‘s over-simplified and generalised treatment of Islam and 
Muslims (Abbas, 2001), has been the racialization of Muslim-ness (Ahmad & Evergeti, 
2010). Muslim communities which are marked by differences in regional background, 
ethnicity and culture are often presented as a homogenous mass, and seen as similar to an 
ethnic or racial group (Ahmad & Evergeti, 2010). They are also assumed to possess inherent 
qualities which allows for them to be positioned as oppositional and threatening to the West 
(Ahmad & Evergeti, 2010). This racialization can be seen as a response to the supposed 
threat that cultural diversity poses to national cohesion and security (Kundnani, 2007). In 
terms of identity, constructing   ‗we‘ in   context of cultural diversity requires the 
demarcation of a constitutive outside (Mouffe, 1991). As such, attention is drawn to 
‗differences‘ between British-ness and Muslim-ness. Kundnani (2007) adds that it has 
become necessary to promote a national story of British-ness to unify the nation around a set 
of core values. Minorities are thus expected to assimilate, and this integrationist discourse 
dr ws on   ―wider  nti-Muslim politic l culture th t is  ssoci ted with the ‗w r on terror‘‖ 
(Kundnani, 2007, p. 24). In this way the focus is shifted away from institutional racism, and 
seen as an attempt to preserve British identity. 
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Richardson (2001) analysed the representation of Muslims and Islam in British broadsheet 
newspapers over a four month period (October 1997 – January 1998). From the 2540 articles 
collected, Rich rdson (2001) looked  t   s mple of 276 ‗domestic‘  rticles which en bled   
focused analysis of British Islam and/or British Muslims. He used quantitative methods to 
empirically analyse the form and frequency of the marginalisation of British Muslim 
communities in broadsheet newspapers. He also used qualitative methods to more specifically 
analyse journalistic discourses that lead from marginalisation to more explicit exclusion 
strategies. Richardson (2001) identified a rejectionist discourse showing that British Muslims 
are mostly excluded from British broadsheet coverage, but where they are mentioned they are 
largely included in negative contexts. Moreover, he found that the opinions of British 
Muslims are either excluded, or quoted so that they contrast with the position on British 
opinion. Thus, Richardson (2001) found that coverage of British Muslims is presented from a 
perspective whereby ‗white‘ superiority is presupposed, excluding the voice of ‗others‘. 
 
Richardson (2001) however, finds it inadequate to label such representations as racist, 
essentialising, simplifying or false because it overlooks the practical function of the 
rejectionist discourse he identified. He argues that the rejectionist discourse should rather be 
viewed as a means of spatial management. This is because the increasingly visible presence 
of British Muslim communities poses   disruption to the ―im gined privileged rel tions 
between ‗r ce‘, ‗ethnicity‘  nd ‗culture‘ [of the ‗white‘ m jority]  nd the n tion l sp ce 
conceived  s its own‖ (H ge, 1998, cited in Rich rdson, 2001, p. 239). 
 
This study agrees with Richardson (2001) in suggesting that the representation of Muslims is 
a management str tegy to exclude ‗others‘. Unlike Rich rdson (2001) though, medi  
representations are taken as racist, oversimplified and essentialising. Moreover, this study‘s 
concern with a postmodern, increasingly borderless world means the distinction between 
domestic and international articles is not made. It is assumed that constructions of 
‗intern tion l‘ Muslims, often  s   ‗constitutive outside‘ or ‗service ble other‘ colour the 
perceptions that people have of Muslims living in Britain, particularly because Muslims are 
seen as immigrants coming from outside. To understand better how media representations are 
racist, oversimplified and essentialist, it is useful to look more closely at the racialisation of 
Muslims. 
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2.19 Visibility/racialisation of Muslim communities in Britain 
2.19.1 Spatial segregation. Understanding the process by which the racialization of 
Muslims takes place is useful, particularly because it indicates how religion has come to 
stand in for race (Williamson & Khiabany, 2010). When certain areas/spaces are associated 
with particular ethnic groups, those spaces are said to be racialised. In countries like Britain, 
ethnic spaces are often discernible by a marked absence of white people in those areas. This 
leads to a differentiation between ethnic spaces and white spaces. This differentiation is often 
negative in that ethnic spaces are depicted as synonymous with high levels of social 
deprivation, poverty, drugs and crime (Phillips, 2006). In Britain, media coverage of the 
urban disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001 was flooded with discourses of 
racialised segregation, rekindling an interest in racialised divisions (Phillips, 2006). This 
interest was directed toward British Muslims, especially those of South Asian origin, who 
were constructed as self-segregating. In response to these media/public discourses, Phillips 
(2006) looked closely at the racialised lives of South Asian Muslims in Britain. This was 
done using spatial analyses, household interview data from a stratified sample of 117 Muslim 
households in Bradford, qualitative in-depth interviews, and 13 focus groups. 
 
Phillips (2006) identified an isolationist discourse where minority ethnic segregation is 
depicted as problematic. British Muslims are depicted as foreign, inward-looking, ―self-
segreg ting‖ minorities (Phillips, 2006, p. 37). Reasons for minority ethnic segregation are 
complex  nd rooted in soci l, economic, politic l  nd cultur l f ctors. The term ‗self-
segreg tion‘ however, in   context of r ci lised politic l  nd medi  discourses, suggests th t 
ethnic minorities choose to withdraw from active participation in British society, and this 
sustains cultural differences (Phillips, 2006). This places the responsibility for community 
tensions on minorities.  
 
Phillips (2006) also found that in British cities like Bradford, Muslim spaces are signified by 
mosques  nd Isl mic institutions which some t ke  s ―symbols of insul rity  nd possible sites 
of insurrection, prompting questions about minority ethnic citizenship, national identity and 
belonging‖ (Phillips, 2006, p. 27). Phillips (2006) found that even though British Muslims 
value residential clustering for reasons such as culture, tradition, familiarity, identity and 
security, they did not indicate a desire for separation. Rather, their separation mostly reflects 
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bounded choices where they are constrained by structural disadvantages, inequalities in the 
housing market, racial prejudice and harassment. Phillips (2006) suggests that these bounded 
choices, and the racialization of space in Bradford, reflect white cultural hegemony. She 
points out that the parallel problematic status of white segregation passes without comment. 
In multir ci l Br dford, prim rily white suburbs  re t ken  s norm l  nd unproblem tic. ―The 
dominance, power, and authority of whiteness as a discourse rely on its taken-for-granted 
n ture  nd invisibility‖ (Phillips, 2006, p. 29). This reflects   cultur lly hegemonic st tus 
where white spaces become normal, centralised spaces against which other spaces are 
measured as deviant or marginal (Phillips, 2006).  
 
2.19.2 Physical signifiers of difference.  Another way in which Muslims are 
racialised is by drawing on physical characteristics to indicate difference (Dunn et al., 2007). 
Instead of focusing on physical characteristics like skin colour though, contemporary 
constructions of ‗r ce‘  lso dr w on physic l signifiers such  s clothing. When looking  t 
Muslims, the veil is one item of clothing that has become an important symbol of otherness 
(Williamson & Khiabany, 2010). Far from being depicted solely as part of a religious and 
cultural dress code for women though, the veil has had connotations imposed on it by the 
media and dominant Western culture (El Hamel, 2002). For the West, the veil often 
symbolises inferiority, fundamentalism, oppression, passivity, and backwardness (El Hamel, 
2002).  It is also constructed as a threat to Western values, or a symbol of defiance whereby 
Muslim women refuse to adopt Western culture (Khiabany & Williamson, 2008). To explain 
how the veil has been inscribed with many different me nings, Fouc ult‘s concepts of 
archaeology and genealogy are useful. 
 
2.19.2.1 Archaeology and genealogy of the veil. Foucault uses the concept of 
 rch eology to describe discourses  s ―pr ctices specified in the element of the  rchive‖ 
where the  rchive is ―the gener l system of the form tion  nd tr nsform tion of st tements‖ 
(Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 24). Archaeology thus indicates an approach whereby 
discourses  re loc ted historic lly,  nd  n lysed in terms of ―differences, tr nsform tions, 
continuities  nd mut tions‖ th t occur over time (Kend ll & Wickh m, 1999, p. 24). This 
approach is particularly useful when considering the construction of the veil in relation to 
Muslims and/or Islam. In the eighteenth century, following colonial exploration, the Orient 
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was represented by European writers and artists through an essentialising discourse of 
mystery, inferiority, danger and sexuality (Ardizzoni, 2004). Consistent with these 
representations, Oriental women were constructed as subjugated, mysterious and exotic, and 
their separation through the veil and harems resulted in an eroticization of Eastern women 
(Ardizzoni, 2004). As the veil was placed at the centre of this construction, the veil itself 
became a symbol of desire.  
 
The Algerian war from 1945-1962, however, signalled a change in the symbolism of the veil 
(Ardizzoni, 2004). Algerian women were seen as the gatekeepers of indigenous tradition and 
culture and were identified as an influential force behind the cultural resistance to colonial 
hegemony (Ardizzoni, 2004). Additionally, Algerian women played a role in the war, 
concealing weaponry in the folds of the haik (a type of veil). This led to a transformation in 
meanings attached to the veil. Previous stereotypes of women as subjugated and erotic were 
no longer sustainable, and the veil became a politicised symbol (Ardizzoni, 2004). 
 
Fouc ult‘s concept of  rch eology provides   sn pshot of the discursive nexus, but his 
concept of genealogy looks at the on-going, processual nature of discourses (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999). Genealogy is thus useful when looking at how the veil is constructed today. 
Khiabany and Williamson (2008) note how discourses on the veil have transformed from 
eroticising or constructing it as evidence of women‘s victimhood  nd Isl m‘s b ckw rd 
p tri rchy, to constructing it  s   symbol of refus l to  ccept ‗our‘ culture,   sign of defi nce, 
and an image of threat (Khiabany & Williamson, 2008). This transformation has occurred 
following a new convention of perceiving cultural diversity as a threat to national cohesion 
and British values (Khiabany & Williamson, 2008). The context for this conversion is the 
incre sed focus on terrorism  nd ‗w r on terror‘ discourse (Khi b ny & Willi mson, 2008). 
This indicates the situated nature of discursive constructions. At the same time though, 
dr wing on Fouc ult‘s concept of gene logy, even though constructions h ve tr nsformed it 
is still possible to discern continuities. 
 
Khiabany and Williamson (2008) illustrate how The Sun employs four themes when reporting 
on the veil. Firstly, the veil is constructed as a refusal to embrace the British way of life. 
Secondly, British people are constructed as having been so tolerant of multiculturalism that 
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they now face a threat from the veil.  A third construction is where Britain is seen as under 
thre t of h ving   ‗culture‘ imposed on them by   minority,  nd fourthly, the use of the veil is 
linked to the threat of terrorism (Khiabany & Williamson, 2008).  
 
To expand on these four constructions, Khiabany and Williamson (2008) suggest that where 
the veil is constructed as a sign of resistance to western values, it becomes linked to a terrorist 
thre t. Dr wing on ‗v lues‘  nd ‗terrorism‘ indic tes the contempor ry n ture of this 
construction, but at the same time Khiabany and Williamson (2008) point out that this image 
h s   lot in common with ―the French colonial image of the veiled Muslim woman as a 
dangerous element in the Algerian resistance to French rule‖ (p. 83). Moreover, these 
constructions on the veil have wider implications on how Muslims are perceived as an 
‗other‘. By depicting Western v lues  s espousing liberty, toler nce  nd rights, Khi b ny  nd 
Williamson (2008)  rgue th t this cre tes   simplistic ―cl sh-of-civilisations n rr tive‖ (p. 
85). This depiction reflects the binary approach used with Orientalism, where the West is 
positioned as superior, but the Muslim/Islamic world poses a formidable threat to Western 
security and identity.  
 
Khiabany and Willi mson‘s (2008) use of The Sun can be criticised because it is a tabloid 
newspaper. Tabloids like The Sun have are known for their hostile reception of multicultural 
and race related issues (Neal, 2003).  Khiabany and Williamson (2008) do acknowledge that 
the Sun is likely to use inflammatory language and factual inaccuracies to construct Muslims 
as a threat to British values. In this study I am interested to see if broadsheet newspapers 
construct the veil and Muslims in a similar way, but under the assumption that the language 
used will be more moderate and less explicit (van Dijk, 2000). Additionally, as the above 
discussion on the ‗enemy within‘ indic tes, it is  ssumed th t constructions of the veil in 
Britain might be more complex. This complexity is evident in the way the construction of the 
veil  s   symbol of Muslim women‘s refus l to  ccept Western culture and embrace 
modernity marks a shift in emphasis from diversity and multiculturalism to integration and 
assimilation (Khiabany & Williamson, 2008). 
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2.20 Integration and assimilation  
Discussions  round integr tion  nd  ssimil tion rel te to Kundn ni‘s (2007)  rgument th t it 
has become necessary to promote a national story of unified British-ness, where minorities 
are expected to assimilate. This focus on integration is rooted in the war on terror. Speaking 
in 2006, former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced that British-ness could no 
longer be taken for granted as an authentic feeling of belonging (Kundnani, 2007). Instead, he 
suggested it was necessary for the state to intervene and positively produce a new sense of 
nationhood as this would help Britain to champion democracy globally, while domestically it 
would address issues of asylum, immigration and community relations (Kundnani, 2007). 
Brown then added that the 7/7 terror attacks indicated the need for more integration in British 
society, and this view was also held by the Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, who 
suggested that the attacks on London were a result of the attackers not being integrated 
enough (Kundnani, 2007). Brown asserted that Britain needed to rediscover the shared values 
of liberty, responsibility and fairness that bind it together (Kundnani 2007). This emphasis on 
‗v lues‘ indic tes th t n tion l identity is no longer a reflection of a singular unchanging 
ethnicity (Kundn ni, 2007). T lking  bout v lues  llows for   ―newer, de-racialised language 
of soci l cohesion‖ (Lewis & Ne l, 2005, p. 437). Although ‗r ce‘ is done  w y with, 
national identity is assumed to be centred on cultural sameness (Kundnani, 2007). This means 
that cultural similarity is a necessary requirement for belonging, and those who are different 
must subsume their culture within British culture and declare allegiance to British values 
(Kundnani, 2007). 
 
The emphasis on culture is evident in integration debates about the compatibility between 
British society and Muslim communities in which there are perceived alien values 
(Kundnani, 2007). These ‗ lien‘ v lues  re constructed  s h ving no pl ce in British society. 
Multiculturalism as a policy, which tolerated cultural diversity, is argued to have allowed 
Muslims in Britain to self-segregate and live by their own values which results in extremism 
and ultimately fosters a home-grown terrorist threat (Kundnani, 2007). As a result, 
integration is now assumed to be the optimal response to diversity, but identifiable in this 
integrationist discourse is an assimilationist undertone and a drive toward homogeneity where 
British values are favoured (Bowskill, Lyons & Coyle, 2007; Worley, 2005). Muslims are 
therefore expected to pick a culture, and in order to be accepted, must show loyalty to a 
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constructed British culture (Worley, 2005). Making such a distinction between British-ness 
and Muslim-ness however, overlooks how identities are often transnational and forged across 
and through other aspects of identity such as gender or religion (Worley, 2005). This 
reinforces a place-bound notion of belonging, which enables dichotomous constructions of 
identity (Worley, 2005). 
 
2.21 Research question and aims 
The idea of there being a dichotomy between British-ness and Muslim-ness brings this 
discussion back to the concept of identity. To recap, in this literature review I have attempted 
to show how bounded notions of identity are no longer sustainable. This is because a 
conceptualisation of identity as bounded overlooks the complex process of identity formation 
in a postmodern context. Accordingly, drawing on relevant theory, I have attempted to show 
how identities are fractured, multiple, fluid, processual, and discursively constructed through 
representation. Of importance then, is the idea that identity categories are neither naturally 
occurring nor complete, and where boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are found, these are 
socially constructed. Also relevant is the idea that boundaries between categories/groups are 
constructed through the use of power to legitimise social divisions (Sampson, 1993). This 
power is seen as the reserve of dominant groups in society who are able to manage the 
construction of their own identity as well as the identity of others (Sampson, 1993).  
 
Central to this study is the idea that these constructed divisions/groups are hierarchically 
organised, and this often results in prejudice and unequal social relations. In my literature 
review I have looked at how prejudice is based on difference and essentialist conceptions of 
the other. I also looked at how prejudice directed at others is present not only between racial 
groups, but also cultural and religious groups.  Cultural and religious minority identities are 
therefore understood  s susceptible to the s me ―soci l processes of system tic inequ lity, 
external labelling,  nd otherness‖  s ethnic  nd r ci l groups (Nagra, 2011, p. 427). Prejudice 
b sed on cultur l or religious differences is c lled ‗cultur l essenti lism‘, ‗new r cism‘ or 
‗xeno-r cism‘,  nd in the context of discrimin tion  g inst Muslims, these concepts  re 
m nifest in wh t is termed ‗Isl mophobi ‘. 
 
  42 
A distinctive characteristic of these new forms of racism is their discursive nature. And when 
it comes to discursive racism, the media is seen to have a critical role in its production and 
reproduction. This is because through the media, social representations are easily and widely 
shared, which can lead to uncritical acceptance and reproduction (Jaspal & Coyle, 2009). An 
example of how discursive racism can become well established is Orientalism. Looking at 
Orientalism, it is evident that anti-Muslim/Islamic sentiment has a long history rooted in 
colonial/imperialist ideologies, and representations. This means that prejudice toward 
Muslims/Islam is not new. At the same time though, the above discussions show that while 
racially prejudiced discourses are influenced by history, discourses surrounding Muslims in 
Britain today have their own distinct contemporary features linked to more recent processes 
of immigration, terrorism and racism (Abbas, 2001). This study therefore aims to examine 
how Muslims are constructed in newspapers today.  
 
The research question is: 
 How do the British print medi  construct the identity of ‗Muslim‘ people tod y  nd 
how do these constructions promote or undermine a xeno-racist project? 
 
To answer the research question, the following research aims will be addressed: 
 Identify how language is used  to construct Muslims  
 Determine the rhetorical function of such constructions  
 Consider the reciprocal constitutive relationship between existing discourses and 
social practices 
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3.  Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
The research is situated within a qualitative social constructionist paradigm. Qualitative 
research is rooted in a philosophy of knowledge that challenges quantitative, positivist 
approaches to knowledge development within the social sciences (Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 
1999). Qualitative research can be taken as an umbrella term encompassing diverse research 
approaches that have all developed their own tradition of rigor (Elliot el al., 1999). These 
approaches aim to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomena of interest (Elliot et 
al., 1999). For example, discourse analysis - the research approach used here, aims for an in-
depth underst nding by looking  t the me ning of content  nd context r ther th n ―simply 
cataloguing the forms that content take‖  s tr dition l qu ntit tive methods would do (Vultee, 
2009, p. 625). Before looking more closely at discourse analysis, the paradigm informing this 
research approach, social constructionism, is outlined below. 
 
Social constructionism can be understood as a postmodern theoretical orientation (Willig, 
2008). This means that social constructionists adopt a critical stance towards assumptions and 
knowledge about the world (Burr, 1995). All ways of understanding are seen as historically 
and culturally relative, so that knowledge is specific to, and the product of, particular cultures 
and periods of history (Burr, 1995). Understanding is constructed through social interactions 
and social processes and this constructed nature of knowledge means that there can be several 
ways of understanding the world (Burr, 1995). For social constructionists, language as a 
social practice is especially useful in illustrating how knowledge is socially produced. 
Language can be used to describe an event or phenomenon in different ways leading to 
different perceptions and understandings of the same thing (Willig, 2008). For example 
descriptions of   gl ss of w ter  s ‗h lf-full‘ or ‗h lf-empty‘ c n provide either   positive or   
negative perception of a single item (Willig, 2008). 
 
Parker (2004) explains that an emphasis on language indicates a conceptualisation of 
l ngu ge  s ―m teri lly effective‖ (p. 154). L ngu ge renders objects  nd events ―think ble 
 nd underst nd ble‖ in the sense th t they  re given sh pe  nd me ning so th t we can hold 
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onto our sense of what is happening (Parker, 2004, p. 157). Social constructionist research 
therefore looks  t the constitutive n ture of l ngu ge  nd,  s the  bove ‗gl ss of w ter‘ 
example illustrates, is aimed at identifying the numerous available constructions of social 
reality in a given culture (Willig, 2008).  It also looks at how these constructions are used, 
and what the implications might be for human experience and social practice (Willig, 2008). 
By offering up the ide  of ―constructive  ltern tivism‖, where re lity is seen  s constructed in 
multiple ways and invested with different meanings, social constructionism is seen as a 
liberating approach (Burr, 1998, p. 13). This is because social categories such as race are 
taken as human constructions, not fixed and naturally occurring, and so in principle it should 
be possible to re-construct categories, and critically examine those that construct people in 
oppressive and limiting ways (Burr, 1998).   
 
3.2 Discourse analysis as theory and method 
To explore more closely how language is used as a constructive tool, this research study uses 
discourse analysis as its methodology. Discourse analysis is an approach that is underpinned 
by a social constructionist ontology and epistemology (Nikander, 2006). The world is taken 
as textual and discursive, and language has more than a representational role – it constructs 
reality (Burr, 1998). Discourse analysis contains both methodological and conceptual 
elements (Wood & Kroger, 2000). This means that it is both a research method and a theory. 
Doing discourse  n lysis thus involves ―tre ting discourse  s d t ‖ (Wood & Kroger, 2000, 
p. 3). And it  lso involves ―  theoretic l w y of underst nding the n ture of discourse  nd the 
nature of psychologic l phenomen ‖ (Billig, 1997, cited in Willig, 2008, p. 95). Thus 
discourse analysis is not simply an alternative methodology; it is an alternative to, and a 
critique of, mainstream psychology and the paradigms informing conventional research 
methodologies (Willig, 2008; Wood & Kroger, 2000). What follows is a discussion of the 
theoretical underpinnings of discourse analysis, and how it is used as a method.  
 
3.2.1 Discourse. When looking at discourses the interest is in how language works 
as a social practice, how it is constructive - defining and producing the objects of our 
knowledge (Hall, 2001; Parker, 1997).  Language use is not restricted to spoken words, but 
also includes written and other semiotic modes of communication and interaction such as 
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newspapers, emails, advertisements, and other types of media (van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen, 
2005). On their own, words are not fixed, self-contained units of meaning (Parker, 1999). 
Rather it is the way that words and phrases are utilised and put together in differing contexts 
that gives them meaning (Parker, 1999). This organisation of words and phrases into patterns 
creates systems of meaning that people can selectively draw on for communication and 
understanding (Parker, 1999). These patterns of meanings are referred to as discourses 
(Parker, 1999).  
 
When people speak or write then they are drawing on discourses that construct events in one 
way or another (Burr, 1995). Where pieces of speech or writing construct the same general 
picture of an object they can be identified as belonging to the same discourse (Burr, 1995). 
The same words, phrases or pictures can, however, be used across different discourses 
thereby creating differing accounts (Burr, 1995). This indicates that words and phrases in 
themselves do not belong to certain discourses. Rather it is the way they are strung together, 
within particular contexts, that gives meaning (Burr, 1995). Discourses can therefore be taken 
as a frame of reference against which the words and phrases that are used can be interpreted 
(Burr, 1995). As such, there is a reciprocal relationship between discourses and the linguistic 
words and phrases people use (Burr, 1995). Discourses emerge from the things that people 
say and write, and in turn, what is said or written depends on the discursive context in which 
they appear for meaning (Burr, 1995).  
 
3.2.1.1  Function.  To better understand the nature of discourse, an elaboration of 
key underlying assumptions is necessary (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Three major assumptions 
are function, construction, and variation (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  An important feature of 
discourse is the emph sis on ―t lk  s  ction‖ where l ngu ge is seen to h ve   perform tive 
function (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 4). Language is used to do things, such as to form 
requests, to persuade, or accuse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Even when seemingly describing 
something, language has an effect (Parker, 1997). Descriptions can end up legitimising, 
challenging, supporting or subverting that which it describes (Parker, 1997).  
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3.2.1.2  Construction. A second important feature of discourse is construction. 
Construction refers to the way in which accounts of events are discursively created by 
drawing from existing linguistic resources (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Construction also 
suggests active selection whereby some resources are included and others left out (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). The constructed nature of discourses often means that for many, social 
inter ctions  re experienced only ―in terms of specific linguistic versions‖ (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p. 34). An illustrative example of this could be if an individual has never 
met a Muslim person, but through reading many newspaper articles where Muslims are 
implicated in acts of terror and violence, he/she learns a constructed version of what Muslims 
 re like. ‗Knowing‘ th t Muslims  re violent, the individu l might perceive them  s   thre t 
and deliberately avoid interactions with them. Discourses thus construct the knowledge we 
have about phenomena, and this knowledge, once applied in the real world, has real effects 
 nd so ―becomes true‖ (H ll, 2001, p. 76). 
  
3.2.1.3  Variation. The third important assumption is variation. Variation refers to 
contradictions found between and within discourses (Parker, 1997). A discourse analysis 
would include the identification of different constructed versions of events, and would 
consider the different functions of these varying constructions (Wood & Kroger, 2000). 
Although a constructionist approach appreciates the diversity of meaning that variation 
affords, from a Foucauldian perspective the idea of contradictory constructions can be linked 
with struggle, power and deconstruction (Parker, 1997). When contradictions within a text 
are identified, it becomes clear which versions are favoured and what the effects of that might 
be (Parker, 1997). Such critical observation then allows for dominant discourses to be 
deconstructed (Parker, 1997).  
 
3.3 Foucauldian discourse analysis 
When looking at discourses there are several different approaches used for doing an analysis. 
Two m in versions  re ‗discursive psychology‘  nd ‗Fouc uldi n discourse  n lysis‘ (Willig, 
2008). Discursive psychology considers the w ys in which l ngu ge is used to ―negoti te  nd 
manage soci l inter ctions‖ so that interpersonal objectives are achieved (Willig, 2008, p. 
95). A researcher would for instance look at how language is used to disclaim undesirable 
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qualities, justify actions, or attribute blame (Willig, 2008). The aim of Foucauldian discourse 
analysis is to provide a description and critique of the discursive worlds that people occupy, 
and to explore the implications that these may have on subjectivity and experience (Willig, 
2008). For ex mple,   rese rcher would consider  n ‗ sylum seeker‘  nd wh t this 
positioning would mean for individuals in terms of action and experience (Willig, 2008). It is 
necessary to stress that these two different approaches are not incompatible (Burr, 1995). 
They are merely a reflection of the different concerns that researchers working within the 
tradition have (Burr, 1995). 
 
Another approach used often in research with newspaper discourses (eg. Richardson, 2007 
and van Dijk, 1987), is critical discourse analysis (CDA). Similarly to Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, CDA is concerned with the use of language in relation to social problems and the 
production and reproduction of power (van Dijk, 2001, cited in Richardson, 2007). CDA 
however, relies more on a Marxist, structuralist reading of power (Wetherell, 2001, cited in 
Meehan & Farquharson, 2012) which differs slightly from the Foucauldian, post-structuralist 
conceptualisation of power used here. CDA is also rooted in linguistics whereas Foucauldian 
discourse analysis is used more often for objects of study within psychology (Meehan & 
Farquharson, 2012). Lastly CDA, in its dependence on ideas of social representation, is 
aligned with a sociocognitive approach (van Dijk, 2001, cited in Meehan & Farquharson, 
2012), and this differs again from the post-structuralist approach used here.  
 
For this study, Foucauldian discourse analysis was therefore deemed the most suitable 
approach. This is because it considers the influence of cultural/historical contexts, examines 
how objects and people are constructed and positioned within discourses, and explores the 
implications these have on subjectivity and experience (Willig, 2008).  This approach is also 
concerned with ―the role of discourse in wider soci l processes of legitim tion  nd power‖ 
(Willig, 2008, p. 113). It is believed that dominant discourses are used to favour those 
versions of social reality that support existing power relations and social structures (Willig, 
2008). Foucauldian discourse analysis also looks at the genealogy of knowledge and 
considers how discourses were initially constructed and how over time they have come to be 
accepted as normal (Parker, 1997). Accordingly, the point of discourse analysis is to reveal 
and deconstruct what is taken for granted in prevalent social practices (Graham, 2005). 
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Fouc uldi n discourse  n lysis is thus used to ―dissect, disrupt  nd render the f mili r 
str nge‖ by ex mining the legitim cy of discourses  nd the m teri l effects they h ve 
(Graham, 2005, p. 4). 
 
3.4 Discourse, social structure and social practices 
Burr‘s (1995) discussion on the rel tionship between discourses  nd soci l structures  nd 
practices helps to elucidate how and why discourses have implications for subjectivity and 
experience. She explains that discourses are not abstract ideas used for talking about and 
representing things. Instead they are intimately tied up in the organisation and workings of 
society. Burr (1995) gives the example of how institutional structures, such as a capitalist 
economy, the law, education, marriage, family and the church, give shape and meaning to 
society. These institutions offer various social positions. For instance a capitalist economy 
positions individu ls  s ‗workers‘, ‗employers‘ or ‗unemployed‘; the institution of m rri ge 
me ns people c n be ‗m rried‘, ‗single‘ or ‗divorced‘;  nd educ tion l institutions offer 
‗educ ted‘  nd ‗uneduc ted‘ people. These w ys of structuring society  re put into pr ctice 
daily. By going to work, receiving a wage, or relying on unemployment benefits, capitalism 
as an institution is put into practice. Social structures and social practices are often ensured by 
the law and state controls such as benefits systems and employment legal contracts.  
 
From the above, it is evident that certain practices develop into legitimate forms of behaviour 
within particular discourses (Willig, 2008). In turn, discourses are reproduced by these 
practices thereby being legitimated as well (Willig, 2008). Discourses and practices are 
therefore seen as supporting one another (Willig, 2008).  From a Foucauldian perspective, 
this is considered problematic because the interdependency between discourses, institutions, 
and social practices is tied up with power (Willig, 2008). Power is enacted and maintained 
through discourse with some discourses presented as truth over others to serve the interests of 
relatively powerful social groups (Burr, 1995; Willig, 2008).  
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3.5 Data Collection 
When doing discourse analysis, it is necessary to keep in mind that this does not involve 
studying language in abstraction, but examining language in use (Wood & Kroger, 2000). For 
discursive psychologists, when speaking or writing, people are performing actions which can 
be revealed through an analysis of the discourse (Wetherell, 1996). This emphasis on action 
has led to discursive psychologists basing their research on, and collecting data from, 
naturally occurring text found in recordings of conversations, and documents such as 
newspaper articles (Wetherell, 1996). 
 
Deciding which texts to look at can also be problematic as the researcher needs to justify why 
a text was chosen (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Identifying a manageable, limited body of texts 
wherein constructions related to the research question can be explored is also difficult 
(Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Some sort of sampling is therefore useful, although the question of 
what and how much to sample depends on what it being studied (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). 
Phillips & Hardy (2002, p. 73) suggest th t ―import nt‖ texts can be captured such as those 
that are widely distributed, those associated with changes in practices, or those that were 
produced in reaction to a particular event. They also suggest texts which can easily be 
comp red,  nd ones which  llow for ―n tur l‖ (p. 74) limits to be pl ced  round the d t  
collection such as a particular time period. 
 
Taking the above guidelines into consideration, data was collected using documentary 
sources (Kelly, 2006). Documentary sources in the form of newspaper articles were useful for 
this study  s they h ve  n ―obviously ‗constructed‘ n ture  nd  re   me ns by which ide s 
 nd discourses  re circul ted‖ in society (Kelly, 2006, p. 316). To find relevant data I used 
articles from the online archives of British newspapers The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph. The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph are two of a small number of national 
newsp pers known  s ―bro dsheet‖ or ―qu lity‖ newsp pers (C rv lho & Burgess, 2005, p. 
1460). Using the se rch function on the newsp pers‘ websites, I se rched for  rticles 
cont ining the terms ‗Muslims‘  nd ‗Isl m‘. By not including any other search terms, this 
ensured there was limited bias in choosing articles. To narrow the search down and place a 
limit on the data, I looked at recent articles from July 2012 going back to January 2011. 
Initially, the limit of exactly one year back yielded too few results for The Daily Telegraph, 
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so the time limit was extended to the beginning of 2011. I then looked at articles which 
cont ined the terms ‗Muslim‘ or ‗Isl m‘ in the title to ensure th t the  rticles cont ined 
information closely related to Muslims and/or Islam, rather than just a passing reference. This 
produced 127 articles from The Guardian and 38 from The Daily Telegraph. In total, this 
gave 165 articles which were then numbered. I then placed 165 numbered pieces of paper in a 
bowl, and picked out 80 at random. From an initial reading of the articles I was then left with 
65 articles as many of the articles were blog posts. These would have contained personal 
opinion, and possibly a more informal style. Published articles were also preferable as these 
would have appeared in print. 
 
Broadsheet newspapers The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph were preferred over tabloid 
ones. In line with v n Dijk‘s (1992)  ssertion th t r cism h s t ken on the form of deni l, is 
less explicit, and thus inherently more insidious, the linguistic style of broadsheet newspapers 
was considered more suitable for this study. Moreover, v n Dijk‘s (1996) discussion of media 
discourses as elite discourses is reflected in the ownership and the readership of broadsheet 
newsp pers. The ownership  nd re dership consists prim rily of ―educ ted, profession l, 
economically and politically powerful individuals and groups and [so] the content and agenda 
of broadsheet newspapers [would reflect] the preferences and politics of this predominantly 
middle and upper class audience‖ (Rich rdson, 2004, p. 36). The reproduction of discourses 
and ideologies in broadsheets is thus considered particularly consequential (Richardson, 
2004). Additionally, the linguistic style favoured by broadsheet newspapers is inclined 
towards providing support for controversial social opinions, whilst concurrently protecting 
the speaker from negative implications about his or her views (van Dijk, 1987). News items 
found in bro dsheet newsp pers thus tend to be written using ―moder te, emotion lly 
controlled l ngu ge‖  nd ―more sophistic ted  nd less explicit mech nisms […] to control 
and bias the information given (Martín-Rojo, 1995, cited in Richardson, 2004, p. 53).  
 
H ving collected the d t , I w s  w re th t discourses  re not ―ne tly p ck ged‖ in   single 
or several texts (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 74). No matter how much data is collected, a 
researcher can only find allusions to these discourses (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). In addition, 
the interpretive nature of discourse analysis means that a researcher cannot aim to exhaust 
categories, he/she can only generate categories by identifying how language is used (Phillips 
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& Hardy, 2002). With regard to data collection and reaching saturation, the researcher does 
not reach an endpoint when he/she stops finding anything new (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The 
endpoint comes when the researcher feels that sufficient data has been collected to make a 
well-grounded argument (Wood & Kroger, 2000). 
 
3.6 Why British newspapers? 
The choice to focus on British newspapers came from a desire to reproduce and build on 
existing research in the area, but as a non-British analyst to see if the analysis will vary. 
Initially, because I am conducting this research from South Africa, I considered using South 
African newspapers. This presented a limitation to my method however, as their online 
archives were not easy to navigate making data collection difficult. Additionally, most of the 
available articles looked at international news coverage of Muslims. This means the available 
research data would have led to a different research focus, such as dominant Western 
discourses, knowledge transfers and the Western framing of stories. Given the already 
considerable leaning towards British print media in existing research literature (e.g. Khiabany 
& Williamson, 2008; Richardson, 2007; Vultee, 2009), it was decided that British 
newspapers were more suitable for this study. Furthermore by looking at more recent articles, 
going one year back, I was interested in seeing whether British newspaper constructions of 
Muslim people are changing or if the constructed identities of Muslims are becoming fixed. 
The choice of newspapers was further informed by the context of media globalisation, under 
the assumption that British newspaper constructions of Muslims are available to individuals 
in other parts of the world. 
 
3.7 Data Analysis  
When it came to the analysis of the data, the approach used was not a blind approach. To 
begin with, my reading of the data was guided by the existing theory discussed in the 
previous chapter. At the same time though, the analysis was flexible enough to 
generate/accommodate new ideas and insights. With regard to the specific discourse analytic 
approach used, I followed the recommendations of Wetherell (1998) and Luyt (2012) who 
both argue for a combined or synthesised approach. 
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Although social psychologists draw distinctions between different styles of discourse 
analysis, for example discursive psychology versus Foucauldian analysis, Wetherell (1998) 
argues that a more synthesised approach whereby one approach is read in terms of another 
will lead to more industrious discourse work. Luyt (2012), citing Edley and Wetherell (1997; 
2008), further notes that there are two approaches to analysis: top-down and bottom-up. A 
top-down approach, such as Foucauldian analysis, focuses on broad concepts such as 
ideology and power in order to determine how individuals are constituted or positioned 
through discourse (Luyt, 2012). The analysis would therefore look at dominant discourses, 
and consider broader background features of text such as ethnicity, race, and social context 
(Luyt, 2012). A bottom-up approach, such as discursive psychology, involves a detailed 
analysis of textual features in order to describe the action-orientation of text (Luyt, 2012). 
Although a tension exists between these two approaches, Luyt (2012) argues that a combined 
approach manages this tension and accounts for the fact that individuals are at the same time 
both products and producers of discourse. As such, while my analysis emphasised a top-down 
approach, and oper ted within Willig‘s (2008) procedur l st ges, I  lso considered the 
contributions of other theorists for a more synthesised analytical approach. Below, I outline 
the main concepts used in attempting a top-down analysis. Following the recommendation of 
Luyt (2012), a more fine-grained analysis of the text is evident in the presentation of findings 
in the Discussion and Analysis chapter. 
 
3.7.1 Willig’s six stages of Foucauldian discourse analysis. The data analysis was 
mostly guided by Willig‘s (2008) six stages of Foucauldian discourse analysis. It must be 
noted though that these six stages do not compose a full analysis in the Foucauldian sense 
(Willig, 2008). For inst nce Willig‘s (2008) st ges do not  ddress Fouc ult‘s discussion of 
the ―historicity  nd evolution of discursive form tions over time‖ (p. 115). The stages 
however provide a useful framework within which the researcher can work to identify 
discursive resources and subject positionings used within a text, and explore the implications 
they may have on subjectivity and practice (Willig, 2008). 
 
3.7.1.1 Stage one: Discursive constructions. The first stage involves identifying 
how discursive objects are constructed within the text (Willig, 2008). Informed by my 
research question (Willig, 2008), the discursive object I focused on was Muslim people and 
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as such I highlighted all direct and indirect references in the data. This stage does not simply 
rely on looking at keywords but looks instead at how the discursive object is spoken about. 
For example, in  ddition to explicit references to ―Muslims‖, there were  lso indirect 
references such  s ―some lovely l dies‖, ―Isl mic courts‖, ―niq bi women‖ where the 
implication of these being Muslims was clear. 
  
3.7.1.2 Stage two: Discourses. After identifying the sections of text that construct 
the discursive object, I looked at the differences between constructions (Willig, 2008). The 
same discursive object can be constructed in different ways and this enables the researcher to 
situate discursive objects within wider discourses (Willig, 2008). For example Muslim 
women who wear the headscarf/veil were sometimes constructed as oppressed, and at other 
times  s   thre t. This indic ted wider discourses such  s ―Isl m  s misogynistic/oppressive‖, 
 nd ―Isl m  s   thre t to western culture‖. 
 
3.7.1.3 Stage three: Action orientation. The next stage of analysis focuses on the 
action orientation of the text, and involves closely examining what the various constructions 
of the discursive object are capable of achieving (Willig, 2008). Here, I looked at what was 
gained from constructing Muslims in a particular way at a particular point within the text 
(Willig, 2008). For example, by constructing Islamic courts as discriminatory, it is implied 
that British law is superior. 
 
3.7.1.4 Stage four: Positionings. The fourth stage looks at the subject positions on 
offer within a discourse (Willig, 2008). Discourses make available positions that groups can 
take up and/or place others in (Willig, 2008). Individuals too can position themselves or be 
positioned by others, with these positions being rel tion l (v n L ngenhove & H rr , 1999). 
For ex mple,   person c n be positioned  s powerful in rel tion to powerless others (v n 
L ngenhove & H rr , 1999). When people  re positioned, soci l identities  re invoked with 
recognition of the p rticul r fe tures or bound ries of those identities (Wetherell, 1998). 
Positions  re  lso fluid  s people t ke up differing positions depending on the situ tion (v n 
L ngenhove & H rr , 1999),  nd this ties in with the ide  of individuals having multiple 
social identities. The concept of subject positioning is concerned with the idea that different 
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discourses position people differently, constructing their identities in different ways, and with 
varying degrees of power (Tuominen, 1997). This means that subject positions can have 
implications for subjectivity and experience (Willig, 2008). For example, by positioning 
Western societies as attentive to moral values, something is implied about the moral position 
of Muslim societies. 
 
For v n L ngenhove  nd H rr  (1999) positioning refers to discursive constructions within 
convers tions th t conjure up   concise story  bout   person‘s mor l  nd person l  ttributes. 
Positioning  lw ys occurs within ―the context of   specific mor l order of spe king‖ (v n 
L ngenhove & H rr , 1999, p. 23),  nd  s such wh t is s id often implies cert in rights, 
duties and obligations for individuals. Consideration is also given to who is allowed to speak 
and who remains silent and what the implications of this might be (Parker, 1997).The 
analysis thus looked at how Muslims were positioned in relation to others, and what 
particular rights and obligations were drawn on. 
 
3.7.1.5 Stage five: Practice. Stage five considers the relationship between 
discourse and practice (Willig, 2008). Discursive constructions and the subject positions 
within them can affect opportunities for action (Willig, 2008). Particular constructions and 
subject positionings can enable or constrain what can be said and done (Willig, 2008). As 
such, certain practices or behaviours can be seen as legitimated by particular discourses. In 
other words practices emerge out of discourses, and in turn practices sustain those discourses. 
For instance, where Muslims are seen as not participating at the national level, this could be 
in re ction to the discourse of ‗othering‘ th t they h ve been subjected to. And in turn, their 
non-participation reproduces or legitimises their othering. 
 
3.7.1.6 Stage six: Subjectivity. This stage of the analysis looks at the relationship 
between discourses  nd individu ls‘ subjectivity. It considers the consequences th t v rious 
subject positions c n h ve on individu ls‘ subjective experiences (Willig, 2008). I looked  t 
what Muslims could possibly feel, think and experience from within various subject positions 
(Willig, 2008). An example is where Muslim women are constructed as oppressed by the 
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practice of veiling. This could have implications on their experience of agency, where their 
assertion of agency through voluntary submission to a divine will is overlooked. 
 
3.8 Parker’s Analytical Stance 
While my  n lysis oper ted within the  bove six st ges, P rker‘s (1992)  n lytic st nce is 
infused within. This follows Willig‘s (2008) mention of how most theorists warn against 
following procedural guidelines too strictly. Parker (1992) agrees with this, and rather than 
providing an analytic method with sequential steps to follow, he suggests criteria that should 
be considered at each level of analysis. These criteria include rules and strategies, variation, 
and contexts, and these are discussed below. 
  
3.8.1 Rules and strategies. When engaging in conversation, people display an 
understanding of the setting and context (Wetherell, 1998). Discourses are thus analysed in 
terms of how socially shared grammatical, textual, communicative or interactional rules 
govern text and talk (van Dijk, 1997). Discourse studies also look closely at how these rules 
are sometimes violated, ignored or changed, and what the function or consequences of these 
violations might be (van Dijk, 1997). People use different strategies to bring about 
understanding and the accomplishment of their communicative goals (van Dijk, 1997). When 
carrying out the analysis I looked for instances of these rules and strategies, and how they 
might govern text, or otherwise be violated. For example, as a general rule overt displays of 
racial prejudice are seen as unacceptable. I therefore looked for instances of violations 
whereby prejudiced comments were made. Or I tried to identify discursive strategies 
individuals employed such as pre-emptive deni ls: ―I don‘t me n to be r cist but...‖ (van 
Dijk, 1997). 
 
3.8.2 Variation and variability. When analysing texts, it is often the case that 
people‘s expressed  ttitudes  nd opinions  re not  lw ys consistent  cross soci l contexts 
(Willig, 2008). It is useful to look for the emergence of contradictory or inconsistent versions 
of people, their characters, and motives, states of mind, and events and try and determine why 
the contradiction has emerged at that point (Wetherell, 1998). It also helps to identify how 
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discourses can overlap, contain other discourses, or rely on other discourses (Parker, 1992). I 
therefore tried to identify how many discourses were at work within a text (Parker, 1992).  
 
3.8.3 Contexts. Parker (1992) also suggests that an analysis should consider how 
discourses are historically located. Local, global, cultural or social contexts need to be 
analysed as they give rise to emergent discourses in communications (van Dijk, 1997). 
Discourses are not static, they change over time, and the researcher can consider the 
circumstances and consequences surrounding their emergence (Parker, 1992). The literature 
review discusses the historical trajectory of Orientalist discourse, racial prejudice and cultural 
essentialism, and how these have taken on new forms. Whilst mindful of historic contexts, 
the discourses surrounding Muslims today were also considered in light of political events 
such as recent terrorist bombings, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Additionally, context structures were examined because they emerge out of discourses. Texts 
were analysed to determine how discourses are used to reproduce existing institutions, and 
also to see whether the use of a particular discourse leads to the subversion of another 
discourse (Parker, 1992). Discourses were also examined for the way they reproduce power 
relations (Parker, 1992). I therefore considered which groups of people stand to gain or lose 
from the use of a particular discourse, and also considered who would want to promote or 
dissolve that discourse (Parker, 1992). Finally, the analysis looked at the ideological effects 
of discourses and how one discourse can connect with other discourses and sanction 
oppression (Parker, 1992). Discourses can be examined to show how dominant groups are 
able to share their narratives while the voices of other groups are subdued (Parker, 1992). 
 
3.9 Dependability and Trustworthiness  
3.9.1 Dependability. Qualitative researchers concern themselves with factors of 
reliability and validity when considering the quality of their study (Golafshani, 2003). When 
determining the quality of a study, however, it is necessary to consider reliability and validity 
in light of the research paradigm used. Reliability refers to the degree to which research 
results are repeatable, but as a valued criterion used to indicate accuracy and conclusiveness, 
the principle is largely informed by a positivist paradigm which takes reality as stable and 
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unchanging (Van de Riet & Durrheim, 2006). The social constructionist paradigm used by 
this study t kes re lity  s constructed  nd unst ble,  nd  ssumes th t   rese rcher‘s own 
values and assumptions will influence his/her interpretation and understanding of data (Elliot 
et al., 1999). As such the research findings are also considered to be discursive constructions 
(Willig, 2008). Qualitative researchers thus propose dependability over reliability (Van de 
Riet & Durrheim, 2006). Dependability is the degree to which a researcher convincingly 
presents findings, and this can be done through rich, detailed descriptions of data collection 
and analysis methods (Van de Riet & Durrheim, 2006).   
 
3.9.2 Trustworthiness. A second quality criteria used in research is validity. 
Validity looks at the extent to which a study measures what it aimed to measure, and the 
concept is also rooted in the positivist tradition (Golafshani, 2003). While some researchers 
argue that validity is not applicable to qualitative research, the need for some kind of quality 
check has led to the concept being redefined (Golafshani, 2003). Qualitative researchers thus 
look at the trustworthiness and rigor of the research by exploring subjectivity and reflexivity 
(Golafshani, 2003). Acknowledgement of my own reflexive role in the research process was 
necessary to ensure validity, particularly because discourses also produce a place for the 
reader – as the person being subjected to discourse, to make sense and meaning of the 
knowledge produced (Hall, 2001; Willig, 2008). To ensure interpretation validity, findings 
c n be supported by evidence from the d t , thus  llowing for  n  ppr is l of the rese rcher‘s 
analysis (Elliot et al., 1999). This was done by including extracts from the newspaper articles.  
 
The extracts used were considered the most relevant to illustrate the main findings of the 
analysis. Using Mitchell‘s (1984) guidelines, I chose extr cts  ccording to how clearly and 
concisely they illustrated points that recurred throughout the articles. I therefore considered 
‗cl rity‘, or how e sily the extr ct w s understood without needing to refer to the rest of the 
article. I looked at how typical or representative the extract was by considering whether the 
point of the analysis would remain the same if an alternative extract was used. I also chose 
extracts based on how detailed they were, as this would enable a more insightful and 
evidential discussion. The analysis also sought to identify variation within discourses and as 
such, I actively tried to include extracts that indicated variation. 
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When doing the analysis I also worked from a broad theoretical framework, looking at the 
functional and constructive dimensions of discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). I therefore 
did not rigidly follow a prescribed method (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Graham (2005), in her 
discussion of Fouc ult‘s work, expl ins th t Fouc ult himself did not provide   systemised 
method for uncovering how social phenomena come into existence. To do so would have 
been a hypocritical move against his own critique of claims to truth (Graham, 2005). Foucault 
was instead explicit about what he did, providing specific, meticulous details about his work 
(Graham, 2005). The lack of prescribed method does not mean that anything goes in a 
relativist way; it simply means that discourse analysts are not required to rigidly follow a 
specific method for doing analysis as this can inhibit innovative thought (Graham, 2005). As 
such, I largely followed the principles of Foucauldian analysis, and when it came to the 
method of analysis I used Willig (2008) as a guide, but my analysis also incorporated the 
work of other theorists.  
 
To increase validity I also considered Potter  nd Wetherell‘s (1987)  dvice on  n lytic 
techniques that support validity. They advise that a researcher be mindful of coherence, new 
problems,  nd fruitfulness.  The v lidity of   study depends on its ‗coherence‘:  n  n lysis 
should reflect how discourse fits together and how discursive structures serve functions 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). To increase coherence, analysis should also involve looking at 
exceptions to the analytic pattern and this involved looking at instances of variation (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). ‗New problems‘ requires th t  n  n lysis be thorough enough to not only 
solve problems, but also lead to new questions arising (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
‗Fruitfulness‘ refers to how   rese rcher should be  ble to produce novel explanations and 
insights regarding the topic at hand (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The validity of my analysis 
also depended on Elliot et  l.‘s (1999) suggestion of ― n  ddition l  n lytic l ‗ uditor‘‖ (p. 
222) or someone with experience in that research area. Here my research supervisor, in her 
capacity, examined my research study findings for credibility and coherence.  
 
3.10  Ethical Considerations 
This study did not include any human participants so there was little risk of harm. The data 
was collected from newspapers that are considered public property so publisher permission 
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was not required. I was also mindful throughout the research process of the fact that 
researchers are expected to display a suitable level of competency, conduct research with 
integrity, and produce work of an appropriate quality as doing otherwise can affect the 
credibility of the discipline (Edwards, 2004).   
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4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
The research aimed to identify how the British print medi  construct the identity of ‗Muslim‘ 
people today and whether or not these constructions promote or undermine a xeno-racist 
project. In doing this, the analysis aimed to identify how language is used to construct and 
position Muslims, and to determine what the function of such constructions are. The 
relationship between existing discourses and social practices was also considered. What is 
presented below provides a window into the analysis process. As discussed in the 
methodology section, the extracts used below were considered the most relevant to illustrate 
the findings of the analysis that was conducted on a total of 65 newspaper articles.  
 
4.1 Outline of analysis  
The analysis revealed that Muslims are constructed in varying ways by drawing on numerous 
discourses. To recap, discourse analysis understands language as constitutive of meaning, and 
  ‗discourse‘ thus refers to the w y in which words  nd phr ses  re org nised into p tterns of 
meaning (Parker, 1999). These patterns of meaning or discourses are further understood to 
structure social reality, especially with regards to defining subjects and their relational 
positions within a social system (Jackson, 2007). In practical terms, and by way of example, a 
discourse is identifiable through core labels, terms or discursive formations used in reference 
to the subject (Jackson, 2007). For example, in relation to ―Muslims‖, terms such as 
―S l fists‖, ―extremists‖, ― l Q ed ‖, ―Isl mists‖, ―terrorist  tt cks‖ were often deployed 
within the newspaper articles. The use of such terms functions to associate Muslims with 
frameworks centred on violence and threat (Jackson, 2007). This introduces a discourse of 
Muslims as a threat (and this is often reinforced by long historic traditions of representing 
Muslims this way e.g. Orientalism). Additionally, these labels or terms are often juxtaposed 
with oppositional labels and terms such as West versus the Islamic world, extremists versus 
moderates, violent versus peaceful, and democratic versus totalitarian (Jackson, 2007). This 
functions to organise Muslims as a particular kind of subject, i.e. one to be feared or vilified, 
and also organises them vis-à-vis other subjects, i.e. non-violent British citizens/Westerners, 
within the overall discourse (Jackson, 2007).  
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When looking at discourses, it is important to note that discourses are never entirely uniform, 
coherent or consistent (Jackson, 2007). This is significant when considering how the analysis 
revealed multiple discourses, as well variation between and within discourses. A dominant 
discourse across the articles was that of Muslims as a threat. The analysis however, indicated 
that Muslims can be presented as a threat in various ways by drawing on different terms or 
associations. For instance, as the above example indicates Muslims are constructed as a 
terrorist threat. They are also presented as a threat by constructing sharia law, an associating 
Islamic practice, as oppositional to British values. Another way Muslims were constructed as 
a threat, was by presenting Muslims as antagonistic toward Christians. A second dominant 
discourse that emerged was Muslims as a cultural threat. Under this prevalent discourse 
emerged further discourses rel ted to Muslims‘ isol tion  nd non-participation in society, the 
position and treatment of Muslim women, the veil/headscarf as an associative practice, and 
issues of identity, visibility and integration. Finally, and importantly, the analysis showed that 
Muslims are not always constructed as a threat; they can instead be presented as a racialised 
‗other‘, but without being   thre t. Or, at the other extreme, they can be discussed using an 
inclusive discourse indicating compatibility and tolerance. The discussion that follows deals 
in more depth with these predominant and emerging discourses identified across the articles, 
and also includes a discussion on the variation in constructions of Muslims. 
 
 
To facilitate discussion, the analysis findings are discussed in the following way. The 
discussion is roughly organised into three main sections. The first broad section relates to 
how Muslims are constructed as a direct threat, the second relates to their construction as a 
cultural threat, and in the last part of the chapter I consider the extremes in variation. Within 
each of these sections, the predominant discourses present across articles are delineated. 
Under each predominant discourse, I look more closely at how Muslim identity is 
constructed. Also discussed are other available discourses that the articles drew on, but which 
were not as prevalent. Such an approach makes it easier to present the different discourses at 
work, draws attention to the overlapping of discourses, and highlights the variation found 
within and between discourses. It also enables a more thorough discussion that includes a 
micro-analysis of the specific linguistic tools used to construct Muslims, as well as a macro-
analysis of meaning across texts (Richardson, 2007). Presenting the analysis this way goes 
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some way in showing how specific linguistic constructions, discourses, and practices fit 
together.  
 
Although my discussion sought to pick out discursive racism, my intention was not to label 
the print media as racially prejudiced. Informed by theory, such as the work of Hall (1996) 
and Said (1978), it is understood that an unconscious bias is present in any reflection of 
reality simply because we cannot lift ourselves out of our historical location (Featherstone et 
al., 2010). As such, it is often the case that media discourses reflect political discourses, 
which themselves struggle to overcome imperial ideological discourses (Featherstone et al., 
2010). 
 
4.2 Drawing on Orientalism and/or Islamophobia  
Keeping historical location, and the archaeology and genealogy of discourses in mind, in the 
discussion of prejudice, I draw on both Orientalism and Islamophobia. The concept of 
Orientalism is drawn on where constructions use binary vocabulary to differentiate between 
Islam/Muslims and the West. For example, the positioning of East versus West, despotism 
versus democracy, and backwardness versus modernity (Said, 1978). Islamophobia is used in 
reference to the hatred or dread of Islam and the subsequent fear or dislike of Muslims 
(Sheridan, 2006). Islamophobia however can be seen as a continuation of Orientalism in that 
it depends on the history of Orientalist constructions (Abbas, 2001). As such there is overlap 
between what could be termed Orientalist and what can be seen as Islamophobic. For the 
most part though Islamophobia is drawn on to reflect present day idiosyncrasies such as the 
threat from Islamists, the perceived threats that Islamic values have on free thought, civil 
liberties and culture, and the prejudice and hostility directed toward Muslim citizens and 
immigrants. Additionally, it should be noted that in the use of Islamophobia is the inherent 
assumption of it being racism. This follows from Fern ndez‘s (2009) explanation that fear on 
the grounds of religion, and hatred on the grounds of race, ethnicity, or culture result in the 
s me ―‗unfounded hostility‘ tow rds   p rticul r group on the b sis of p rticul r perceptions, 
misconceptions  nd stereotypes‖ (p. 270). 
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4.3 Islam and Muslims as a direct/physical threat 
To begin with, the analysis of the data showed that Muslims are still stereotypically discussed 
within discourses of terrorism and fundamentalism. Islam is associated with an extreme, 
violent and foreign ideology and its followers are depicted as susceptible to carrying out acts 
of terrorism. The discussions below look more closely at how Islam is discussed as a 
politicised threat. It is often depicted as espousing values that are in direct opposition to 
democratic ideals. To support these depictions, the articles often draw on the Islamic 
concept/practice of sharia law, and interpret this to be inherently oppressive and limiting to 
personal freedoms. Consideration is also given to how Muslims are subjected to processes of 
‗othering‘  nd how, by using essenti list constructions, Muslims in gener l  re associated 
with fundamentalism. 
 
4.3.1 Politicised/Terrorist threat in Britain. In line with Fe therstone et  l.‘s 
(2010) findings, the articles revealed a complex construction of the terrorist threat within 
Britain. The extract below is from an article about the jailing of Bilal Zaheer Ahmad, a 24 
year old, who had posted threats on an extremist website calling on Muslims to attack and kill 
members of the British parliament who had voted in favour of the war in Iraq.  
 
Extract 1 
Ahmad, who holds British and Pakistani passports, had purported to be a British 
citizen, said Royce. "But what you stand for is totally alien to what we stand for in our 
country." He added that his views were "corrosively dangerous". 
"It's important MPs can hold constituency surgeries without the threat of someone 
pulling out a knife and trying to kill them. You were intent on striking at the heart of 
our democracy and if our politicians are to be at risk from those like you, then the 
message must go out loud and clear that this country will not tolerate such threats to 
its democratic processes." 
Ahmad posted his threat on 3 November, the day after Choudhry, a 21-year-old 
university student, was jailed for life for the knife attack on Timms in May last year. 
She stabbed him twice with a six-inch knife, damaging his liver and perforating his 
stomach. She later said she had been influenced by the radical sermons of Anwar al-
Awlaki, a Yemen-based preacher and al-Qaida leader. 
Police arrested Ahmad, at the time living in Dunstall, Wolverhampton, on 10 
November. He pleaded guilty at an earlier hearing to soliciting murder, publishing 
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written material with intent to stir up religious hatred and three counts under Section 
58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which covers collecting information of a kind likely to 
be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. 
[…] 
Ahmad, now of Wollaton, Nottingham, was born in Warwickshire and studied for A-
levels at Wolverhampton College. He became radicalised as a teenager and was an 
active contributor to RevolutionMuslim, Islam4UK and IslamicAwakening websites. 
He graduated from the University of Central England with a 2:2 degree in business 
information technology and worked for a year as a junior development analyst at the 
Dorset County hospital in Dorchester. 
The court heard he had also posted on Facebook a link to YouTube where he recorded 
a video saying: "My message to the West. You are all going to die." He was in 
possession of electronic copies of books called 39 ways to serve and participate in 
jihad and Zaad-e-Mujahid: Essential provisions of a mujahadid as well as a magazine, 
Inspire, which instructs English-speaking young Muslims in how to train and organise 
violent jihad at home. 
Imran Khan, defending, said Ahmad had fallen in with members of al-Muhajiroun 
when aged 16 at college because he felt excluded from mainstream society. His 
growing interest in Islam had been at odds with the non-religious upbringing of his 
parents. 
"During the period that someone has been indoctrinated they lose the ability to know 
right from wrong. 
"It was wrong, it was perverted and it's one he now absolves himself from completely. 
He was a follower and not a leader," said Khan. (The Guardian, July 29, 2011). 
 
In the extract a discursive struggle (Featherstone et al., 2010) is evident in the negotiation of 
Ahm d‘s identity. Although Ahm d is born in W rwickshire,  nd is   British citizen, the 
 rticle mentions th t he h s both ―British  nd P kist ni p ssports‖ (l. 1). In terms of 
citizenship, this suggests that he is not entirely British. His British-ness is further thrown into 
question by the comments of the judge, Joyce, ruling on the c se. Joyce‘s use of words like 
―purported‖  nd the st tement: ―wh t you st nd for is tot lly  lien to wh t we st nd for in our 
country‖ (ll. 2-3), both throw into doubt Ahm d‘s cl ims th t he is   citizen  nd  lso 
emphasise the idea of Ahmad being foreign. Additionally, the repe ted reference to ―our 
country‖, ―our democr cy‖,  nd ―our politici ns‖ (ll. 2-6) further indicates a non-inclusive 
rhetoric. 
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The extract appears to follow the same storybook characterisation identified by Featherstone 
et al. (2010). The complex characterisation of the central actor is detailed when looking at 
Ahmad. He was born and lives in Britain. He studied for his A-levels, graduated from the 
University of Central England with a degree in business information technology, and worked 
 s   junior development  n lyst. There is  lso mention of his ―non-religious upbringing‖ (l. 
33). This information indicates that Ahmad possessed inclusive British characteristics, was 
well integrated into society, and was an ordinary, non-practising individual. At the age of 
sixteen though, while  t college, he felt ―excluded from m instre m society‖ (l. 32), and here 
there is  n indic tion of the ‗misguided loner‘. 
 
Featherstone et al. (2010) point out how the individual is always linked back to a wider terror 
network, with mosques and their foreign clerics importing a foreign extremist ideology. 
Ahm d w s  n ― ctive contributor to RevolutionMuslim, Isl m4UK  nd IslamicAwakening 
websites‖ (l. 21) and associated with members of al-Muhajiroun. No information is given 
about what these websites/groups promote, and it could be assumed that they are extremist. 
Ahmad was also found in possession of electronic copies of books on jihad, and a magazine 
Inspire which instructs ―English-speaking young Muslims in how to train and organise 
violent jih d  t home‖ (ll. 29-30). Such details could serve to legitimise the war on terror 
discourse bec use it indic tes th t there is   re l thre t ― t home‖. The  rticle  ppe rs to 
individualise this threat without implicating the entire Muslim community in Britain. Ahmad 
w s ―indoctrin ted‖  nd he now re lises it w s ―wrong‖, ―perverted‖,  nd he ― bsolves 
himself from it completely‖ (l. 37). That said however, it is mentioned that this was an 
 ttempt to ―stir up religious h tred‖ (l. 16). By depicting it as a religious, and not a political 
act, terrorism is portrayed as rooted in religion, and as such any religious Muslim could be 
considered susceptible to following this path. 
 
Extract 2 
White Muslim convert Richard Dart and a former police community support officer 
were among six people arrested for allegedly plotting a terror attack in Britain.  
Richard Dart, who was radicalised by the cleric Anjem Choudary, was held following 
police raids in east and west London.  
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A former PCSO and two of his brothers, who were living just over a mile from the 
Olympic site in Stratford, were also among those detained during the police and MI5 
operation to prevent a suspected terror assault.  
One of the brothers was Tasered by officers. Counter-terrorism police had first 
searched their home last November.  
The Daily Telegraph understands the police moved over fears that a group had 
obtained a sword which could potentially be used in a terrorist attack.  
Mr Dart, 29, the son of Dorset teachers, featured in a BBC documentary last year 
filmed by his own brother about his conversion. During the film, called My Brother 
the Islamist, he was seen protesting about British soldiers in Afghanistan and accused 
them of being ―murderers‖. (The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 2011). 
 
In extract 2 above a similar characterization of radical Muslims within Britain takes place. 
Richard Dart is a white Muslim convert accused of plotting a terror attack in Britain. His 
white identity, former occupation as a police community support officer, and his parents 
being ―Dorset te chers‖ (l. 12), all indicate inclusive British attributes.  He was however 
―radicalised by the cleric Anjem Choud ry‖ (l. 3). Choudary can be taken as the foreign 
cleric importing a foreign extremist ideology (Featherstone et al., 2010). In this extract, the 
inclination toward terror attacks can partly be seen as a response to the war in Afghanistan. 
Dart, in a documentary called My Brother the Islamist, was seen ―protesting about British 
soldiers in Afghanist n  nd  ccused them of being ‗murderers‘‖ (ll. 14-15). This was a theme 
recurrent throughout the data where acts of terror, violence, and resistance were often 
discussed within a context of anger expressed toward events occurring in the Middle East. 
Presumably this is done out of a sense of solidarity with the global Muslim community.  
 
4.3.1.1 Addressing the terrorist threat in Britain. In response to the perceived 
threat of terrorism in Britain, the extracts below are from articles indicating an effort towards 
dealing with this threat. Discussions surrounding the threat of home-grown terrorism appear 
to draw on multiple discourses of tolerance, integration, Orientalism and security. There also 
appear to be inconsistencies or contradictions in apportioning blame and/or responsibility. 
This is expanded on below. 
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Extract 3 
David Cameron will today signal a sea-change in the government fight against home-
grown terrorism, saying the state must confront, and not consort with, the non-violent 
Muslim groups that are ambiguous about British values such as equality between 
sexes, democracy and integration. 
To belong in Britain is to believe in these values, he will say. Claiming the previous 
government had been the victim of fear and muddled thinking by backing a state-
sponsored form of multiculturalism, the prime minister will state that his government 
"will no longer fund or share platforms with organisations that, while non-violent, are 
certainly in some cases part of the problem". 
In a major speech to a security conference in Munich, he will demand: "We need a lot 
less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular 
liberalism." 
He will say that "some organisations that seek to present themselves as a gateway to 
the Muslim community are showered with public money while doing little to combat 
extremism.  
… 
Cameron will argue many young men have been drawn to extremism due to a 
rootlessness created by the weakening of a clear collective British cultural identity. 
He will say: "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged 
different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We 
have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. 
"We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run 
counter to our values. So when a white person holds objectionable views – racism, for 
example – we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or 
practices have come from someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious, frankly 
even fearful, to stand up to them." (The Guardian, February 5, 2011). 
 
Extract 3 is from an article that discusses a speech to be delivered by David Cameron. In this 
speech, C meron is to ―sign l   se -ch nge‖ (l. 1) in the fight against home-grown terrorism. 
The idiom ―se -ch nge‖ suggests   l rge tr nsform tion,  nd words like ―fight‖  nd 
―confront‖ (ll. 1-2) suggest a direct, confrontational manner. In this extract a discourse of 
tolerance is apparent where Britain is constructed as having been too lenient towards Muslim 
groups, and consequently they are now facing a threat from home-grown terrorists.  
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Part of the blame/responsibility for this home-grown threat is attributed to non-violent 
Muslim organisations within Britain. The extract mentions how Muslim organisations are 
―cert inly in some c ses p rt of the problem‖ (l. 9),  nd while ―showered with public 
money‖, they  re ―doing little to comb t extremism‖ (ll. 14-15). This suggests that the 
Muslim community in Britain is responsible for solving the problem of extremism. 
Featherstone et al. (2010) argue that when the responsibility for monitoring and tackling 
problems in society is placed within specific communities the authorities are relieved of 
blame. This also creates a conflict between the discourse of integration - where Muslims are 
positioned within British-ness and encouraged to self-monitor, and the implicit suggestion 
th t Muslims  re responsible for Brit in‘s problems (Fe therstone et  l., 2010). 
 
Extr ct 3  lso indic tes   discourse of British superiority  nd othering. V lues such ―equ lity 
between sexes, democr cy  nd integr tion‖ (ll. 3-4)  re ―British v lues‖  nd non-violent 
Muslim groups  re constructed  s ― mbiguous‖  bout these v lues. It is suggested that this 
 mbiguity me ns they do not belong in Brit in, bec use ―To belong in Brit in is to believe in 
these v lues‖ (l. 5). At the same time though, a contradiction appears where Cameron 
 ssumes responsibility by s ying ―We h ve f iled to provide a vision of society to which they 
feel they w nt to belong‖ (ll. 19-20). This failure is, however, again presented through a 
discourse of tolerance. The shortcoming, or fault, of British society is that it was too tolerant 
of communities behaving in ways th t r n counter to their v lues. They were ―too c utious, 
fr nkly even fe rful, to st nd up to them‖ (ll. 24-25).  
 
A discourse of integration is again apparent where integration is presented as a solution. It is 
suggested that young men become attracted to extremism because of   ―rootlessness cre ted 
by the weakening of a clear collective British cultural identity‖ (l. 17). The word 
―rootlessness‖ could refer to a diasporic identity where these young men, as ethnic/religious 
minorities, perhaps struggle to define their identity in Britain, while maintaining an 
attachment to a culture/religion that surpasses geographic borders (Palmer, 2000). The 
solution to this is ―  cle r collective British cultur l identity‖. This integr tionist discourse 
appears to have assimilative undertones because tolerating communities that behave in ways 
th t run counter to ―our v lues‖ is presented  s problem tic. As such, it is implied th t 
different cultures  re expected to conform to ―our v lues‖. This  lso reflects Lentin‘s (2007) 
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r cist st te where the ‗other‘ is subsumed under   drive tow rd homogeneity,  nd expected to 
conform. 
 
Although this  rticle is looking  t ―home-grown‖ terrorism  nd the British government‘s 
attempts to combat it, C meron‘s speech is to be delivered  t   ―security conference in 
Munich‖ (l. 10). This is interesting, and suggests that the threat posed is still linked to 
foreign, transnational Islamist networks. In extract 4 below, from the same article, C meron‘s 
― udience‖ which is  ssumedly ‗Europe‘ is w rned th t it needs to ―w ke up to wh t is 
h ppening in our own countries‖ (ll. 1-2). In this way, the blame is again averted from the 
British government, as the threat of extremism is present in all European countries. This 
introduces an Orientalist discourse where Europe is positioned as facing a threat from a 
terrorist ‗other‘. 
 
When looking  t this terrorist ‗other‘ though,  n inconsistency is  pp rent in the linking of 
terrorism to Islam. In extract 3 above, there is an implicit suggestion that the Muslim 
community is responsible for combatting extremism. Extract 4 though, from the same article, 
cont ins  n un mbiguous  ssertion th t Isl mist extremism is  n ideology th t is ―entirely 
sep r te from Isl m‖ (l. 4).  
 
Extract 4 
He will warn his audience: "Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own 
countries. We need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist 
attacks lie – and that is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism." 
This ideology he says, is entirely separate from Islam, and "at the furthest end 
includes those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist 
realm, governed by an interpretation of sharia". 
But he adds: "Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject 
violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real 
hostility towards western democracy and liberal values. (The Guardian, February 5, 
2011). 
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Although this distinction is made, it comes later, after Cameron has already indistinguishably 
spoken about non-violent ―Muslim‖ groups  nd org nis tions r ther th n ―Isl mist‖ groups. 
An Isl mist ideology is presented  s working  long   ―spectrum‖ (l. 7), with those backing 
terrorism at one end, and people who reject violence at the other end. Those rejecting 
violence  re depicted  s  ccepting of ―v rious p rts of the extremist world-view including 
re l hostility tow rds western democr cy  nd liber l v lues‖ (ll. 8-9). This suggests that all 
Islamists, violent or not, can be considered a threat to western values.  
 
The depiction of Islamists as inherently hostile toward western values can be criticised 
though as is evident in extract 5 below.  
 
Extract 5 
Muslims must embrace "British" values of freedom, democracy and equal rights, he 
declared, as if the vast majority didn't do so already. Jihadist terror attacks were not 
driven by British and US wars in the Muslim world, he insisted – in the face of his 
own intelligence reports – but by an "extremist ideology" rooted in problems of 
"identity". 
[…] 
And by branding political Islam as extremist, he's playing on the ignorance of those 
for whom Muslim and Islamist are as good as indistinguishable. What is called 
Islamism includes a wide spectrum of political trends, peaceful and violent, socially 
conservative and progressive, from Turkey's ruling party to al-Qaida. Mainstream 
Islamists, certainly including almost all the groups Cameron is now casting into outer 
darkness, are in fact committed to democratic freedoms. (The Guardian, February 9, 
2011). 
 
Extract 5 is from  nother  rticle th t  ppe red in the s me newsp per, where C meron‘s 
speech is criticised for its inaccurate depiction of both Muslims and Islamists. The inclusion 
of an article which opposes the views in a previously published article makes it difficult to 
conclude that The Guardian newspaper is itself inherently biased in the opinions or 
representations it publishes. There does appear to be some balance and variation. In extract 5, 
the author adopts a cynical tone. In response to C meron‘s  ssertion th t Muslims must 
embr ce ―British‖ (l. 1) v lues, the  uthor retorts with ― s if the v st m jority didn‘t do so 
 lre dy‖ (l. 2). The  uthor  lso pl ces ―British‖ within quot tion m rks suggesting perh ps 
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th t the v lues of ―freedom, democr cy  nd equ l rights‖ (l. 1) are not exclusively British. He 
then refutes C meron‘s cl im th t terror  tt cks in Brit in  re driven by  n extremist ideology 
―rooted in problems of ‗identity‘‖ (ll. 4-5). He s ys C meron m kes this cl im ―in the f ce of 
his own intelligence reports‖ (ll. 3-4), and attributes the terror attacks to the British and US 
wars in the Muslim world. 
 
In extr ct 5, the  uthor points out th t C meron‘s ―br nding [of] politic l Isl m  s extremist‖ 
(l. 6) pl ys on the ―ignor nce of those for whom Muslim and Islamist are as good as 
indistinguish ble‖ (ll. 6-7). Added to this, the author also says that Islamism is 
misrepresented. He too refers to   ―spectrum‖ of politic l trends encomp ssing both 
―pe ceful  nd violent‖ (l. 8) strands, but points out that there are mainstream Islamist groups 
―committed to democr tic freedoms‖ (l. 11) which opposes C meron‘s cl im th t  ll 
Islamists reject democracy and liberal values. 
 
4.3.2 Sharia law as a politicised threat.  In relation to political Islamists, the data 
also revealed a discourse that draws on sharia law as repressive and oppositional to 
democratic ideals. 
 
Extract 6 
The al-Nour party is the main political arm of the hard-line Salafi movement which, 
unlike the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, is a new player on Egypt's political 
scene. 
Guided by a Saudi-inspired school of thought, Salafists have long shunned the 
concept of democracy, saying it allows man's law to override God's. But they decided 
to form parties and enter politics after the exit of Mubarak in February. 
Salafi groups speak confidently about their ambition to turn Egypt into a state where 
personal freedoms, including freedom of speech, women's dress and art, are 
constrained by sharia. 
"In the land of Islam, I can't let people decide what is permissible or what is 
prohibited. It's God who gives the answers as to what is right and what is wrong," 
Hamad said. "If God tells me you can drink whatever you want except for alcohol, 
you don't leave the million things permitted and ask about the prohibited." (The 
Guardian, December 2, 2011). 
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Extract 6 above discusses the Egyptian al-Nour political party. Al-Nour is described as a 
―h rd-line S l fi movement‖ (l. 1). Salafism refers to one of several major tendencies among 
those who take Islam as a reference point for their thinking, discourse and engagement 
(Ramadan, 2004). For Salafis the Qur‟an and Sunna  re interpreted ―in  n immedi te w y, 
without schol rly concl ves‖ (R m d n, 2004, p. 25). They therefore take a literal approach 
that forbids interpretive readings, as interpretation, by definition, is believed to contain error 
and innovation (Ramadan, 2004). When looking at political engagement, Salafi discourse is 
seen as forceful, radical and opposed to any involvement or corroboration with non-Islamic 
sp ces or  ctors (R m d n, 2004). This is suggested in the extr ct  bove. The term ―h rd-
line‖ suggests  n  uthorit tive or  bsolutist movement. They  re described  s h ving ―long 
shunned‖ (l. 4) democracy bec use it en bles ―m n‘s l w to override God‘s‖ (l. 5). The word 
―shunned‖ suggests th t democr cy is   system they h ve deliber tely  voided or rejected. 
Despite rejecting democracy however, they have decided to take part in the election process. 
Their reason for entering politics seems underhanded though, as the next paragraph reveals 
their ambition is to turn Egypt into a state governed by sharia law.  
 
Sharia l w is depicted  s limiting tow rd ―personal freedoms, including freedom of speech, 
women's dress and art‖ (l. 8). As such, it could be perceived as misogynistic and oppressive. 
The extract then quotes a spokesperson for the al-Nour group, who c lls Egypt ―The l nd of 
Isl m‖ (l. 10), dem rc ting it  s  n Isl mic sp ce. He then  dds th t he ―c n‘t let people 
decide wh t is permissible or wh t is prohibited‖ (ll. 10-11); rather it is God who has this 
authority. 
 
While it is not within the remit of this thesis to explore the complex nature of sharia law, it is 
important to briefly look at the sources of sharia law. Sharia is an Arabic term that roughly 
tr nsl tes to ‗the w y‘ or ‗p th to be followed‘ (M shhour, 2005; R m d n, 2004). 
Essentially it shows Muslims how to be and remain Muslim, and extends to all aspects of a 
Muslim‘s life, including pr yer, giving charity, fasting, dress, and respect for ethics 
(Ramadan, 2009). The primary source of reference for Islamic law is the Qur‟an which 
Muslims believe is the word of God (Mashhour, 2005). A second important source is the 
Sunna which refers to the tradition – including the teachings, practices and model of 
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behaviour - of the Prophet Muhammad (Mashhour, 2005). The other sources of sharia 
include analogy (Qiyas), consensus among Muslim scholars (Ijma), and independent juristic 
reasoning (Ijtihad) (Mashhour, 2005; Ramadan, 2004).  Sharia law is thus believed to consist 
of timeless, universal principles derived from the divine (Qur‟an and Sunna), but because 
there is room for independent human reasoning, it also consists of socially and historically 
derived interpretation (Mashhour, 2005). This distinction is important when considering how 
the ideal of sharia has been betrayed by Muslims themselves, who take it as wholly divine, 
and use it for repressive purposes (Mashhour, 2005; Ramadan, 2004).  
 
4.3.3 Muslims as a threat to Christians. The use of sharia for repressive purposes 
was also present within discussions on the political threat that non-Muslims face from 
Muslims. The data offered a particular focus on Christian-Muslim relationships, revealing a 
discourse around the antagonistic relationship between Muslims and Christians. The extracts 
that follow indicate how Christians were positioned as under threat in populous Muslim 
nations like Nigeria and Egypt. The persecution of Christians by Muslims contributes to the 
image of Muslims and Islam as threating, violent and oppressive. This threatening image is 
also enhanced by drawing on discourses related to Islamists. 
 
Extract 7 
The Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, has confirmed for the first time that the 
Islamist group Boko Haram has secret backers among government and security 
officials. 
Jonathan said Boko Haram presents Nigeria's greatest security challenge since the 
1967 Biafra civil war, when a three-year campaign by the Igbo people to secede from 
the country's 150 other tribes left a million dead. 
The organisation, whose name means "non-Islamic education is sacrilege", is fighting 
to impose a strict interpretation of sharia law across Africa's most populous country. 
A simmering low-level insurgency erupted on Christmas Day with four co-ordinated 
attacks that killed at least 30 people as they poured out of church services. Since then, 
a spree of violence at churches has claimed dozens of lives, prompting a state of 
emergency in the group's northern homebase states and threatening to ignite a 
sectarian conflict in a country split evenly between Muslims and Christians. (The 
Guardian, January 9, 2012). 
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In the extract above the Islamist group Boko Haram is presented as a threat to Nigerian 
security. The Boko Haram group is seen as responsible for violence against Christians in 
Nigeria. The article uses several techniques to augment this threat posed by the group. The 
extract initially draws evidence from a statement by the Nigerian president. The position of 
―president‖ me ns his soci l loc tion gives weight to his st tement,  nd here the article is 
using a device called category entitlement (Potter, 1996). This device refers to the way claims 
can be verified by a speaker who, possessing certain characteristics or skills, is entitled to 
speak in a particular category (Potter, 1996). As president, Jonathan would have knowledge 
of government  ctivity,  nd he ―confirmed for the first time‖ (l. 1) that Boko Haram has 
―secret b ckers  mong government  nd security offici ls‖ (ll. 2-3). A referential technique 
(Rich rdson, 2007) is used when n ming ―government‖  nd ―security offici ls‖. As these 
carry social meaning in terms of influence or power within a country, the apparent backing 
for Boko Haram from these sources incre ses the perceived thre t. The f ct th t it is ―secret‖ 
also implies that this support is amiss. The president is then quoted as saying Boko Haram 
present the ―gre test security ch llenge since the 1967 Bi fr  Civil W r‖ (ll. 4-5). By using 
the superl tive ―gre test‖, the  rticle employs  n extreme c se formul tion (Pomer ntz, 
1986), which is when an evaluative dimension is used to its extreme limits (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). This places a pronounced emphasis on the threat. Furthermore, by 
comparing the threat to the 1967 Biafra Civil War which left a million dead, it is suggested 
that the consequences of this threat could be as severe. 
 
The article then provides a brief explanation of the meaning of Boko Haram, and the 
org nis tion‘s n me. Me ning ―non-Isl mic educ tion is s crilege‖ (l. 7), the name suggests a 
sharp polarisation between Muslim and non-Muslim values. The words ―fighting‖  nd 
―impose‖ (ll. 7-8) imply an aggressive attempt by the group to force sharia law on the 
country. Describing Nigeri   s ―Afric ‘s most populous country‖ (l. 8) might also function to 
bring attention to how large or widespread the effect of this would be. There is 
 cknowledgment th t this is   ―strict interpret tion‖ (l. 8) of sharia law by  n ―Isl mist 
group‖. Th t s id, however, it is import nt to look  t where this fits in the  rticle  nd how it is 
narrated. When looking at the narrative form in the extract, or how the story is presented 
(Richardson, 2007), the extract begins with setting up the ominous threat that this group 
poses. It then establishes what Boko Haram stands for, and while there is mention of this 
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being  n ―interpret tion‖ of sharia, the next sentence, and the rest of the paragraph moves on 
quickly to the violence witnessed against Christians.  
 
The violence  g inst the Christi ns w s the result of   ―simmering‖ (l. 9) low-level rebellion, 
suggesting that this conflict has been imminent. The attacks were also coordinated indicating 
that this was premeditated. The premeditation and attacks on people as they left church 
makes the violence against the Christians seem cold blooded and cruel. Following this, the 
paragraph mentions the threat of sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians, with the 
words ―thre tening to ignite‖ (l. 12) carrying on with the theme of an ominous threat about to 
erupt. There is no differenti tion m de  t this point between ―Isl mists‖  nd ―Muslims‖, 
however. Furthermore, by s ying Nigeri  is   ―country evenly split‖ (l. 13) between Muslims 
and Christi ns, the word ―split‖ suggests  n  nt gonistic divide, r ther th n   mere equ lity in 
numbers. Muslims are thus undifferentiated as a group from Islamists, who might actually 
pose a threat, and are positioned as a threat to Christians in Nigeria.  
 
In extr ct 8 below, Egypt‘s Coptic community is  lso seen  s   religious minority ―f cing 
incre sing persecution‖ (ll. 7-8) and being denied their rights.  
 
Extract 8 
Spe king in Indonesi , the world‘s l rgest Isl mic country, the Prime Minister will 
urge young Muslims to  b ndon ―the de d-end choice of dict torship  nd extremism‖ 
by forcing their countries to hold elections. 
He will cl im it would be ―the gre test defe t th t Al Q ed  could ever suffer,‖ if 
more rebel and follow the lead of the young Muslims who sparked the Arab Spring. 
Mr Cameron will express his concern for the rights of millions of Christians, 
especially in Egypt, where the Coptic minority say they are facing increasing 
persecution. In   strong rebuke to Egypt‘s powerful Muslim Brotherhood party, Mr 
C meron will dem nd it does not ―deny the rights of religious minorities who do not 
sh re their specific religious views‖. 
Egypt‘s Coptic community, which  ccounts for 10 per cent of the country‘s 80 million 
population, has been subjected to a continuous campaign of sectarian attacks since the 
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak last February. Thirteen were killed last May and another 
10 two months before in attacks by suspected Islamists. (The Daily Telegraph, April 
12, 2012). 
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In the extract, British Prime Minister D vid C meron urges ―young Muslims to  b ndon ‗the 
dead-end choice of dict torship  nd extremism‘ by forcing their countries to hold elections‖ 
(ll. 2-3).  This reflects an Orientalist approach whereby Eastern/Muslim governments are seen 
as despotic. The concern over rights and the persecution of Christians in Egypt shows 
Brit in‘s mor l position l superiority  s it suggests th t these  re not v lued in Muslim 
countries. The words ―strong rebuke‖ (l. 8)  nd ―dem nd‖  (l. 9) further indicate superiority 
bec use they suggest th t C meron h s  uthority or influence over Egypt‘s Muslim 
Brotherhood which is itself described  s ―powerful‖ (l. 8).  
 
In extr ct 8 the  tt cks  g inst the Christi n community  ppe r c lcul ted  nd unremitting, ―  
continuous c mp ign‖ (l. 12). Only at the end of the extract is mention made that the attacks 
 re c rried out by ―suspected Isl mists‖ (l. 14), but it is not specific about which Islamist 
group. Specifying the Islamist group is important as mentioned in extract 5 above, because 
not all Islamist groups are inherently violent.  
 
The above two extracts (7 and 8) indicate an Orientalist practice whereby Muslim nations are 
constructed as despotic, with an implicit assumption that the British system of democratic 
government is superior. Muslims are depicted as violent and intolerant toward Christians. 
While they are constructed as a threat, they occupy a Muslim space, and so do not threaten 
the identity of Britain. In the following extract though, Muslims are constructed as now 
posing an internal threat to the identity of British Christians.  
 
Extract 9 
Mrs Halawi, who came to Britain from Lebanon in 1977, worked in the duty-free 
section as a perfume saleswoman of the airport for 13 years but was dismissed in July.  
Her case is being supported by the Christian Legal Centre, who say it raises important 
legal issues and also questions over whether Muslims and Christians are treated 
differently by employers.  
It comes amid growing concern among some Christians that their faith is being 
marginalised and follows calls from Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of 
Canterbury, for Christians to be given greater legal protection in the wake of a series 
of cases where they have been disciplined or dismissed for practising their faith.  
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[…] 
Mrs Halawi, 47, said: "I have been sacked on the basis of unsubstantiated complaints 
so there is now great fear amongst my former colleagues that the same could happen 
to them if one of the Muslims turns on them.  
"This is supposed to be a Christian country, but the law seems to be on the side of the 
Muslims." 
A mother of two, she says that she had always got on well with her Muslim 
colleagues and relations between staff of different faiths had been good in the past, 
but that the atmosphere became increasingly uncomfortable with a growing number of 
employees espousing ―fundamentalist Islam‖.  
She says they harassed Christians at work by making fun of them for wearing crosses, 
ridiculing Jesus and telling them they would go to Hell if they did not convert to 
Islam.  
"One man brought in the Koran to work and insisted I read it and another brought in 
Islamic leaflets and handed them out to other employees," she said.  
"They said that 9/11 served the Americans right and that they hated the West, but that 
they had come here because they want to convert people to Islam. (The Daily 
Telegraph, November 27, 2011). 
 
Extract 9 is from an article in which consideration is given to the relationship between, and 
the treatment of, Muslims and Christians in Britain.  This Muslim-Christian relationship is 
discussed in relation to a case where a Christian lady named Mrs Halawi lost her job due to 
complaints made by her Muslim colleagues. Mrs Halawi appears to espouse a postmodern, 
immigrant identity in Britain. She is a Lebanese immigrant, and now a British citizen. 
Coming from Lebanon, Mrs Halawi is assumedly of Arab ethnicity but the article appears to 
disregard ethnic differences, focusing instead on religious identity. This indicates how 
religious belonging, like race and ethnicity, is used as a symbol of difference. While Mrs 
H l wi‘s identity is det iled, her Muslim colle gues  re indistinguish bly referred to  s ―the 
Muslims‖ (l. 12). This concretises their religious identity, but also contributes to an 
Islamophobic attitude whereby Muslims are spoken of as a monolithic whole. 
 
The Islamophobic attitude is continued as Muslims are constructed as a threat. Mrs Halawi 
mentions the ―gre t fe r‖ (l. 11) th t her former colle gues h ve ―if one of the Muslims turns 
on them‖ (l. 12). The idea that one of the Muslims might turn on a colleague implies that they 
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c nnot be trusted. She then mentions how the work  tmosphere ―bec me incre singly 
uncomfortable with a growing number of employees espousing ‗fundamentalist Islam‘‖ (ll. 
17-18). A link is thereby drawn between Muslim employees and fundamentalism, and Mrs 
Halawi goes on to mention how they harassed Christians and mocked and insulted their 
religious pr ctices  nd beliefs. She  lso s ys they ―h ted the West‖  nd w nted to ―convert 
people to Isl m‖ (ll. 24-25). This positioning of Muslims as hostile towards the West draws 
on the Orientalist dichotomy of East versus West. And the idea that Muslims want to convert 
people to Islam is suggestive of a constitutive outside, whose presence threatens the identity 
of British people. 
 
Interestingly, the extract is seen to employ a device known as inversion (Fozdar, 2008). 
When taking into consideration the construction of Muslims across the data, they are often 
seen as a minority, or marginalised group in Britain. In the above extract though, this is 
inverted and attention is drawn to the ―concern  mong some Christi ns th t their f ith is 
being m rgin lised‖ (ll. 6-7). And when Mrs Halawi s ys th t the ―l w seems to be on the 
side of the Muslims‖ (ll. 13-14) there is an indication that Muslims receive preferential 
treatment. Mrs H l wi  lso  sserts th t Brit in ―is supposed to be   Christi n country‖ (l. 13), 
indicating   belief th t Muslims don‘t belong in Brit in. Although Mrs H l wi‘s comments 
could be interpreted as xeno-racist, the article, by using an Orientalist discourse, appears to 
justify her comments. The Muslims, although constructed as inferior, are perceived as having 
a greater potential for destructive power (Said, 1981). 
 
There is more evidence of an Orientalist discourse when Mrs Halawi is described as a 
―mother of two‖ (l. 15) who  lw ys ―got on well with her Muslim colle gues‖ (ll. 15-16). She 
is thus constructed as a rational person, and the personal information about her immigration 
and children humanises her and gives her an identity. The Muslims by contrast, are spoken of 
in monolithic terms, with no information on their ethnicity or even gender. Additionally, 
where they  re cited  s s ying th t ―9/11 served the Americ ns right‖ (l. 24), they could be 
perceived of as irrational and callous. An Orientalist approach is also evident in the use of the 
word ―Kor n‖ (l. 22). Vultee (2009) argues that the use of older transliterations such as 
‗Kor n‘ for Qur‟an reflects reluctance by conservative press commentary to give up familiar 
terms in order to  ccommod te ‗others‘.  
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The above discussions show that Muslims and/or Islam are still discussed using a socio-
political discourse whereby they are seen as violent, extremist and oppressive. In this way, 
Isl m is linked to neg tive tr its  nd neg tively differenti ted from Brit in‘s positive tr its. A 
clear hierarchy is constructed with Britain, representing the West, positioned as morally 
superior because of the democratic ideals it upholds. In contrast, Islamic ideals are presented 
as undemocratic, oppressive and threatening. A binary discourse of good versus evil is 
therefore generated (Kellner, 2004), justifying the Islamophobic rhetoric that is drawn on 
within the articles.  
 
4.4 Muslims as a cultural threat 
As shown above, Muslims are constructed as posing a physical and/or direct threat especially 
in terms of violence. The data however, also showed that Muslims are constructed as 
presenting a more indirect threat to the culture and values of British society. Looking at 
discourses th t dr w on ‗culture‘ is import nt bec use,  s discussed in the liter ture review 
chapter, racism today no longer relies on biological factors (Verkuyten, 2003). Instead 
differences are discursively constructed using cultural or religious signifiers. The discussions 
below indicate that Islamic/Muslim cultural and religious practices/values are often 
constructed as different, and are replete with assumptions and stereotypes that contribute to 
an overall negative image of Muslims. Here, v n Dijk‘s (1998) concept of the ideologic l 
square is evident, where minority out-groups groups are subjected to negative depictions, and 
the majority in-group is positively depicted. Embedded within these constructions are usually 
discourses of isolationism, participation in society, treatment of women, visibility, rights, and 
extremism/fundamentalism.  
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4.4.1 Isolation and non-participation in society. Extract 10 is from an article that 
appears to draw on all these discourses. The article is about an Islamic group in London, the 
Tablighi Jamaat, which is trying to keep its mosque from being closed down. This Islamic 
group is not ‗Isl mist‘, nor discussed using a rhetoric of terror. It is, however, described as a 
―suprem cist movement‖ encour ging ―isol tion from wider British society‖ (ll. 2-3). 
Usu lly, forms of r cism involve  n im gined ‗self‘  sserting  n ‗other‘ le ding to bound ries 
of inclusion and exclusion (Allen, 2010). In this article the Tablighi Jamaat is differentiated 
 s  n ‗other‘, but interestingly the usu l process of r cism is inverted,  nd here the minority 
group is doing the excluding. The group is described  s ―suprem cist‖ which invokes 
suggestions of an extreme, threatening, racist ideology.  
 
Extract 10 
An Islamic group fighting to keep its east London mosque, near to the Olympics site, 
has been described by opponents as a "supremacist movement" that encourages 
isolationism from wider British society. 
Tablighi Jamaat, a global proselytising movement with tens of thousands of members 
in the UK, is trying to overturn an enforcement notice on its mosque, called the 
Riverine Centre, after temporary planning permission expired in 2006. 
A planning inquiry at Newham town hall will determine whether the group can 
continue to use the modest collection of buildings. On Thursday it heard that 
followers of Tablighi Jamaat were taught to "shun integration with all unbelievers in 
order to be uncontaminated Muslims and to isolate themselves from wider society". 
According to evidence from Dr Taj Hargey, an imam who runs a progressive Islamic 
educational centre in Oxford, the "isolationist dynamic" of Tablighi Jamaat has 
caused the growth of a "separatist Muslim enclave" in the streets around its Dewsbury 
headquarters. 
Hargey was called as a witness by Newham Concern, a local campaign group which 
has long opposed Tablighi Jamaat and its ambitions to expand its facilities. The group 
is behind plans to build a much larger facility at the site, dubbed a "megamosque" by 
the media, although it currently has no planning application in place. 
Hargey told the inquiry that Tablighi Jamaat had "achieved very little for the 
community" and rejected the group's assertions that closing the mosque would lead to 
the marginalisation of Muslim youth. 
He said: "Over the past 14 years that TJ has occupied the site it has furnished no 
proven track record of opening their facilities to the wider Muslim community, let 
alone non-Muslim community. In that time they have not even managed to create any 
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facilities for women. The facility itself currently contributes substantially to 
marginalisation". He described it as a "supremacist movement with adverse 
implications for the government's community cohesion policies". 
Newham Concern also called Tehmina Kazi, from the group British Muslims for 
Secular Democracy, as a witness. 
Kazi, speaking in a personal capacity, said the government's national planning policy 
sought to promote "mixed and balanced communities" and that Tablighi Jamaat was 
"particularly inward-looking" because it only engaged with other Muslims. "The main 
issue is not that they are a socially conservative movement, but the fact they have 
been reluctant to engage in dialogue with people who are different." 
Newham council has said it wants to shut the mosque down over concerns about 
traffic levels, land contamination and visual impact. (The Guardian, February 18, 
2011). 
 
In the extr ct, the ide  of   ―suprem cist‖ ideology  nd  n isol tionist discourse is c rried 
throughout. The Muslim group is constructed as self-isolating and their exclusion from the 
wider British society is self-imposed. Self-segregation is considered problematic because it is 
believed to sustain cultural difference (Phillips, 2006). That this segregation is self-imposed, 
functions to remove blame from the wider British society because their isolation is 
volunt rily undert ken. The followers of the group  re s id to be t ught to ―shun integr tion 
with all unbelievers in order to be uncontaminated Muslims and to isolate themselves from 
wider society‖ (ll. 9-10). The word ―shun‖, suggesting deliber te  void nce,  nd the words 
―unbelievers‖  nd ―uncont min ted‖ m ke it seem  s though this group is disp r ging to 
those who do not follow the s me f ith. The  rticle dr ws on ―evidence‖ (l. 11) from an 
imam, Dr T j H rgey, who s ys the T blighi J m  t‘s ―isol tionist dyn mic‖ (l. 12) has 
c used   ―sep r tist Muslim encl ve‖ (l. 13). It also quotes Tehmina Kazi who says they are 
―p rticul rly inw rd looking‖ (l. 32)  nd ―reluct nt to engage in dialogue with people who 
 re different‖ (l. 34).  
 
Assumingly, because Hargey is an imam (leader), and Kazi is the director of British Muslims 
for Secular Democracy, and because they are both Muslim, they are taken as expert 
commentators. Hargey runs   ―progressive‖ (l. 11) Islamic educational centre and is therefore 
likely to hold liber l views. His ―progressive‖ str nd is possibly met with opposition from 
more conservative Muslim groups. Kazi is a female activist, and her group, British Muslims 
for Secular Democracy, aims to increase interaction between Muslims and the wider British 
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society (Organisation Objectives, 2012). The objectives of her group likely differ from the 
T blighi J m  t group which she s ys ―only eng ged with other Muslims‖ (l. 32). What this 
article appears to overlook then is that the views of Hargey and Kazi, coming from liberal 
groups, are likely to be biased against the Tablighi Jamaat group because of differences in 
religious views and group objectives. The article is also biased in that it does not include any 
commentary from members of the Tablighi Jamaat group. 
 
The Tablighi Jamaat group is described  s ―  global proselytising movement with tens of 
thousands of members in the UK‖ (ll. 4-5). The f ct th t it is ―glob l‖  nd h s ―tens of 
thous nds of members‖ suggests its influence is widespre d,  nd this could be received with 
alarm. The Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic movement, influenced by the Deobandi tradition in 
India (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002). The Deobandi tradition sought to acquaint 
Muslims with a pure unalloyed Islam liberated from cultural influences, and close the gap 
between scholars and the illiterate Muslim masses (Vahed, 2003). The Tablighi Jamaat 
movement is an offshoot of this tradition and their objective is to promote religious enclaves 
of proper Islamic practice and belief (Vahed, 2003). Vahed (2003) says that assimilation, 
multicultur lism,  nd politic l medi tion  re not objectives,  nd this indic tes th t the group‘s 
 ims differ from K zi‘s British Muslims for Secular Democracy. As a tradition originating in 
Indi , Brit in‘s l rge South Asi n Muslim community is likely to identify with this 
movement,  ccounting for the l rge number of members. C lling them   ―proselytising 
movement‖ is  g in  larmist in tone if the suggestion is that they are trying to convert people 
to Islam. Islamic mission work, or da‟wah, is believed to be a duty of Muslims (Mumisa, 
2002). Da‟wah however, only entails informing people about the message of Islam, with the 
implicit knowledge and understanding that guidance comes from God alone (Mumisa, 2002). 
This me ns th t the Muslim‘s responsibility is not to convert people, but simply to convey   
message, and this would be similar to other religious groups‘ efforts to invite people to their 
faith. 
 
The article appears to be biased when it constructs the Tablighi Jamaat as not contributing or 
 chieving  nything for the community. H rgery s ys th t they h ve no ―proven tr ck record 
of opening their facilities to the wider Muslim community, let alone non-Muslim 
community‖ (ll. 22-24). This appears to be in contr diction to the ―proselytising‖ l bel used 
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earlier. Additionally, it seems as though a responsibility toward the community is being 
expected of them, when that it not the objective of their existence. They are also presented as 
misogynistic where H rgery s ys ―they h ve not even m n ged to cre te  ny f cilities for 
women‖ (ll. 24-25). The  rticle mentions how they  re using   ―modest collection of 
buildings‖ (l. 8),  nd l ter mentions th t they pl n to ―exp nd their f cilities‖ (l. 16). If at 
present the mosque is ―modest‖  nd in need of exp nding, it could be specul ted th t 
preference is given to accommodating men, since prayer at the mosque is stressed for men, 
but not an obligation for women (Al-Johar, 2005). This is difficult to determine from the 
article alone however, as no members of the mosque, male or female, are quoted. 
 
Finally, the above negative constructions of the group seem closely linked to what could be 
perceived as the problematic physical presence of the mosque. The London mosque is near to 
the Olympics site,  nd  lthough the group is using   ―modest collection of buildings‖ (l. 8) it 
intends to build   much l rger f cility ―dubbed   ‗meg mosque‘ by the medi ‖ (ll. 17-18). 
Notably, here the  rticle cites ―the medi ‖. The Guardian is part of the media too, but this 
cit tion provides   dist ncing from the use of the moniker ―meg mosque‖. This is perh ps  n 
indication of how broadsheets are inclined toward using sophisticated, implicit linguistic 
techniques that both provide support for controversial social opinions, whilst concurrently 
protecting the speaker from negative implications about his or her views (van Dijk, 1987). 
The construction of the mosque is presented as somewhat unlawful because they ―h ve no 
planning application in pl ce‖ (l. 18), and resistance to its construction is further apparent in 
the Newh m council‘s ―concerns  bout tr ffic levels, l nd cont min tion  nd visu l imp ct‖ 
(ll. 35-36). The ide  of the mosque h ving   ―visu l imp ct‖ is simil r to Rich rdson‘s (2001) 
rejectionist discourse of spatial management where the increased visibility of a Muslim 
presence disrupts the imagined white-privileged national space that is conceived of as its 
own.  
 
In the above discussion I have tried to show that an isolationist discourse which constructs 
Muslims as unwilling to contribute to British society is biased and inaccurate. At the same 
time though, the data revealed some variation in this regard. In extract 11 below, the 
argument that Muslims are not interested in participating at the national level is used again. 
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The approach used here however is less biased, and even critical of Muslims who are accused 
of too often  ssuming   ―victim ment lity‖ (ll. 27-28).  
 
Extract 11 
But there is a much bigger question at stake here: why is it that most British Muslims 
get so excited and aroused by foreign affairs, yet seem so bored by and uninterested in 
domestic politics and the economy? 
From the march against the Iraq war in 2003 to the demonstrations against the Danish 
cartoons in 2006 and the protests against Israel's attack on Gaza in 2009, British 
Muslims have shown themselves perfectly willing to take to the streets to make their 
voices heard. But how many times have they, individually or collectively, joined 
rallies over issues that affect our daily lives: from the reforms of the NHS to the future 
of local schools; from the lack of social housing to rising energy bills and train fares? 
[…] 
It isn't just a combination of anti-terror laws and media demonisation that has 
hindered efforts at Muslim integration into mainstream British society. So, too, has 
the reluctance of many British Muslims to step outside the political comfort zone of 
the anti-war movement. When we only talk of foreign affairs, is it any wonder that we 
seem to come across as foreigners? 
Muslims do not lack for opponents or antagonists; those who want to portray us as 
foreign, alien, un-British, are growing in number. We should not be handing them a 
club with which to beat us. In fact, the best way of overcoming Islamophobia and 
suspicion is for British Muslims to broaden, not narrow, our political horizons, to get 
involved in our local communities, to show our fellow citizens that we care not just 
about events in Palestine and Pakistan, but Portsmouth and Paisley too. 
How can Muslims complain about our rights, our freedoms, our collective future, if 
we aren't engaged in the political process across the board as active British citizens? 
We have an obligation, as Britons and as Muslims, to fully participate in local and 
national debates and not to stand idly by. 
We have allowed ourselves to be defined only by foreign policy and, in particular, by 
events in the Middle East for far too long. British Muslims can make a positive 
contribution to British society, but first we have to stop our navel-gazing and victim 
mentality. We must let the people, press and politicians of this country know that we 
are as British as we are Muslim, and we care about our shared future. (The Guardian, 
April 2, 2012). 
 
In the extract it is suggested that British Muslims only show interest in foreign affairs, but not 
domestic issues. The  uthor  sks why British Muslims get ―excited  nd  roused‖ (l. 2) by 
  85 
foreign affairs, but seem ―bored by  nd uninterested in domestic policies‖ (ll. 2-3). He gives 
foreign ex mples such  s the Ir q w r in 2003, the D nish c rtoons in 2006,  nd Isr el‘s 
 tt ck on G z  in 2009, where British Muslims were ―willing to t ke to the streets to make 
their voices he rd‖ (ll. 6-7). Using a rhetorical question for effect, he asks how many times 
they have rallied for domestic issues such as the reforms of the NHS, the future of local 
schools, lack of social housing, rising energy bills, and train fares, all of which affect their 
daily lives.  
 
Although the  uthor in this extr ct  cknowledges th t ―  combin tion of  nti-terror laws and 
medi  demonis tion‖ (l. 10) has made it difficult for Muslims to integrate into mainstream 
society, he asserts that Muslims are not entirely blameless. Muslims have shown a 
―reluct nce‖ (l. 12) to step outside the ―politic l comfort zone of the  nti-w r movement‖ (ll. 
12-13), and the author asks if through a preoccupation with foreign  ff irs, ―is it  ny wonder 
we seem to come  cross  s foreigners?‖ (ll. 13-14). The author of this article is Muslim too 
 nd uses  n inclusion ry ―we‖  nd ―us‖. His Muslim identity  ppe rs to give his  rgument 
credibility. He re sons th t Muslims do not l ck ―opponents or  nt gonists‖ (l. 15) who want 
to portr y them  s ―foreign,  lien, un-British‖ (l. 16) but if Muslims were to get involved in 
domestic politics, this would be one way of overcoming Islamophobia and suspicion. He then 
 rgues th t Muslims c nnot compl in  bout ―our rights, our freedoms, our collective future‖ 
(l. 21) if they  re not  ctively p rticip ting  s British citizens. They ―h ve  n oblig tion,  s 
Britons  nd  s Muslims, to fully p rticip te in loc l  nd n tion l deb tes‖ (ll. 23-24). 
 
The idea of having an Islamic obligation to participate in society is shared by Ramadan 
(2004) who explains that Islam requires Muslims to engage, as equals, in an authentic 
dialogue with fellow citizens, working together towards mutual enrichment (Ramadan, 2004). 
The author of the above extract suggests that Muslims have not yet managed to achieve this, 
s ying they need to stop ―n vel-g zing‖ (l. 27) which implies that they are inward looking. 
He  lso s ys they need to stop their ―victim ment lity‖ (ll. 27-28), and this is important 
because it acknowledges that Muslims have agency. Although they are subjected to external 
labelling and constructions they are able to have some influence on how they are defined. 
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When it comes to the formation of identity it is important to remember that processes 
underlying the construction of identity are not reliant on external labelling alone, but are also 
a consequence of individual agency (Nazroo & Karlsen, 2003). Identity thus involves an 
internal definition where individuals define their own identity, and an external definition 
where they are defined by others (Jenkins, 2000; Nazroo & Karlsen, 2003). This reflects the 
interplay between agency and structure (Nazroo & Karlsen, 2003). Jenkins (2000) expands on 
this further by making a distinction between groups (internally defined) and categories 
(externally defined). Group identification and categorisation are interdependent – the concept 
of ‗us‘ requiring   ‗them‘, but in terms of power it is necess ry to consider whose definition 
counts (Jenkins, 2000). As such, it is possible that externally imposed, racist categorisations 
are more influential in defining a person and governing how they interact with others (Nazroo 
& Karlsen, 2003). For Muslims in Britain then, their reluctance to engage at the national level 
could be in reaction to the othering that they have experienced. And since there is a loop 
relationship between discourses and practices, the non-engagement by Muslims reproduces or 
legitimizes their othering.  
 
British Muslims‘ ―n vel-g zing‖,  nd preferred interest in foreign  ff irs, could  lso be   
reflection of the way in which processes of globalisation have exposed and contested the 
supposed unified and trans-historical boundaries of national identity (Hall, 1992, cited in 
Nazroo & Karlsen, 2003). In Britain, globalisation processes such as migration have resulted 
in a significant part of the population having a migrant history. Immigration usually requires 
that individuals reconcile characteristics from their native culture with features from the local 
culture to which they have immigrated, thus creating a hybrid culture (Arnett, 2002). Often, 
individuals living in the host culture also come to  dopt  spects from the immigr nts‘ culture, 
fusing them into their own identities (Arnett, 2002). This means that a unified or culturally 
pure national identity is difficult to sustain as elements from other cultures are invariably 
adopted (Arnett, 2002; Nazroo & Karlsen, 2003). Jacobson (1997) suggests that the 
boundaries of a religious identity are more clear and well-defined and this could account for 
why Muslims preferably choose to position themselves within their religious identity over 
national/cultural identities. And this universal, diasporic religious identity which they identify 
with more strongly could account for why they show more interest in foreign affairs affecting 
Muslims, rather than domestic issues. 
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4.4.2 Muslim women as oppressed. Another dominant discourse that was prevalent 
in the data was the treatment of Muslim women within Islam. In agreement with Fernandez 
(2009), analysis of the data revealed that the binary constructions of Islam and the West are 
mapped onto gender-based issues. Fernandez (2009) argues that Muslim women are often 
situated within the ―m trix of conflicting morals, norms, values, religions, ideologies, politics 
 nd civilis tions‖ (p. 270). Within the articles discussions around women often seemed to 
function to highlight the difference between British/Western values and Islamic values. This 
was often done through criticism of Islamic/Muslim practices. The extract below is one 
example. Here the concept of sharia law is drawn on again, but this time it is discussed 
within the context of Muslim women‘s mistre tment/oppression.  
 
Extract 12 
Bill limiting sharia law is motivated by 'concern for Muslim women' 
Lady Cox, the proposer, says aim is to prevent discrimination against Muslim women 
and 'jurisdiction creep' in Islamic tribunals 
Islamic courts would be forced to acknowledge the primacy of English law under a 
bill being introduced in the House of Lords. 
The bill, proposed by Lady Cox and backed by women's rights groups and the 
National Secular Society, was drawn up because of "deep concerns" that Muslim 
women are suffering discrimination within closed sharia law councils. 
The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill will introduce an offence 
carrying a five-year jail sentence for anyone falsely claiming or implying that sharia 
courts or councils have legal jurisdiction over family or criminal law. The bill, which 
will apply to all arbitration tribunals if passed, aims to tackle discrimination, which its 
supporters say is inherent in the courts, by banning the sharia practice of giving 
woman's testimony only half the weight of men's. 
Cox said: "Equality under the law is a core value of British justice. My bill seeks to 
preserve that standard" 
[…] 
The tribunals should only be deciding civil disputes but two years ago the think-tank 
Civitas claimed sharia courts, some 85 of which operate in Birmingham, London, 
Bradford and Manchester, had crossed the proper limits of their jurisdiction and were 
regularly giving illegal advice on marriage and divorce. 
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Cox said they are increasingly ruling on family and criminal cases, including child 
custody and domestic violence. Jurisdiction "creep" had caused considerable suffering 
among women compelled to return to abusive husbands, or to give up children and 
property. 
Diana Nammi, of the Iranian and Kurdish Women's Rights Organisation, said: 
"Women and children are very vulnerable members of the community and under 
sharia law they become invisible. Women and children are the most vulnerable in 
minority communities where religion tradition and culture has become the identity 
taking precedence over the human rights and women's rights that are protected under 
civil, UK law." 
The bill requires public bodies to inform women they have fewer legal rights if their 
marriage is unrecognised in English law. Cox said she had found "considerable 
evidence" of women, some of whom are brought to Britain speaking little English and 
kept ignorant of their legal rights, suffering domestic violence or unequal access to 
divorce, due to discriminatory decisions made. "We cannot continue to condone this 
situation. Many women say: 'We came to this country to escape these practices only 
to find the situation is worse here.' " 
Cox said she would be asking the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, 
who caused a row last year when he said a recognised role for sharia law seemed 
unavoidable, to back her bill. She said: "By appearing to condone this inherent 
discrimination system which is causing real suffering to women, he has failed to 
recognise that suffering. He is appearing to forward the acceptability and validity of 
Sharia law in this country."  
Aina Khan, a solicitor who advises on sharia law, said: "It is good in parts. I would 
like to see best practice in sharia councils, like in the Beth Din model and I would like 
some legislation. I don't want somebody opening up a sharia board in their front 
room. Of course sex discrimination laws must apply. But there are some alarmist 
tones in the bill. Where she goes wrong is assuming that some sort of misogyny and 
discrimination goes on. Eighty per cent of its users are women." 
Khurshid Drabu, adviser on constitutional affairs to the Muslim Council of Britain, 
said: "Bills of this kind don't help anybody. They don't appear to understand that we 
live in a free country where people can make free choices. Yet again, it appears to be 
a total misunderstanding of the concept that underpins these arbitration councils. 
Sharia councils operate under consent. If there is a woman who suffers as a result of a 
decision by one of these councils a woman is free to go to the British courts." (The 
Guardian, June 8, 2011). 
 
When looking at news articles such as the above, it is apparent that the crux of a news event 
is presented through the use of a headline and/or lead sentence (Teo, 2000). These often 
function to predetermine   re der‘s processing of the text (Teo, 2000). The he dline for this 
article suggests that a proposed bill to limit sharia law is motiv ted by   ―concern for Muslim 
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women‖ (l. 1). The le d sentence then el bor tes th t the  im is to ―prevent discrimin tion 
 g inst Muslim women‖ (l. 2). A reading of the article would thus begin with the assumption 
that sharia law results in the unfair treatment of women. Furthermore, the words ―jurisdiction 
creep‖ (l. 3) in the lead sentence suggest an infringement by Islamic courts within the legal 
sphere, adding to the inference that sharia law is something negative. 
 
The article then goes on to establish the superiority of English law.  It begins by asserting that 
the proposed bill will force Isl mic courts to ― cknowledge the prim cy of English l w‖ (l. 
4). In Brit in, English l w would leg lly t ke precedence, but the use of the word ―prim cy‖ 
suggests a belief in the superiority of British values over Islamic values regardless of national 
context. This is supported by the fact that sharia courts are then constructed as inherently 
discriminatory toward women. The article uses a predicational strategy (Richardson, 2007) 
whereby sharia is personified and assigned human qualities. For example, sharia courts ―h d 
crossed‖ (l. 19)  nd ―were regul rly giving illeg l  dvice‖ (ll. 19-20). This functions to 
distance blame away from any specific individual or group. Since sharia law originates from 
Islamic practice, however, blame is implicitly present. Moreover, the lack of distinction 
between sharia law and those individuals who cross the limits of their jurisdiction presents a 
biased view against sharia law as a whole, rather than attributing blame to the specific 
individuals who may be abusing it.  
 
The  rticle positions Muslim women  s ―very vulner ble‖ (l. 26)  nd ―invisible‖ (l. 27) under 
sharia law. Sharia courts  re purported to c use Muslim women ―consider ble suffering‖ (l. 
22), forcing them to return to ― busive husb nds, or to give up children  nd property‖ (ll. 23-
24). There is no evidence given of cases to support this, however. The proposer of the bill, 
Cox, is  lso v gue  bout where these ―deep concerns‖ (l. 7) over sharia law are coming from, 
relying on the evidence of ―women‖ (l. 33)  nd ―m ny women‖ (l. 36) without being specific. 
Cox refers to sharia l w  s  n ―inherent discrimin tion system‖ (ll. 40-41) and appears to 
criticise the Archbishop of C nterbury‘s toler nce  nd recognition of the role sharia law has 
in Britain. By suggesting that sharia l w h s no ― ccept bility‖ or ―v lidity‖ (l. 42) in Britain, 
Cox contributes to the idea that Islamic values are oppressive, inferior, and not welcome in 
Britain.  
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According to Fernandez (2009), where religious practices are conceptualised as oppressive, 
this obscures r cist bin ries  nd feeds into  n ide  th t equ lity  nd freedom  re ―the sole 
preserve of the West‖ (p. 271). Underlying this idea is an Orientalist approach that narrowly 
defines and interprets Islam through a Western lens. The extract above mentions the sharia 
pr ctice of h ving   wom n‘s testimony weigh h lf th t of   m n‘s. This ruling h s resulted 
in   lot of criticism directed  t women‘s st tus in Isl m (W lker, 2009). The interpret tion of 
  wom n‘s testimony h ving h lf the v lue of   m n‘s origin tes from the verse: 
 ―O you who believe!  When you de l with e ch other, in tr ns ctions involving future 
oblig tions in   fixed period of time reduce them to writing (…) And get two 
witnesses, out of your own men, and if there are not two men, then a man and two 
women, such as you choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the other can 
remind her (2: 282). 
This verse has been critically interpreted to mean that women are considered legally and 
socially inferior and more prone to forgetfulness (Walker, 2009). Walker (2009) argues that 
this interpretation ignores both context, and the narrow application of the verse to testimony 
th t is rel ted to ―tr ns ctions involving future oblig tions‖ (i.e. fin nci l credit). When it 
comes to testimony regarding other matters no distinction is made between male and female 
witnesses. For example, in relation to adultery, gender indifference regarding witnesses is 
evident: ―And those who l unch   ch rge  g inst ch ste women,  nd produce not four 
witnesses, flog e ch of them with eighty stripes‖ (24: 4). W lker (2009) expl ins th t two 
female witnesses are only required when looking at testimony regarding financial matters, 
and then too only for corroboration. To understand why, it is important to look at context. In 
pre-Islamic Arabia, men were primarily involved with financial dealings, whereas women 
were consigned to the domestic sphere (Walker, 2009). This means women would have less 
experience with, and exposure to, financial matters. The above depiction of sharia law 
therefore indicates a lack of effort to understand it within a socio-cultural context. 
 
Towards the end of the article there is variation introduced with a counter-argument provided 
by Khan, a solicitor who advises on sharia law. Mentioning her law occupation is a 
referential technique that draws attention to her social category (Richardson, 2007). As a 
solicitor, her opinion on l w m tters would c rry weight. Kh n mentions the ― l rmist‖ (l. 
47) tones in the bill and asserts that it is wrong to assume that discrimination takes place. She 
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says eighty per cent of users are women. This use of statistics also gives authority to a claim 
as numbers are seen to stand objectively and are taken as factual (Waidzunas, 2005). This 
balancing information comes at the end however, and Teo (2000) argues that the heading and 
lead sentence already biases the reader toward a particular reading. 
 
4.4.3 The veil and/or headscarf. Another gender-based issue that is more 
commonly drawn on in relation to Muslim women is their clothing and what it symbolises. 
The data revealed that discussions surrounding Muslim women are often centred on their 
dress or appearance, with the focus usually on the veil or headscarf. These items of clothing 
were found to be variously constructed as symbolic of oppression, Islamist extremism, 
cultural or religious expression, and a barrier/resistance to integration. Before discussing the 
discourses related to the veil/headscarf, and how these contribute to the construction of 
Muslims, closer consideration is given below to the different terms drawn on in relation to the 
veil/headscarf. 
 
When discussing the pr ctice of covering, the  rticles drew on terms such  s ‗hijab‘, ‗niqab‘, 
‗burqa‘, ‗veil‘  nd ‗he dsc rf‘. The ‗niqab‘, ‗burqa‘ and ‗veil‘ were mostly used in  llusion 
to clothing th t included the covering of the f ce, while ‗hijab‘  nd ‗he dsc rf‘ were often 
used synonymously to mean a head covering. The use of different terms for the veil/headscarf 
indicates a postmodern shift in meaning. At the same time though, I argue that the use reflects 
an Orientalising approach. In the Qur‟an, the words ―khimar‖ (24: 31)  nd ―jilbab‖ (33: 59) 
me ning ‗he dsc rf‘  nd ‗outer g rment or clo k‘ respectively,  re used for the prescription 
of modest dress. The word ‗hijab‘ me ns to conce l, to veil, to hinder  nd to sep r te,  nd 
while it is used as a noun in the Qur‟an, it is not used in reference to women‘s clothing 
(Amer, 2000; Ruby, 2006). One of the uses of the word hijab is in reference to a screen (33: 
53) behind which m le Muslims were to  ddress the Prophet Muh mm d‘s wives (Sechzer, 
2004). This understanding of the term hijab is important because it indicates that it has an 
Islamic association that does not simply equate to a veil or headscarf (Ruby, 2006). Hijab is a 
broader concept that includes modest dress, but also behaviour and interaction with the 
opposite sex. Today, however, the word hijab is narrowly used, usually in reference to 
clothing only. It is also manifest in multiple ways. For example, a Saudi woman might wear a 
niqab, an Iranian woman a chador, and a Canadian woman a headscarf (each reflecting 
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different cultural codes of dress), and all three might identify their dress as hijab (Ruby, 
2006). 
 
The medi ‘s us ge of the terms often brushes over the complexity of the pr ctice of covering 
up by Muslims, or functions to  ctiv te   p rticul r im ge (Ruby, 2006). The use of ‗veil‘ or 
‗he dsc rf‘ in reference to  ll he d, f ce  nd body coverings le ds to the erasure of cultural 
and ethnic differences (Ruby, 2006). Even when different terms are used, Ruitenburg (2008) 
argues that they are already historically, culturally and politically marked. For example, the 
word ‗sc rf‘ is trivi l, signifying nothing more than a piece of cloth, but the words hijab and 
‗veil‘ ―religionizes‖ it (Ruitenburg, 2008, p. 24). This then h s implic tions for how the 
wearer is perceived. In the discussions that follow, for ease of reading, I use the same terms 
employed by each article.  
 
Extract 13 is from an article looking at the practice of veiling by British women, in light of 
the French niqab ban. 
 
Extract 13 
In some ways, they were like any other young women, waiting at the bus stop for the 
25 to Ilford, clutching their mobile phones and small bottles of water. But thanks to 
Europe's most controversial item of millinery, you could see nothing of Muna Jama 
and her friend but their eyes. 
This was the week that France banned the niqab, the Islamic full-face veil. The law's 
principal author called it a way to "eradicate [a] minority of fundamentalists" who 
"instrumentalise Islam for political reasons." President Nicolas Sarkozy said the niqab 
was "a sign of debasement and subservience;" for another minister, it was a male-
imposed "prison." But is any of that true? (The Daily Telegraph, April 16, 2011). 
 
The extract begins by describing two young Muslim women in London. By beginning with 
the words ―in some w ys, they were like  ny other young women‖ (l. 1), there is already a 
suggestion of difference. They  re not the s me in ‗ ll‘ w ys. A commonpl ce scene of 
young girls waiting for the bus, mobile phones and small bottles of water in hand is given. 
Using the conjunction ―but‖ (l. 2) to start his next sentence, the author gives emphasis to what 
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he s ys next: ―But th nks to Europe‘s most controversi l item of millinery‖ (ll. 2-3), nothing 
is visible of the girls except their eyes. The words ―th nks to‖ suggest s tire, reflecting the 
opinion of the author. He then brings attention to how the face veil has become a contentious 
issue by using  n extreme c se formul tion: ―Europe‘s most controversi l item‖, but then 
undermines or m kes light of the signific nce of this issue by referring to it  s  n ―item of 
millinery‖. Comp ring the veil to   wom n‘s h t, something considered ordinary, reflects a 
somewhat dismissive attitude toward the controversy surrounding the face veil.  
 
The extract then outlines the reasons given for the niqab (face veil) ban in France. The veil is 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism where religion is used as a tool, and banning it is 
seen  s w y to get rid of   ―minority of fund ment lists‖ (l. 6). This not only creates an 
association between women who veil and religious fundamentalism, but also suggests that 
they are not wanted in France.  The other reason for the ban draws on the interpretation of the 
niqab as a sign of misogynistic oppression. The French president calls the niqab a sign of 
―deb sement  nd subservience‖ (l. 8) suggesting that this practice is humiliating for women 
 nd positions them  s subordin te to men. A minister  lso describes it  s   ―m le-imposed 
‗prison‘‖ (ll. 8-9), suggesting again that it is restrictive and enforced by patriarchy. Even 
though this article quotes the French president and a minister, despite their social position, 
their words are undermined by the tone the author takes. He follows their reasoning with a 
rhetoric l ―But is  ny of th t true?‖ (l. 9) indicating skepticism toward their reasoning for the 
ban. 
 
While the extract above indicates incredulity toward taking the veil as a symbol of extremism 
or patriarchal oppression, extract 14 below indicates that the veil is an item that can reflect 
male dominance. It shows that issues regarding women are often accompanied by discussions 
on their dress or appearance. This in turn suggests that bigotry toward women is sometimes 
disguised through rhetoric that calls on the religious practice of veiling. Drawing on the 
Islamic principles of modesty to subjugate women is also indicative of the conflation of 
culture and religion. 
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Extract 14 
Despite the slow change, there is still significant resistance to the girls' basketball 
within Nagpada. Clerics regularly criticise the players in sermons. 
In the Zulfiqar restaurant, only a few metres from the training ground, the owner, 
Abdul Haq, said it was wrong that girls played basketball. "They should be indoors or 
at school at that age. It's not the right activity for them," he said. 
Ali Hassan, a 34-year-old medical technician, said there was nothing wrong with girls 
playing basketball but they should be "properly dressed". He suggested a full head-to-
toe veil. Zulfiqar Haidar, a cobbler, thought that given the demands of the sport, some 
kind of adapted dress which would allow the girls to see would be preferable – though 
"definitely no shorts and no exposed hair".  
For Noor Khan and the club's other organisers, however, the immediate problem is 
not social, but financial. (The Guardian, November 18, 2011).  
 
The extract presents a discussion around a group of Muslim female basketball players in 
Indi . There is ―signific nt resist nce‖ (l. 1) to their b sketb ll,  nd clerics ―regul rly 
criticise‖ (l. 2) them in sermons. This suggests a deeply conservative community. The 
opinion of the restaurant owner, Abdul Haq, reflects a view that girls have a defined role or 
pl ce in society. He s ys th t they ―should be indoors or  t school  t th t  ge‖ (ll. 4-5). He 
 lso rem rks th t b sketb ll ―is not the right  ctivity for them‖ (l. 5), which indicates some 
bigotry toward women. Another community member, Ali Hassan, a medical technician, sees 
nothing wrong with the girls playing basketball. Hassan does, however, believe that they 
should be ―properly dressed‖ (l. 7), and suggests   ―full he d-to-toe veil‖ (ll. 7-8). The 
impracticality of playing basketball dressed in a full head-to-toe veil, suggests that even if 
basketball is acceptable for women it is not going to be facilitated. When looking at the word 
―veil‖ here, it seems in ccurate as it usually denotes a face/head covering, rather than a 
garment that covers the entire body, such as the burqa. This indicates how the term is used 
loosely to cover a range of styles.  The opinion of Zulfiqar Haidar, a cobbler, introduces some 
vari tion. He is quoted  s s ying th t there should be ―no shorts and no exposed hair‖ (l. 10), 
but he  cknowledges th t the sport would require some sort of ― d pted dress‖,  nd this 
would be ―prefer ble‖ (l. 9). As such, he holds on to the principle of religious dress, but 
proposes a flexible approach where their mode of dressing can be adapted. He also does not 
disapprove of the girls playing basketball. 
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When looking at the above extract, it is important to consider the cultural context and the 
influence this would h ve on women‘s experience. N gp d  is   community in Mumb i, 
India, and it is implied that it is a poor, conservative and patriarchal society. The idea of 
context and social position influencing the meaning attached to the veil can be explained 
using Anthi ‘s (2009) tr nsloc tion l position lity. Anthi s (2009) expl ins th t identity 
should be considered in terms of context and the categorical organization of boundaries and 
hierarchies. This means that identity categories are often taken as bounded, and depending on 
the context, these categories are arranged hierachically. For example, in the extract gender 
boundaries appear well defined. This is evident from the discussions around what are 
appropriate activities and dress for women. In terms of hierarchy, it appears to be a 
patriarchal society and this is reflected in the resistance toward girls playing basketball. The 
Nagpada location/context could therefore be one wherein women have a lower social 
position, and their experience of their female identity and the practice of veiling might be one 
of oppression.   
 
While extract 14 shows that the practice of veiling can be interpreted as oppressive, in extract 
15 that follows, the hijab is taken as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism. The extract is from 
an article looking at a trend towards religiosity among wealthy women in Pakistan.   
 
Extract 15 
"I started reading the Qur'an properly and praying five times a day. No one made me 
wear the hijab. That would be impossible," she laughs brightly. "I showed the way to 
the other girls at work." 
They are not alone. Though there are no statistics and most evidence is anecdotal, a 
new wave of interest in more conservative strands of Islam among wealthier and 
better educated women in Pakistan appears clear. 
It is part of a broader cultural and religious shift seen in the country over decades but 
which observers say has accelerated in the past 10 years. 
"The other girls who were working with us left." Shumaila said. "They found the new 
environment a bit unfriendly." 
One indication of the trend is the growing proportion of women within the 
conservative religious political organisation Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). (The Guardian, 
April 9, 2012). 
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In the extract, Shumaila mentions how she ―st rted re ding the Quran properly and praying 
five times   d y‖ (l. 1). She asserts that no one made her wear the hijab and it is implied that 
this practice is in fulfilment of a religious obligation. This interest in religion is constructed as 
a trend however, and Shumaila says ―I showed the w y to the other girls  t work‖ (ll. 2-3), 
which sounds like she set a precedent. The extract goes on to explain that this trend or interest 
in religion is evident ― mong we lthier  nd better educ ted women in P kist n‖ (ll. 5-6). The 
extract mentions how this interest is   ―new wave of interest in more conservative strands of 
Isl m‖ (l. 5). It is  lso p rt of   wider ―cultur l  nd religious shift‖ (l. 7) which has 
― cceler ted‖ (l. 8) over the l st ten ye rs. The words ―new w ve‖  nd ― cceler ted‖ suggest 
the extent and speed of this trend is significant. The extract then hints at this trend being a 
concern when it quotes Shum il   s s ying th t other girls left work bec use the ―new 
environment‖ w s ―  bit unfriendly‖ (ll. 9-10); the new environment presumably being a 
conservative Islamic one.  
 
This trend is visible in the incre sing proportion of women found in the ―conserv tive 
religious political organisation Jamaat-e-Isl mi‖ (l. 12). Here, the rhetoric of the hijab as a 
symbol of Islamic fundamentalism is drawn on. Franks (2000) explains that hijab is often 
taken as a signifier for initiation into Islamist groups. Women are more easily identifiable 
through dress, and as such they are given an emblematic status that confirms the 
Islamification of a group (Franks, 2000). This is apparent in the same article which continues: 
 
 
Extract 16 
JI, like its counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world, has traditionally recruited 
among the lower middle class, swollen in recent decades in Pakistan by rapid 
urbanisation and economic growth. But the new wave of devotion is now touching the 
elite in a new way. Al-Huda (The Guidance), an organisation set up in 1994 to spread 
a new and often rigorous piety among Pakistani women, has gained a foothold among 
the upper reaches of society. 
The group, which critics accuse of encouraging intolerant strands of Islam influenced 
by those practised in Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, has grown from 
an initial single small centre in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, to a presence in every 
city, and is expanding among the Pakistani diaspora abroad. (The Guardian, April 9, 
2012). 
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In the extr ct, Al Hud  is described  s  n org nis tion th t  ims to spre d   ―new  nd often 
rigorous piety  mong P kist ni women‖ (l. 5), and it has been accused of promoting 
―intoler nt str nds of Isl m‖ (l. 7). If the words ―rigorous piety‖  nd ―intoler nt‖  re 
 ssoci ted with extremism, then the f ct th t the group h s   ―foothold‖ (l. 5) among 
prominent classes of society, and is present in every city could elicit concern. This is because 
the group will have influential backing and widespread influence. More alarming though, 
would be the ide  th t the group‘s presence is exp nding  mong the P kist ni ―di spor  
 bro d‖ (l. 10). Diasporic communities often share a religious identity that surpasses 
geographic borders (Palmer, 2000). Historically they also undergo political struggles to 
define identity in a context of displacement (Howard, 2000). With a large number of British 
Muslims being of South Asian origin, and mostly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent 
(Ansari, 2002), the presence of a diasporic Muslim community in Britain could be perceived 
as threatening.  
 
The following extract also suggests that the idea of a diasporic Muslim community with 
traditionalist or strict religious practices is a real possibility and threat in Britain. 
 
Extract 17 
The vast majority of Tower Hamlets Muslims are originally from Bangladesh, an 
overwhelmingly Muslim country. But the niqab, a Saudi garment, is almost 
completely unknown there. In supposedly backward, monocultural Dhaka, the capital, 
you will never see it on the streets. In supposedly liberal, multicultural London, I saw 
perhaps twenty niqabi women in half an hour. 
"I grew up in what people would call a Muslim ghetto, in Rochdale," says Haras 
Rafiq, director of the moderate Muslim think-tank Centri. "I never even saw a niqab 
until I was 19. They have grown enormously." 
Tower Hamlets is headquarters to a particularly pernicious form of Islamic radicalism. 
Over us in the Whitechapel Road towered the East London Mosque, funded by Saudi 
Arabia and controlled by the hardline Islamic Forum of Europe, accused by the local 
Labour MP of infiltrating his party to further its declared goal of a sharia state in 
Europe.  
[…] 
Yet it is still too simplistic to say, as the French have done, that niqab-wearer equals 
Islamist radical. Many of the niqabi women we spoke to did feel that Islam was under 
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attack – a key element of the Islamist worldview. But this did not usually translate 
into political activism. "It was not a political thing at all," said one woman. "It was 
personal." Surprisingly, some of the niqabi women we spoke to did not even go to the 
mosque. None said they were members of any organisation or group. At best, the 
niqab is a symptom, not a cause. (The Daily Telegraph, April 16, 2011). 
 
Here, a diasporic Muslim Bangladeshi community living in London is looked at. The author 
describes the niqab  s   ―S udi g rment‖ (l. 2) th t is ― lmost completely unknown‖ (ll. 2-3) 
in B ngl desh. In London, within h lf  n hour, he s w  bout ―twenty niqabi women‖ (l. 5) 
wearing it. This practice of Bangladeshi women living in London wearing a Saudi garment is 
indicative of the postmodern processes of cultural hybridity. Niqabs are then described as 
h ving ―grown enormously‖ (l. 8) in London, and this personification of the veil as growing, 
assigns the object importance. The extract also identifies Tower Hamlets and a ghetto in 
Rochdale as Muslim spaces. Tower Hamlets is described as the ―he dqu rters to   
p rticul rly pernicious form of Isl mic r dic lism‖ (l. 9). This can be construed as a threat, 
particularly because it is a space within Britain. The extract draws on threatening imagery by 
using words like ―pernicious‖, describing the mosque as towering, and linking the mosque to 
Saudi Arabia which is often associated with hardline, literalist movements. As in extract 16 
above, extract 17 also draws on the rhetoric of conservative, traditionalist organisations as a 
threat.  Here, accusations are made by a local MP that the Islamic Forum of Europe wants to 
establish a sharia state in Europe.  
 
Although the mention of radicalism and threats to Europe takes place within an article of the 
niqab, the practice of veiling is not always directly implicated with fundamentalism or 
Islamist extremism. As the article continues, the extract above indicates that wearing the 
niqab does not equate to being a radical Islamist. It also shows that wearing the niqab can be 
  ―person l‖ (l. 18) decision that does not suggest belonging to a political organisation. 
Interestingly, while trying to dispel misconceptions, the author found it surprising that some 
of the women who wear the niqab ―did not even go to the mosque‖ (ll. 19-20). This indicates 
a misunderstanding of Islam as attendance at the mosque is compulsory for men, but optional 
for women (Al-Johar, 2005). Non-attendance is therefore not that unusual. Notably, the 
extract ends with the niqab being c lled   ―symptom‖ (l. 21) at best of radical Islamism. This 
  99 
suggests that while there is no direct link, there is still an association between the niqab and 
radical Islamism. Even though the veil is not directly constructed as problematic, discourses 
related to fundamentalism and extremism are included within the article.  
 
4.4.3.1 Hijab and agency. From the above discussions two broad themes can be 
delineated: Muslim women who wear the veil and/or headscarf are paradoxically depicted as 
either passive victims of an oppressive culture/religion, or they are depicted as an active 
threat to Western society and culture (Bilge, 2010). Where veiling is equated with oppression, 
the veil is taken as a sign of subjugation and whether women wear it through consent or 
force, does not appear to change its meaning (Bilge, 2010). Where the veil is constructed as a 
sign of resistance, or a threat, Bilge (2010) c lls this ―instrument list reductionism‖ (p. 20) 
whereby the motivation and the outcome of veiling are amalgamated. In this way the reasons 
for veiling are ignored, and the focus is on the outcome or effect that the veil has. These two 
readings of veiled Muslim women cast them as devoid of agency. The data, however, did 
reveal variation in the construction/positioning of Muslim women. In extract 18 below, we 
see multiple reasons given for the veil, with the women constructed as having agency. They 
also attribute different meanings to the veil. 
 
Extract 18 
"I used to go clubbing, I used to drink, I used to wear skinny jeans," said Ms Jama, 
who is 28 and from Barking. "But I just got thinking it wasn't right. I had lots of men 
and I never got anything out of it. They would use me and then leave me. They would 
look at me like a piece of meat, and this [the niqab] stops all that. 
"It is hard in other ways. I live near Essex, and people are sometimes hostile. But it's 
still better. It gives me confidence." 
Ms Jama's friend, who did not want to be named, said: "We do it because there's a 
higher reward. There's a lot of things [Islamic obligations] we're not capable of doing 
but we can do this." 
Many of the women insisted that wearing the veil was an act not of repression but of 
self-assertion. "I am doing it to assert my identity as a Muslim," said another young 
woman, Karima. "My parents hate it, actually. My father keeps threatening to throw 
me out." I got a strong sense that for at least some of them it was part of finding an 
identity in the same way that a white teenager might dye her hair or become a goth. 
(The Daily Telegraph, April 16, 2011). 
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In extract 18, it is shown that women wear the veil as an act of assertion, or to control how 
others perceive, or behave towards them. Ms J m ‘s re son for veiling indic tes th t the 
presence of the veil stopped men from looking  t her ―like   piece of me t‖ (l. 4). She also 
suggests that it transformed her sense of self (Tarlo, 2007), when she says that despite 
hostility from people, we ring the veil ―gives [her] confidence‖ (l. 6). Ms J m ‘s friend 
offers a different reason for veiling, saying that they do it ―bec use there‘s   higher rew rd‖ 
(ll. 7-8). There is mention here th t the veil is  n ―Isl mic oblig tion‖ (l. 8), which they are 
capable of fulfilling. The young woman Karima wears the veil to assert her identity as a 
Muslim,  nd her test ment th t her p rents ―h te it‖ (l. 12),  nd her f ther thre tens ―to throw 
[her] out‖ (ll. 12-13) subverts the stereotype of the veil as a symbol of patriarchal oppression. 
The  uthor of the  rticle  lso suggests th t veiling is ―p rt of finding  n identity‖ (ll. 13-14) 
akin to dyeing your hair or becoming a goth. This idea of the veil/hijab being used to 
formulate an identity is also evident in the extract below. 
 
Extract 19 
But Sarsour believes she can embody her two identities: that of a Muslim of 
Palestinian descent, and that of an American woman born and bred in Brooklyn. "My 
American side marries my Palestinian side well. Americans in general, we are very 
steadfast people, we know what we want, we get what we want. My American side 
makes me fearless." 
Which is perhaps why Sarsour's ambitions lie beyond the AAANY. She has already 
flung herself into local Democratic politics by organising voter drives in Brooklyn. 
She believes that through hard work and campaigning she can persuade not only the 
Muslim Americans of Bay Ridge to vote for her, but also the rest of the community: 
the Italian Americans, the Irish Americans and the Russians. Anyone, really, 
regardless of faith. She aims to stand for office one day, wearing her hijab. "I care 
about affordable housing, I care about bus routes, I care about small business, I care 
about schools. These are not Muslim issues. Even protection of civil rights – that's not 
just a Muslim issue. That is for everyone." 
Ten years after 9/11, perhaps one of the least expected outcomes of that terrible day 
will be a headscarf-wearing Arab American woman hitting the streets of Brooklyn 
and asking her fellow citizens for their votes. (The Guardian, September 5, 2011). 
 
In extract 19 S rsour is   ―he dsc rf-we ring Ar b Americ n wom n‖ (l. 16), embodying two 
identities. As an American woman Sarsour shows that she is well integrated into American 
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society, h ving ―flung herself into loc l Democr tic politics‖ (l. 7) and relating her desire to 
run for office one day. At the same time though, she is a Muslim of Palestinian descent, and 
wears a headsc rf. While S rsour‘s  mbition  nd  ctions show th t her n tion l identity  s  n 
American are important, her headscarf equally serves as an important marker of her religious 
and ethnic identity. As such, the headscarf allows Sarsour to maintain her concurrent 
identities.  
 
4.4.3.2 Overlooking women’s agency. 
 Although the data showed that Muslim women can be positioned as having agency, for the 
most part it is suggested that this agency is overlooked. As the discussions above indicated, 
the veil/headscarf is often t ken  s symbolic of women‘s oppression by Isl mic p tri rchy, 
and in Western countries this oppression is considered incompatible with Western values and 
national character (Bilge, 2010). Ironically, where effort is made to counter gender 
discrimination against Muslim women, such as banning the veil, discrimination is itself 
 chieved (Fern ndez, 2009). This is bec use on the grounds of their sex, Muslim women‘s 
autonomy is not recognised, and they are unable to freely practice their religion in the same 
way that Muslim men can. It could therefore be argued that the focus on minority gender 
relations obscures forms of oppression that occur on a majority-minority level through social 
divisions such as nation, class or race, and they further obscure how ― ssumptions  bout 
gender  re r ci lised  nd how cultur l othering is modul ted by gender‖ (Bilge, 2010, p. 18). 
Therefore by focusing on one subordinating practice, such as Muslim sexism, other existing 
hierarchies are maintained (Bilge, 2010). These hierarchies include cultural hierarchies where 
for example British/Western societies are considered liberal with regard to women, whereas 
Islamic societies are considered inherently sexist. This conflation of Islam with culture 
however, contributes to the further marginalisation of women.  
 
Extract 20 below offers some insight into how the overlooking of Muslim women‘s  gency 
can be frustrating for them because it leads to their marginalisation and denies them the 
ability to contribute to society. In the extract Tehmina Kazi expresses frustration at the 
stereotyping of Muslim women as oppressed. Her views are echoed by Sarah Khan who finds 
it ―p tronising‖ (l. 19) to s y th t ―Muslim women  re oppressed or don‘t contribute‖ (l. 19). 
Kazi finds that this perception of Muslim women is m nifest in ―the medi  preoccup tion 
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with the hij b‖ (ll. 22-23). This close association made between Muslim women and articles 
of clothing is evident in K zi‘s own experience. As director of British Muslims for Secul r 
Democracy, Kazi seeks to ch llenge Isl mic extremism. She is one of   ―sm ll but growing 
number of British Muslim women‖ (l. 9) doing so. This indicates that there are Muslim 
women who are participating in British society, actively addressing issues that affect them. 
For this though, K zi been ―l belled   whore,  dmonished for not we ring the hij b  nd 
 ccused, in ccur tely, of we ring short skirts by people she h s never met‖ (ll. 2-4). Kazi 
goes on to s y ―They  lw ys t lk  bout wh t you we r‖ (l. 14), and later relates how she tired 
of the media obsession surrounding the hijab and stopped wearing it. Discussing women 
within the context of clothing alone is a reductive, essentialising approach. As the extract 
indicates, Muslim women have the potential to contribute to society, but their efforts are 
undermined or overshadowed by discourses fixated on their dress. 
 
Extract 20 
Tehmina Kazi wears modest western dress and believes in plurality and diversity 
within her faith, Islam. For her pains, she has been labelled a whore, admonished for 
not wearing the hijab and accused, inaccurately, of wearing short skirts by people she 
has never met, writing online. 
When she defended Usama Hasan, the London imam who faced death threats and was 
suspended from Leyton mosque last month after he said evolution was compatible 
with Islam, she had to go to police after receiving threats of her own. 
Despite this, Kazi, the director of British Muslims for Secular Democracy, remains 
defiant in her role as one of the small but growing number of British Muslim women 
challenging and combating Islamic extremism. Campaigning against any extremism is 
not for the faint-hearted, but for Muslim women it requires a special kind of resolve. 
"It takes a lot more courage to do this if you're a woman because the type of criticism 
you get is very different," she says, highlighting the personal nature of the abuse. 
"They always talk about what you wear." 
Kazi believes women should be free to wear whatever they choose – it is stereotypes 
about Muslim women that she aims to confront. 
…. 
These views are echoed by Sara Khan who set up Inspire two years ago because she 
felt there was no organisation helping Muslim women to achieve their potential. "It's 
quite patronising. To say Muslim women are oppressed or don't contribute is just so 
patronising – no community wants to be stereotyped." 
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Khan makes no attempt to hide her frustration as she rails against the wider perception 
of Muslim women, which, for her, manifests itself in the media preoccupation with 
the hijab. Khan wore the hijab for 15 years before she tired of the "obsession" 
surrounding it. Despite Khan's frustration at stereotyping, she is not blind to the fact 
that not all Muslim women have had the same freedom and opportunities as she has, 
recognising that there are "Muslim women not allowed to go out of the house". (The 
Guardian, April 29, 2011). 
 
In the extract it is acknowledged by Kazi that there are Muslim women being oppressed, who 
don‘t h ve ―the s me freedom  nd opportunities  s she h s‖ (l. 25), but her frustration is 
directed at the perception that all Muslim women are oppressed. The oppression of women is 
not necessarily rooted within the Islamic tradition. Esposito (2002) points out that historically 
the revelation of Islam raised the status of women by abolishing female infanticide that was 
pr cticed  t the time,  bolishing women‘s st tus  s property,  nd est blishing their leg l 
capacity, right to receive their own dowry, and control over their property (Esposito, 2002). 
He also points out that in the Qur‟an men and women are discussed as created to be equal 
p rts of   p ir (51:49). Men  re not t ken  s superior; inste d God‘s expressed preference for 
individuals in the Qur‟an is b sed on   person‘s f ith, not their gender (Esposito, 2002). 
Islam, however, has become established in societies that have long been patriarchal, and 
Islamic laws and Qur‟anic verses were interpreted by men. The oppression of women is 
therefore not inherent to Islam, but is instead a result of societal and cultural practices. Where 
Muslim women are today struggling to attain their rights within their own communities, this 
is no different to women‘s liber tion struggles th t h ve taken place in the West. Depicting 
their oppression as inherent to Islam, only serves to stereotype Muslims in a negative way.   
  
Kundnani (2007) points out that there is no great difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim women‘s oppression,  nd in effect, the intent focus on Isl m  llows for other 
communities to conceal their own oppressive practices. Extract 21 below offers more of an 
indic tion on how gender issues  re stereotypic lly depicted  s ‗Muslim issues‘ in the medi .  
 
 
 
 
  104 
Extract 21 
Atakav said the course would be an important way of changing perceptions of Islam. 
Study materials include films and TV programmes from around the world, including 
Iran, the US, Turkey and China. "We will look at how the media talk about 'honour'-
based violence, for example. If it's a Middle Eastern woman who happens also to be a 
Muslim woman it's called an 'honour crime'. But if it's a British woman who was 
killed because her husband was jealous because she was having an affair with another 
man, it's called murder. 
"These crimes happen everywhere in the world, it's not just a Muslim, or just a 
Middle Eastern thing." (The Guardian, January 19, 2012). 
 
The extract looks at how honour-based violence is labelled differently according to 
ethnicity/religious identity. If a Muslim Middle Eastern woman is killed it is called an 
―honour crime‖ (l. 5), but if a British woman is killed it is called murder. The exclusive use 
of the term ―honour crime‖ for Muslims, suggests th t this is   pr ctice th t Muslims  lone 
carry out, yet it is no different to the violence carried out against women in other parts of the 
world. This follows Kundn ni‘s (2007)  rgument th t episodes of domestic violence in 
British society receive less media attention than the honour killings carried out by Muslims. 
While it is correct to expose the justifications (i.e. honour) that Muslim men use to legitimise 
violence, this should not be done in way that depicts the fight against Muslim gender violence 
as a fight against culture or religion, while combatting violence against non-Muslims is seen 
as a fight for rights (Kundnani, 2007). Depicting Muslim women‘s oppression  s uniquely 
derived from Islam, counter-poses a religion against global systems and structures and 
Shaheed (2002) explains that this impedes an understanding of structural inequalities, 
belittles the efforts of those trying to execute change in their societies, and clouds the 
different political and social forces that are often in conflict within particular countries or 
regions. It also serves to stereotype Muslims in a negative way, which places Muslims as a 
whole on the defensive, inhibiting the potential for self-critical analysis which would 
otherwise lead to growth and change (Shaheed, 2002). 
 
4.4.4 Identity, visibility and integration. The above discussions show that the veil 
is still discussed within discourses of female oppression, and religious or political 
fundamentalism. In addition to this, the analysis of the data also revealed that the 
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veil/headscarf is often discussed in relation to identity, visibility and integration. The 
headscarf/veil is constructed as symbolic of Muslim women‘s in bility to integr te/be 
integrated. Notably, discourses of identity, visibility and integration mostly alluded to 
Muslim women  nd not men. From this it could possibly be  rgued th t women‘s bodies  re 
design ted  s   ―key b ttle site of cultur l imperi lism‖ (Fernandez, 2009, p. 272). Women 
are believed to have an important role in the biological reproduction of members of nations 
and ethnic groups, and traditionally they are held as responsible for the socialisation of the 
young (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989, cited in Moghadam, 1999). This m rks women‘s 
bodies as transmitters of culture, traditions, and symbols of community (Moghadam, 1999). 
This ide  of women  s   signifier of culture is rooted in ―coloni l im ginings of the fem le 
Other‘s body‖  nd continues to inform contempor ry ―western responses to the pr ctices of 
the Other‖ (Fern ndez, 2009, p. 272). Looked  t  nother w y, dress is   cultur l phenomenon 
that signifies belonging to a particular group, and simultaneously differentiates an individual 
from others (Barnes & Eicher, 1997). This means that dress as a signifier has the ability to 
include and exclude, and therefore plays a role in the contestation and negotiation of identity 
(Dwyer, 1999).  
 
In the extracts that follow the idea of women as signifiers of culture is evident, and so is the 
idea of the veil/headscarf as a visible marker of difference. The extracts look at the 
veil/headscarf in the context of the French ban on veiling in public. This news coverage by 
British newspapers on the ban in France mostly appears neutral, and at times sympathetic 
toward Muslim women. For the most part though, it would appear that coverage of the ban 
publicises the practice of hijab and for the British public this could function to highlight the 
‗otherness‘ of Muslim women.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, national identity is no longer based on an unchanging 
singular ethnicity, but is rather based on values and cultural similarity (Kundnani, 2007). In 
France, the idea of secularism is central to French culture and society (Ardizzoni, 2004). 
Secularism restricts religion to the private sphere with the aim of constructing a more 
equitable society, and therefore observable displays of religion are rejected (Ardizzoni, 
2004). Muslim women‘s decision to we r the veil/he dsc rf dist nces them from the 
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m instre m culture,  nd is therefore perceived  s   contest tion  g inst   ―n tion l identity 
b sed on secul rism  nd  ssimil tion‖ (Ardizzoni, 2004, p. 638). 
 
According to van Dijk (1997), debates around integration and assimilation can be taken as 
features of racist rhetoric. In their study on acculturation, Bowskill et al. (2007) found that 
integration was often used synonymously with ―  privileging of  ssimil tive outcomes‖ (p. 
805). Integration would thus mean a minimisation of difference between groups through 
conformity to mainstream values (Bowskill et al., 2007). When looking at the integration of 
Muslims, assimilation is often implemented through measures such as the altering of 
citizenship laws, compulsory language and civics tests for citizenship applicants, codes of 
conduct for trustees of mosques, and cultural codes of conduct for Muslim women (Fekete, 
2004). Legislation that aims to assimilate racial others is also characteristic of what Lentin 
(2007) calls the racist state.  In the extracts below, the drive towards assimilation is evident in 
Fr nce‘s b nning of the veil,  nd secul rist rhetoric.  
 
Extract 22 
Why are record numbers of French people now voting Front National? 
"Fear," he says with a sigh. "People are afraid of everything. There has been a 
banking crisis, a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis, a geostrategic 
crisis and an environmental crisis. 
"That's considerable in a country that's used to being protected. But the Front National 
doesn't have any answers." 
Copé claims the UMP's best tactic is "solutions" such as the niqab ban. It's about 
women's rights and the notion of living together, he argues. "If you meet a woman in 
a burqa, she can't reply to your smile. It's a denial of identity." (The Guardian, March 
24, 2011). 
 
In the extract above, French politician Copé, in discussing his p rty‘s loss to the Front 
National party, explains that France has been through so many crises that its people are now 
fe rful of ―everything‖ (l. 2). Copé then says that the niqab b n is one of his p rty‘s best 
t ctic l ―solutions‖ (l. 7) to these fears, implying that the niqab is something that was feared, 
or symbolic of something thre tening. He  lso refers to women‘s rights,  nd the ―notion of 
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living together‖ (l. 8), indicating a perception of the niqab as oppressive and as a barrier to 
interaction and coexistence. Copé is then ambiguous when he says that a woman in a burqa 
―c n‘t reply to your smile‖ (l. 9),  nd follows this st tement with ―It‘s   deni l of identity‖ (l. 
9). This could mean that Muslim women are unable to interact, and are denied an identity by 
covering up. It could also be interpreted to mean that burqa-clad women deny others access 
to their identity and the right to have their civility reciprocated. 
 
Cop ‘s reference to ―rights‖ (l. 8) indicates a rights discourse, where women have the right to 
be free from the supposed patriarchal oppression that the veil indicates, and French citizens 
have the right to be free from the cultural/extremist threat that the veil symbolises. According 
to Freedman (2007) this presents an antagonism between advocating universal rights for 
women on the one h nd,  nd protecting minorities‘ cultur l rights on the other. This is 
because banning the headscarf/veil in the name of universal rights is arguably a Eurocentric 
conception of women‘s rights,  nd ends up infringing on Muslim women‘s right to observe 
their religion or culture (Freedman, 2007). And where the veil is associated with an extremist 
thre t, shifts in n tion l policy occur from  n ― ssertion of the ‗right to difference‘, and a 
defence of minority rights, to   more strongly  ssimil tionist  ppro ch‖ (Freedm n, 2007, p. 
29). In this way, minorities are required to moderate or subdue their religious or cultural 
identity in order to be accepted. Furthermore, in the extract that follows, it is seen that far 
from protecting Muslim women, the ban places further limitations on their rights. 
 
 
Extract 23 
Under the law promoted by Nicolas Sarkozy, any Muslim woman wearing a face veil 
is now banned from all public places in France, including when walking down the 
street, taking a train, going to hospital or collecting her children from school. Women 
in niqabs will be effectively under house arrest, allowed only inside a place of 
worship or a private car, although they risk being stopped by traffic police if they 
drive. (The Guardian, April 11, 2011). 
 
If Muslim women we r the veil, they will be ―b nned from  ll public pl ces in Fr nce‖ (l. 2). 
This effectively prevents them from carrying out daily activities such  s ―walking down the 
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street, taking a train, going to hospital or collecting [their] children from school‖ (ll. 2-3). 
Essenti lly this pl ces them ―under house  rrest‖ (l. 4). Banning them from public places will 
also result in their reduced visibility. The issue of Muslims‘ visibility in Fr nce could be 
viewed  s simil r to Rich rdson‘s (2004)  ssertion th t the visibility of British Muslims 
disrupts the imagined privilege of white culture and ethnicity in a national space that is 
conceived of as its own. In extract 24 from the same article, however, it shows that many 
Muslim women in France who wear the veil are ―French converts‖ (l. 5) meaning they are 
national citizens.  
 
Extract 24 
Women in f ce veils risk   €150 (£132) fine or citizenship lessons. Police cannot 
forcibly remove face coverings in the street but can order women to a police station to 
check their identity. The government estimates between 350 and 2,000 women cover 
their faces in France, out of a total Muslim population between four and six million. 
Some niqab-wearers – many of them French converts – vowed to continue going out 
and to take their cases to the European court of human rights if stopped by police. 
Others have moved abroad, while just one woman told French papers she had 
permanently removed her face covering. (The Guardian, April 11, 2011). 
 
Brubaker (1992, cited in Hussein & Bagguley, 2005) argues that citizenship involves 
inclusion and exclusion, and in most European states the status of citizens is recognised by 
their country of birth. In the extract above though, the measures taken against women who 
veil indicate that even though Muslim women might be native to France, their Muslim 
identity will prevent them from fitting in. This reflects the idea that citizenship and identity 
are often counter-posed to each other (Hussein & Bagguley, 2005). Citizenship is seen to 
encompass universal rights and duties, whereas identity implies particularism and group 
membership (Hussein & Bagguley, 2005). Subjecting women to citizenship lessons if they 
wear the veil reinforces the idea that symbols of Muslim-ness do not fit into French society. 
So even though they  re French citizens, the women‘s Muslim identity positions them  s  n 
out-group. Furthermore, a state ban on the veil could legitimise cultural racism and even 
make way for institutionalised racism through legislation. As the extract above indicates, 
under the ban the practice of veiling in public is illegal and Muslim women risk being fined, 
or ordered to police stations for identity checks. This not only stigmatises Muslim women, 
but contributes to a sense of criminalisation.  
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In extract 24 it is also estimated that out of a total Muslim population of 4-6 million, only 350 
– 2000 women in France cover their faces. Banning the veil would therefore further 
marginalise a small minority of women, within an already marginalised population in France. 
That the practice of such a small number of women has caused so much debate, however, 
suggests that the niqab alone is not the problem, but is representative of a trend toward anti-
Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia. Extract 25 below supports the idea that the niqab alone 
is not the problem; instead the ban indicates a need to contain Muslim visibility in France.  
 
Extract 25 
Topics include the building of mosques – a few overcrowded, makeshift prayer-rooms 
spill on to the street – as well as Sarkozy's drive to ban halal food in secular school 
canteens and define how French imams should preach. 
Sarkozy's former diversity adviser, sacked for denouncing the debate, called Copé an 
Islamophobe. 
Copé dismisses this outright. He argues that fundamentalists are creating a "deformed 
caricature" of Islam and stoking tension in France. 
"There are a certain number of extreme behaviours led by fundamentalists who are 
using their religion for political ends and use extremist techniques," he says, citing 
street prayers, the niqab, women refusing to be treated by male doctors and girls 
banned by their parents from mixed swimming sessions. 
"None of these phenomena existed 10 years ago. They have developed today with 
fundamentalism. The Front National is seizing on them to caricature Muslims and 
exacerbate tensions. 
"All this is happening with a backdrop in France of a social crisis, and an identity 
crisis for some recent immigrant families who haven't been able to integrate for 
various reasons: they were put in ghettos, they have education or professional 
problems, crime or they can't make ends meet." 
The 1905 French law separating church and state predated the arrival of most 
Muslims, he argues, so now "Islam in France" must be defined. "We have to remind 
of the rules of secularism and come up with concrete measures." (The Guardian, 
March 24, 2011).  
 
In the extract it appears that the niqab is taken as symbolic of Islam in general. Debates in 
France include topics related to other Islamic practices such prayer, halal (permissible) food, 
and the sermons delivered by imams (leaders). The extract provides a crude description of 
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mosques  s ―overcrowded‖,  nd ―m keshift‖ (l. 1) which indicates a basic and 
unsophistic ted structure. The mosques ―spill on to the streets‖ (l. 2), and this suggests an 
image of makeshift mosque structures spreading beyond a boundary or limit. This can be 
taken as expressive of the need to contain Islam. Later in the extract Copé speaks of how 
―‗Isl m in Fr nce‘ must be defined‖ (l. 20). The French need to define Islam reflects an 
Orient list  ppro ch of defining  nd cont ining the ‗other‘ on one‘s own terms.  
 
Another example of how Islam is defined by others is where Copé denies being an 
Isl mophobe,  nd  rgues th t fund ment lists  re cre ting   ―deformed c ric ture‖ (ll. 6-7) of 
Islam. Although this is a valid point, when Copé cites ―street prayers, the niqab, women 
refusing to be treated by male doctors and girls banned by their parents from mixed 
swimming sessions‖ (ll. 10-11) as examples of extreme behaviour, he himself is presenting a 
distorted image of Islam. These Muslim actions can be taken as acts of religious 
consciousness. In the extract though, religious displays that are conspicuous are interpreted as 
proof of religious extremism. By implication then, any Muslim engaging in devout practice 
could be labelled a fundamentalist.  
 
Although Copé draws on the discourse of Muslim fundamentalism, he mentions how this is 
h ppening with   b ckdrop of ―  soci l crisis,  nd  n identity crisis‖ (ll. 15-16). He explains 
that recent immigrant families have been unable to successfully integrate because they live in 
ghettos, have educational and employment problems, or experience crime and poverty. 
Immigration issues in France are thus generating a social crisis and it is possible that this 
social crisis is what creates a xenophobic attitude toward immigrants. Islamophobia in France 
could then possibly be explained by this immigrant crisis. Immigrants are often identified by 
their ethnicity, but their ethnic minority identity is conflated with religious identity. This is 
because religious identity is often embedded in ethnicity (Cesari, 2002). As a result, it is 
possible that the prejudice directed at ethnic minority groups will lead to prejudice against 
Muslims and Islam more generally.  
 
The idea of Muslims posing   cultur l thre t in Fr nce is l ter  ffirmed by Cop ‘s  rgument 
th t secul rist l w ―pred ted the  rriv l of most Muslims‖ (ll. 19-20) in France. This 
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est blishes Muslims‘ out-group status, and constructs them as a constitutive outside. Where 
Copé c lls on the rules of secul rism  nd  dvoc tes ―concrete me sures‖ (l. 21), Muslims are 
effectively denied the ability to practice their religion freely. For example, banning halal food 
in secular school canteens would marginalize Muslim students. Attempts to control how 
Isl m is pr cticed  re  lso evident in the need to ―define how French im ms pre ch‖ (l. 3). 
This interference in religious practice also goes against the secularist ideals that are 
promoted.  While France uses the pretext of being a secular state, Sivanandan (2006) argues 
that secularist states have yet to distinguish between rites and rights. Religious symbols that 
people exhibit, such as the cross or hijab, are viewed as a rite, but from the view of the 
secular state, they are a right. This is because a secular state is defined by equality of 
individual liberty, where   person‘s freedom is limited only by  nother‘s (Siv n nd n, 2006).  
 
It could therefore be argued that debates around the veil are less because of secularism, and 
more  bout the veil being   symbolic element of the ‗other‘. The b nning of it is possibly  n 
attempt to reduce the visibility of Islam in France so that the culture of French society is 
preserved. This discourse that perceives Islam and the face veil as a threat to the culture of 
French society is consistent with the Orientalist way of constructing binaries: secularism 
versus Islam, ‗us‘ versus ‗them‘,  nd E st versus West (Ardizzoni, 2004). Ardizzoni (2004) 
argues that such a narrow approach reflects a notion of identity as bounded and complete. 
Identities however, as discussed earlier, are contextual, relational, always in a process of 
formation and never to be taken as complete (Hall, 2000). 
 
4.5 Extremes in variation in the construction of Muslims 
In this section, I look at the extremes in variation when it comes to the construction of 
Muslims. On the one hand, Muslims are comprehensively racialised. This has the effect of 
identifying them as different. It also indicates how religion has come to stand in for race. And 
on the other end, Muslims are constructed using a rhetoric of inclusiveness where their values 
are seen as compatible with British/Western values.  
 
4.5.1 The Racialisation of Muslims.  When looking at how Muslims are identified, 
a process of racialization is apparent in the data.  Dunn et al. (2007) explain that new racism 
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finds continuity in drawing on the physical features of targets be they observable bodily 
features, clothing, or place of residence. In the data analysed, Muslims were recognised as 
different based on features such as clothing and place of residence. In extract 26 Sarsour, a 
Palestinian Muslim, recalls a moment following the 9/11 terror attacks, when she realised her 
experience of being   Muslim in Americ  w s  bout to ch nge. S rsour‘s mother w s rushing 
out to pick up her son from school, but without her hijab on. The extract shows how skin 
colour is not used as an indicator of difference, bec use her brother ―looks like   white kid‖ 
(l. 3). Rather it is the hijab that her mother felt would h ve  lerted people to the boy‘s 
Muslim identity.  
 
Extract 26 
"I bumped into her," Sarsour says. "I was: 'Mom! You forgot to wear your hijab.' And 
she said: 'We can't wear it.' She was going to pick up my brother from middle school. 
My brother looks like a white kid with dark hair and she didn't want to wear a hijab so 
that people would not know he was a Muslim. I was speechless." (The Guardian, 
September 5, 2011).  
 
Extracts 27 and 28 indicate that on top of clothing, an identifying physical feature is the beard 
for men. Moreover, the beard is associated with extremism or fundamentalism. Extract 27 
refers to the ―be rdies‖ (l. 2) which are militant extremists in Russia, whereas extract 28 
mentions G dd fi we ring   ―be rd‖ (l. 2) th t is ch r cteristic of ―the fund ment list 
s l fists, or w h bi interpret tion of Isl m‖ (l. 3). He  lso reportedly c rried ―pr yer be ds‖ 
(l. 4). This portrayal of beards and prayer beads as representative of extremism or 
fundamentalism indicates an Islamophobic approach. It is irrational and essentialising to take 
these features as characteristic of extremism/fundamentalism because these items are often 
taken as symbolic of faith, thus it is unlikely that every person with a beard or prayer beads is 
an extremist.  
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Extract 27 
Albert, a taxi driver who declined to give his surname, said: "Every other day 
someone is exterminated. The beardies [extremists] leave leaflets around town 
threatening, 'don't go to this doctor, don't get your hair cut by a woman.'" (The 
Guardian, February 20, 2011).  
 
Extract 28 
Gaddafi, who has only twice agreed to be interviewed since the rebel uprising in 
Libya in February, had transformed his appearance. He wore a beard which was 
characteristic of the fundamentalist salafist, or wahabi interpretation of Islam during 
the interview, and reportedly carried Islamic prayer beads. (The Guardian, August 4, 
2011). 
 
This generalisation or reductive use of physical features to signpost Muslims is again evident 
in the extract below. Here, the extract uses metonyms, which is when a concept or word is 
substituted with another closely associated word (Richardson, 2007). By referring to Muslims 
 s ―be rds  nd hij bs‖ (l. 2), the extract shows how intimately linked these physical features 
are with Muslim people. The use of metonyms like ―be rd‖/―hijabs‖ is reductive though, as it 
reduces Muslim men and women to simplistic observable features. It also disregards the fact 
that not all Muslim men have beards, and neither do all Muslim women wear the hijab.  
 
Extract 29 
But from my own vantage point on the platform at Hyde Park that afternoon, I was 
disappointed to see few beards or hijabs among the sea of faces in the crowd – despite 
the fact that deprived Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities will be hit hardest by 
the coalition's cuts to public services. (The Guardian, April 2, 2011). 
 
Another way in which Muslims are racialised is by identifying Muslim spaces or places of 
residence. The occupation of an urban space by an ethnic minority community often leads to 
the racialisation of that space, and that neighbourhood can become stigmatised or 
discriminated against (Andersson, 1998). In the extract 30 below, Rochdale is referred to as a 
Muslim ―ghetto‖ (l. 1). The word ―ghetto‖ h s connot tions of   poor, crime ridden 
neighbourhood. This is evident in extract 31. As a result of being placed in ghettos Muslim 
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immigrant families in France are unable to integrate, and an association with educational 
problems, unemployment and crime is made. 
 
Extract 30 
"I grew up in what people would call a Muslim ghetto, in Rochdale," says Haras 
Rafiq, director of the moderate Muslim think-tank Centri. (The Daily Telegraph, April 
16, 2011). 
 
Extract 31 
"All this is happening with a backdrop in France of a social crisis, and an identity 
crisis for some recent immigrant families who haven't been able to integrate for 
various reasons: they were put in ghettos, they have education or professional 
problems, crime or they can't make ends meet." (The Guardian, March 24, 2011). 
 
On a larger scale, the data revealed that countries too were identified as Muslim spaces. 
R ther th n focusing on n tion lity, these countries were identified  s ―Isl mic‖,  nd the 
citizens were  lso spoken of in rel tion to their religious identity: ―Muslims‖  nd 
―Christi ns‖. The result of this is a conflation of political practices with Islamic principles. 
This was clear in extract 8 discussed earlier where young Muslims in Indonesia are urged to 
 b ndon the ―de d-end choice of dict torship  nd extremism‖ (l. 2) suggesting that these are 
characteristic of Muslim countries. When discussing countries that have a predominantly 
Muslim population, the articles appear to conflate political ideologies with a religion. While 
it is plausible that these countries use religion in an instrumental way, it is too simplistic to 
say that their political systems and activities are a reflection of the values inherent to Islam.  
 
4.5.2 Compatibility between Islamic and British/Western values. The 
racialisation of Muslims indicates a constructed difference between ‗them‘  nd ‗us‘. A 
consequence of this is th t the self‘s politic l or cultur l systems  re seen  s superior to th t 
of the ‗other‘. Allen (2010) suggests th t this is bec use there is such   strong  tt chment to 
‗our‘ w y of life th t it inevitably leads to a negative interpretation of other cultures. 
Although the data largely appeared to support this, there were some articles which suggested 
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that Islamic/Muslim values were compatible with British/Western values. These articles 
introduced variation not only in the way Muslims were constructed, but also in terms of 
subject matter. While the preceding discussions indicated a narrow focus on particular topics 
such as extremism, sharia law and the headscarf/veil, the extract that follows is from an 
article about a famous Muslim musician.    
 
Extract 32  
In 2007, the Lebanese-born Swedish musician Maher Zain was in the US, preparing 
for the next stage of his career. He was working with chart-topping artists and 
recording with the Grammy-winning music producer RedOne, himself a Swede of 
`Moroccan heritage. Success was almost within his grasp. Even so, he could feel 
something was wrong. 
"I felt that the music business was very empty," Zain says from a hotel room in Cairo, 
over Skype. "In the west, all the songs are about love and getting hurt, but there's 
more to life than that." After making some new Muslim friends in Sweden and finding 
solace in going to the mosque, he began to practise Islam seriously. But music was 
something he had loved from a young age and he didn't want to abandon it. Instead, 
he made a transition: he swapped secular music for something more religious. 
In the process, he ended up finding celebrity status anyway. His debut album, Thank 
You Allah, released in late 2009, became a worldwide sensation: the record took top 
position on Amazon.com's world music chart, and was the best-selling album of the 
decade in Malaysia. In Indonesia, it even knocked Justin Bieber off the leading spot. 
Zain has been criticised by some Muslims for using musical instruments – a 
contentious issue in Islamic jurisprudence, with many scholars insisting the voice 
should take minimal accompaniment. However, Zain's use of music represents the 
nuances of his faith, and there are other scholars who argue that activities should be 
considered permissible unless explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an, which music is not. 
"I grew up with music and thus using musical instruments was just natural," Zain 
says. "I did fear a reaction [to using music]. I spoke to some people and they clarified 
that it's just a matter of difference of opinion amongst Muslim scholars and that as 
long as the content is positive and clean, then it will be fine. My music is a message of 
Islam. But I want people to understand what Islam is about. It's a message of peace, 
brotherhood, humanity, respect and love." 
The fusion of east and west permeates Zain's music. In his videos, including 
Insha'Allah and The Chosen One – which have almost 25m YouTube views between 
them – we see him wearing western attire but reflecting on Islamic topics. The 
supposed contrast between the two ways of life is challenged in the videos. "I've 
learned that Islam doesn't contradict with anyone or anytime. It's for everywhere and 
all times," he says.  
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His rise to prominence is emblematic of the Arab revolutions, in which young 
Muslims who don't want to choose between Islam and modernity have played a 
leading role. Zain's latest single, Freedom, was inspired by the uprisings: "Freedom 
comes from what happened in Tunis and then in Egypt. We hope it carries on in a 
peaceful way for freedom to prevail." He is now working on his second album. With 
Islamophobia such a problem in America and Europe, could Zain's music make an 
impact in changing people's perceptions of Islam? "I've seen that people want to hear 
good music but with a positive message. I think it can reach out to new people, given 
the topics and the quality we are hoping to produce."  (The Guardian, December 15, 
2011). 
 
The extract above is from an article looking at Muslim musician, Maher Zain. The article is 
interesting bec use it dr ws on  n Orient list discourse where ‗E st‘  nd ‗West‘  re 
differenti ted. Wh t‘s different though is th t Z in,  s   Muslim, is positioned positively 
within this discourse, and Eastern and Western cultures are seen as reconcilable. For one, 
being   ―Leb nese-born Swedish‖ (l. 1), Z in‘s hybrid identity is a combination of Eastern 
and Western cultures. A similar identity combination is found with his producer RedOne who 
is   ―Swede of Morocc n herit ge‖ (ll. 3-4). Z in‘s c reer is  lso seen to h ve successfully 
spanned both Western and Eastern contexts.  In the extract, Zain is first discussed within a 
Western context. In 2007 he w s in the US ―prep ring for the next st ge of his c reer‖ (ll. 1-
2). His c reer is depicted  s on the rise, with success ― lmost within his gr sp‖ (l. 4).  Despite 
this setting of potenti l c reer success, Z in could feel ―something w s wrong‖ (l. 5). The 
article then shifts to an Eastern context, where Zain is now in Cairo. He explains that he felt 
the ―music business w s very empty‖ (l. 6) in the West and this accounts for his transition. 
 
In accounting for this transition a comparison is made between the East and West, but it is the 
West that is negatively differentiated from the East. Western music culture is perceived as 
sh llow or ―empty‖, where  ll the songs  re  bout ―love‖  nd ―getting hurt‖ (l. 7). Zain says 
th t there is ―more to life th n th t‖ (l. 8). Wh t is p rticul rly not ble here is th t Z in‘s 
transition follows a similar path to the home-grown terrorist described in extract 1. Zain felt 
something w s ―wrong‖ in his career, he became acquainted with some Muslims, started 
going to the mosque and began to practice Islam more seriously. The language used though, 
constructs this as a positive experience. The Muslims he began to spend time with were 
―some new Muslim friends in Sweden‖ (l. 8). As ―friends‖ they c n be perceived  s non-
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threatening, and they are not associated with any foreign ideology, but are inclusively 
positioned ―in Sweden‖. His  ttend nce  t the mosque is  lso constructed  s   positive 
experience as he found ―sol ce‖ (l. 9) in going there. In this way, his transition and swapping 
of ―secul r music‖ for ―religious music‖ (l. 11) is seen as better for him. And the article says 
―he ended up finding celebrity st tus  nyw y‖ (l. 12), suggesting his Muslim identity is not 
problematic. His fame does appear to be more prominent in Eastern, or populated Muslim 
countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, but he topped Am zon.com‘s world music chart 
showing he is likely known worldwide. Additionally, the fact the he is being interviewed by a 
British newspaper suggests a fan base in Britain who would be interested in his story. 
 
Another way in which parallels can be drawn between Zain and the construction of terrorists 
is th t Z in‘s efforts h ve  lso been inspired by current global events in the Muslim world. In 
his c se though, it is  g in   positive re ction. His ―rise to prominence‖ (l. 33) is taken as 
symbolic of the current Ar b revolutions, where young Muslims who ―don‘t w nt to choose 
between Islam and modernity h ve pl yed   le ding role‖ (ll. 34-35). His latest album, he 
says, is inspired by the uprisings in Tunis and Egypt. Unlike the terrorist, violent reactions to 
the w rs in Afgh nist n  nd Ir q, Z in hopes for the uprisings to c rry on in   ―pe ceful w y‖ 
(l. 37), and hopes his music can have some impact on Islamophobia and changing negative 
perceptions about Islam. 
 
The article goes on to mention how Zain has received criticism from some Muslims because 
music is a ―contentious issue in Islamic jurisprudence‖ (l. 17). It also mentions how he did 
―fe r   re ction‖ (l. 22) to using music. The article does not construct the Islamic censuring of 
music as backward, irrational or problematic though. Rather, it provides insight into how 
there  re ―nu nces‖ (l. 19) within the faith, and differences of opinion. This could serve as an 
ex mple of how Isl mic l w works  nd how it bro dly encomp sses  ll  spects of   Muslim‘s 
life. Zain himself does not explicitly state whether he thinks music is permitted or not. For 
him, he ―grew up‖ with music  nd so the use of instruments is ―n tur l‖ (l. 21).  
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Fin lly, the  rticle‘s positive positioning of Z in within  n Orient list discourse is 
p rticul rly evident where it s ys ―The fusion of e st  nd west perme tes Z in‘s music‖ (l. 
27). In his videos he is we ring ―western  ttire but reflecting on Isl mic topics‖ (l. 29). 
According to the  rticle this ―fusion‖ of cultures ch llenges the notion th t there is   contr st 
between Islam and the West. The Islamic values that Zain says his music aims to share, are 
univers l v lues of ―pe ce, brotherhood, hum nity, respect  nd love‖ (ll. 25-26), prompting 
him to  dd th t Isl m is ―for everywhere  nd  ll times‖ (ll. 31-32).  
 
In the extracts that follow, there is again variation in the way that Muslims are constructed. 
The three extracts (33, 34 and 35) are from the same article which is about an exhibition at 
the British Museum looking at the Muslim pilgrimage or hajj. The article seeks to dispel 
prejudices against Islam, and although long, it is very detailed and provides an in-depth 
historical background to the pilgrimage. In this way, an understanding of Muslims and their 
practices is augmented. 
 
Extract 33 
Ever since the Crusades, when Christians from western Europe were fighting holy 
wars against Muslims in the near east, western people have often perceived Islam as a 
violent and intolerant faith – even though when this prejudice took root Islam had a 
better record of tolerance than Christianity. Recent terrorist atrocities have seemed to 
confirm this received idea. But if we want a peaceful world, we urgently need a more 
balanced view. We cannot hope to win the "battle for hearts and minds" unless we 
know what is actually in them. Nor can we expect Muslims to be impressed by our 
liberal values if they see us succumbing unquestioningly to a medieval prejudice born 
in a time of extreme Christian belligerence. 
Like Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, Sikhs and secularists, some Muslims have 
undoubtedly been violent and intolerant, but the new exhibition at the British Museum 
– Hajj: Journey to the Heart of Islam – is a timely reminder that this is not the whole 
story. The hajj is one of the five essential practices of Islam; when they make the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, Muslims ritually act out the central principles of their faith. 
Equating religion with "belief" is a modern western aberration. Like swimming or 
driving, religious knowledge is practically acquired. You learn only by doing. The 
ancient rituals of the hajj, which Arabs performed for centuries before Islam, have 
helped pilgrims to form habits of heart and mind that – pace the western stereotype – 
are non-violent and inclusive. (The Guardian, January 22, 2012). 
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The article begins with a reference to the Crusades, which involved holy wars between 
Christians from Western Europe and Muslims from the near East. The article explains that at 
that time Islam was perceived as a ―violent  nd intoler nt f ith‖ (l. 3). And today, the recent 
terror  tt cks  ppe r to ―confirm this received ide ‖ (l. 5) of Islam as violent and intolerant. 
Th t this ide  is ―received‖ suggests th t the prejudice  g inst Isl m tod y h s historic l 
continuity  nd is not   recent construction. It is therefore suggested th t  t present, ―we‖  re 
―succumbing unquestioningly‖ (l. 8) to a prejudice that was historically constructed. The 
 rticle therefore c lls for   ―more b l nced view‖ (ll. 5-6), and refers to anti-Islam prejudice 
 s   ―mediev l prejudice born in   time of extreme Christi n belligerence‖ (ll. 8-9).  In this 
way, the idea that Muslims pose a threat to Christians is inverted with suggestions that 
Crusader Christians were more violent and intolerant. Although the article seeks to construct 
Muslims more positively, by using the pronoun ―we‖  nd spe king  bout ―our‖ liber l v lues, 
they are still positioned as an out-group. Here, however, as an out-group there is no 
suggestion that they need to assimilate, rather the onus appears to be on the British to impress 
with their liberal values.  
 
In its attempt to provide a more balanced view, the article then goes on to impartially explain 
how within all religious and non-religious groups there  re undoubtedly some ―violent  nd 
intoler nt‖ (l. 11) members but it is important to remember that these members do not 
represent the ―whole story‖ (ll. 12-13). The main purpose of the article is to promote/create 
 w reness  bout   new exhibition  t the British Museum titled ―Hajj: Journey to the Heart of 
Islam‖ (ll. 12). It is suggested that knowledge about other aspects of Islam will create a better 
understanding and help to deconstruct stereotypes. Following this logic, the article itself 
attempts to provide detailed information about the history of the hajj. The hajj is one of the 
five foundational principles of Islam. It is the pilgrimage made to Mecca, during which 
Muslims ―ritu lly  ct out the centr l principles of their f ith‖ (l. 14). The article explains that 
religious knowledge is pr ctic lly  cquired  nd le rnt through ―doing‖ (l. 16). Islam can 
therefore be understood as a religion that encompasses both belief and practice. The article 
constructs this belief-practice link as normal through inversion by saying that equating 
religion with belief  lone is   ―modern western  berr tion‖ (l. 15). Modern western religious 
observance could therefore be taken as unusual.  
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The article continues to try and provide a more balanced view of Islam by confronting the 
stereotype that Islamic practices encourage violence. It explains that the rituals of hajj were 
performed by Arabs for centuries before Islam, and the idea is that these rituals help pilgrims 
develop ―h bits of he rt  nd mind‖ (l. 18) which are non-violent and inclusive. In extract 34, 
it is explained how violence of any kind is forbidden during the pilgrimage. This includes 
carrying weapons, killing insects, or even speaking in anger, and the discipline that this 
restr int requires, introduces   ―new w y of living‖ (l. 3). The article also includes a detailed 
 ccount of how the Prophet Muh mm d drew on this tr dition  nd c rried out  n ― ud cious 
non-violent initi tive‖ (l. 8) that helped to ease hostilities between the Muslims and the 
Meccans at that time.  
 
Extract 34 
In the holy city of Mecca, violence of any kind was forbidden. From the moment they 
left home, pilgrims were not permitted to carry weapons, to swat an insect or speak an 
angry word, a discipline that introduced them to a new way of living. At a climactic 
moment of his prophetic career, Muhammad drew on this tradition. Fleeing 
persecution in Mecca in 622, he and the Muslim community (the umma) had migrated 
to Medina, 250 miles to the north. Mecca was determined to destroy the umma and a 
bitter conflict ensued. But eventually Muhammad broke the deadly cycle of warfare 
with an audacious non-violent initiative. (The Guardian, January 22, 2012). 
 
In addition to dispelling misconceptions about Islam and violence, the article also seeks to 
counter the idea that there are no commonalities between Islam and other religions. In extract 
35 it is explained that the hajj is based on the experiences of the prophet Abraham and his 
family. 
 
 
Extract 35 
Like Abraham, who had not belonged to a closed-off cult, they would take no pride in 
an established institution and, as Abraham had done, focus on the worship of God 
alone. Hence the Muslim hajj is all about the Abrahamic family – not Muhammad 
himself. Pilgrims re-enact the story of Hagar and Ishmael, symbolically returning to 
the era that preceded religious chauvinism. 
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Alas, all traditions lose their primal purity and we all fail our founders. But the British 
Museum's beautiful presentation of the hajj can help us understand how the vast 
majority of the world's Muslims understand their faith. Socrates, founder of the 
western rational tradition, insisted that the exercise of reason required us constantly 
and stringently to question received ideas and entrenched certainties. The new 
exhibition can indeed become a journey to the heart of Islam and also, perhaps, to a 
more authentic and respectful western rational identity. (The Guardian, January 22, 
2012). 
 
The extract explains that Muslims follow the same monotheistic practice of Abraham of 
worshipping God alone. The rituals of the hajj are a re-enactment of the story of Hagar and 
Ishmael, the family of Abraham, and according to the article, this symbolises a return to an 
era preceding religious chauvinism. The inclusion of these historic details is important when 
considering how Islam is often taken as a foreign or alien religion. Like Christianity and 
Judaism, Islam is also rooted in the Abrahamic tradition. Muslims believe that all three faiths 
are descendant from the patri-lineage of Abraham, where Jews and Christians can trace 
themselves back to Abraham and his wife Sarah, and Muslims to Abraham and the servant-
girl Hagar (Esposito, 2002). 
 
 It is  lso Abr h m who built the ‗K ‘b h‘ – the sacred structure around which the pilgrims 
circumambulate. It is considered the first house of worship of the one God and it is also 
tow rd the K ‘b h th t Muslims f ce while pr ying d ily to demonstr te unity (Esposito, 
2002). Muslims also recognise and respect many of the biblical prophets, and believe that 
God sent his revelation first to the Jews through the prophet Moses, and then to the Christians 
through the prophet Jesus, and the final revelation to the prophet Muhammad (Esposito, 
2002). All three f iths stress ―mor l responsibility  nd  ccount bility, Judgment D y,  nd 
etern l rew rd  nd punishment‖ (Esposito, 2002, p. 73).  
 
Understanding similarities in religious faith and values could help to reduce 
misunderstandings about Islam. Islam today, however, is not often compared to other 
religions, but is instead differentiated from culture/ethnicity. As Saleh (2009) noted, this 
polarisation is odd and makes it difficult to identify what is being compared. Additionally, 
constructions of Islam are seen to rely on available stereotypes or clichés, which are often 
constructed in response to events affecting the in-group, or based on the actions of a few 
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Muslims. In this way, the history of Islam and the way in which Muslim themselves 
understand their faith is overlooked. The article suggests a differentiation between the 
―prim l purity‖ (l. 6) of religious traditions and the failings of its followers. This indicates 
that Islam itself should not be taken as inherently violent if Muslims behave in ways that are 
violent. The article suggests that doing so is an irrational response and opposes the idea of a 
―western r tion l identity‖ (l. 12).  
 
The reference to ―western r tion l tr dition‖ (l. 9) is interesting because it introduces the idea 
of a Western identity, and unlike in most of the other articles, opens it up to criticism. Here, 
this Western identity is equated with rationality. To unquestioningly  ccept ―received ide s 
 nd entrenched cert inties‖ (l. 10) would therefore go against this ideal of rationality. This is 
because rationality, or the exercise of reason, requires a constant deconstruction of prevailing 
views and structures. The  rticle suggests th t when this is re lised,   more ― uthentic  nd 
respectful western r tion l identity‖ (l. 12) will be achieved. 
 
4.6 Implications of variation 
The above examples of articles that introduced variation are important because they appear to 
disrupt ―received ide s‖  bout Isl m  nd Muslims. These inst nces of v ri tion c n be 
criticised though because, as the extracts above show, they were very specific. Extract 32, for 
example, is about an individual Muslim who has successfully managed to reconcile both his 
Muslim and European identities. As a celebrity he could possibly be perceived as an 
exception to the norm. Another limitation is that both examples appear in the Culture section 
of The Guardian. Although I did not differentiate between genres of articles, it seems worth 
pointing out that the articles that contained the most detailed and balanced perspective on 
Muslims/Islam were found in the Culture section. This would mean that these articles are 
read by a much smaller audience, as opposed to articles found in the News sections.  
 
Despite this marginalisation, it is important to look at variation because it reveals how 
identity is discursively constructed. As mentioned, the point of discourse analysis is to 
examine the legitimacy of discourses by revealing and deconstructing what is taken for 
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granted (Graham, 2005). If across the data, there was a single dominant discourse that 
constructed Muslims in one particular way, this would be difficult to deconstruct. For 
example, if Muslims were only constructed as terrorists, it could become difficult to conceive 
of them in any other way. Although dominant discourses appear to work in this way, as 
evidenced by how Orientalist stereotypes have become well established, it is important to 
remember that discourses are socially constructed and therefore not fully sutured (De Vos, 
2003).  Thus identities constructed through discourses are also socially constructed and never 
taken as complete. Accordingly, actively seeking out the different ways in which Muslims are 
constructed, even if these variations are negative/marginalised, will indicate the possibility of 
Muslims being constructed or represented in multiple, more facilitative ways. An awareness 
of variation therefore enables a disruption of dominant discourses, and in the context of this 
study, allows for the legitimacy of Orientalist and/or Islamophobic constructions to be 
challenged.  
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5. Further Discussion and Conclusions 
 
5.1 Concluding overview and discussion of the research study 
This research study was premised on the idea that knowledge and social reality are knowable 
through language. The importance of language as constitutive of reality relates to the area of 
discourse, wherein discourses are understood to influence how people speak and act, to 
legitimise forms of knowledge and political practices, and to determine which modes of 
representation are favoured over others (Jackson, 2007). With this understanding of the 
relation between language, representation and power, the research sought to examine how 
language is used to construct the identity of Muslims in British newspapers, with thought 
given to how this might contribute to stereotyping and prejudice. Overall, the analysis 
showed that the articles were primarily focused on topics such as Islamist extremism, sharia 
law, discrimination towards Christians, the veil or hijab, and the political situations in 
countries like Nigeria and Egypt. This framing (Downing & Husband, 2005), or narrow focus 
on particular traits or topics was generally found to be negative in that Muslims/Islam were 
depicted through an Orientalist lens or an Islamophobic discourse. 
 
The l rgely neg tive tone of the newsp pers‘ cover ge follows v n Dijk‘s (1996)  rgument 
that stories about minorities are often stereotypical and related to social problems. The 
analysis of the data showed a reliance on discourses that portrayed Muslims and Islamic 
practices/concepts as foreign, oppressive, and incompatible with Western democratic ideals. 
In relation to the first aim of the study, i.e., identifying how language is used to construct 
Muslims, a prevalence of core labels, terms and discursive formations used in reference to 
Muslims was evident within the articles. These labels, terms and discursive formations were 
often used to construct Muslims  s   problem tic ‗other‘. This w s  pp rent in the w y 
Muslims were identified as a social grouping based on their faith and religious practices. 
Although there was acknowledgment and reference to nationality, race and ethnicity, 
emph sis w s usu lly pl ced on their ‗Muslim‘ identity. This w s done through processes of 
racialization where Muslims were primarily identified by their Muslim-ness, i.e. using 
physical features such the hijab or beard, or referring to spaces such as neighbourhoods or 
countries which are primarily occupied by Muslims.  
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The re soning behind or purpose of constructing Muslims  s ‗other‘ w s the concern of the 
second research aim which looked at the rhetorical function of discursive constructions. The 
construction of Muslims  s ‗other‘ c n be t ken  s indic tive of how identity construction is 
rel tion l with the dem rc tion of  n ‗other‘ being necess ry. Furthermore, the neg tive 
differentiation of Muslims indicates how processes of identity construction are inherently 
strategic and linked to acts of power. This was particularly evident in the way Muslims were 
constructed and positioned within a discourse of threat/terror.  
 
By using terms and phrases associated with violence and extremism, a discourse of terror and 
threat was often pronounced within the articles in response to extremist attacks by individuals 
in Britain, the activities of Islamists in Muslim-majority countries, and attacks on minority 
Christian groups.  This discourse of terror functioned to associate terrorism and violence with 
Islam and portrays Muslims as an external threat to physical/national security. This had the 
effect of essentialising Muslims as inherently violent. It also placed responsibility and blame 
on Muslims as a whole for the actions of a few, discounting other structural or political 
factors that could be in play. In addition to being constructed as an external threat, Muslims 
were also constructed as posing an internal, cultural threat to British/Western identity with 
concerns around issues of values, identity, visibility and integration. This was done through 
drawing on discourses of isolation and integration. Depicted as self-isolating and reluctant to 
integrate, Muslims were portrayed as a threat to societal cohesion and the idea of a unified 
national/cultural identity.  
 
Depicting Muslims as a threat to national security and identity was seen to justify certain 
practices and this links to the third aim of the study which was to consider the relationship 
between existing discourses  nd soci l pr ctices. T king H nsen‘s (2006) discussion of the 
service ble other, the Derride n notion of the ‗constitutive outside‘ (De Vos, 2003),  nd 
Lentin‘s (2003) discussion of the r cist st te into  ccount, constructing Muslims  s   neg tive 
‗other‘  rgu bly justifies their m rgin lis tion and scapegoating, and also justifies particular 
foreign and domestic policies such as military action, immigration laws, multiculturalism and 
assimilation. This was apparent within the articles where the construction of Muslims as 
‗other‘ w s linked closely to discussions around combatting extremism, and debates over 
citizenship, loyalty and rights.  
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When looking at the third aim of the study and how existing discourses influence social 
practices, it is admittedly difficult to base this off an analysis of newspaper texts alone. 
Although the centrality of media influence is indisputable, it is too simplistic to assume that 
people interpret media texts in a passive or uniform manner (Ben Moussa, 2004). Instead, 
media interaction ought to be understood as dynamic with individuals bringing to bear their 
shared and personal experiences, as well as their particular individual traits, when producing 
meaning from media texts (Ben Moussa, 2004). Furthermore, it is important to highlight the 
fact that media as an institution does not monopolise all the channels and spaces through 
which identity is constructed and through which people make sense of the world (Ben 
Moussa, 2004).  It therefore becomes necessary to consider other societal institutions, 
structures and means through which people interpret identity and/or social reality. This point 
of discussion reveals a limitation of the study, and this is expanded on in the next chapter.  
 
Before looking at the limitations of the study, it necessary to point out that although Muslims 
 re often constructed  s   r ci lised ‗other‘, the  n lysis showed th t  t times they c n  lso be 
constructed using inclusive terminology where their construction does not include terms of 
difference but rather those of compatibility and similarity. Therefore, while the above 
discussion reveals how a number of dominant discourses were favoured, there were instances 
of variation which disrupted the generally negative narrative. Although marginalised, 
variation in the data showed that Muslims are not all Islamists, nor are all Islamists 
necessarily violent and opposed to ideals of democracy. Another alternative construction was 
that Muslim women do not experience Islam as oppressive, but rather where there is 
oppression, it is rooted in culture. The ide  of Muslims‘ reluct nce to integr te w s  lso 
challenged with suggestions that their participation is either impeded by structures of 
inequality, or they do in fact participate and contribute without issue.  
 
5.2 Coherence, new problems and fruitfulness 
Vari tion is  lso import nt in terms of coherence. Using Potter  nd Wetherell‘s (1987)  dvice 
on validity, I have tried in my analysis and discussion to provide a coherent account by 
looking at meaning across texts, but also by including a micro-analysis of the linguistic 
structures used. Coherence, they advise, is also increased by looking at variation, which I 
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have again tried to be attentive to throughout the analysis. Where constructions of Muslims 
deviated from dominant patterns, this revealed how there is a privileging of particular 
representations. As such, instances of variation opened up new problems (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) around how Muslims can be constructed. Variation in the analysis indicated that 
Muslims can be constructed in positive, non-threatening ways. It also indicated that to portray 
Muslims, especially women, as without agency is itself oppressive. Consequently, an 
interesting avenue of research would be to consider how we can harness positive 
constructions of Muslim identities, and mobilise their agency to offer opportunities for more 
equitable representation in the media. One possible solution that appeared in the data is the 
inclusion of minority voices. Van Dijk (1996) has argued that where minority groups are 
negatively represented, it is difficult for them to contest this because they have unequal 
access to the media. In the data, there were a number of articles written by minority 
journalists, with some of them identifiable as Muslims. These articles seemed to provide a 
more balanced view. Additionally, in many of the articles Muslim minorities were 
interviewed and given a voice, and these instances too provided balancing information. 
Where Muslims were able to comment on issues, this indicated a difference in interpretation 
between internal and external definitions. An example is the practice of hijab. In terms of 
fruitfulness (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), by looking at internal definitions and how Muslims 
themselves experience their identities, this allows for novel explanations. Within my 
discussion I have also attempted a novel analysis by discussing and explaining relevant 
concepts and issues from within an Islamic/Muslim perspective, while remaining within a 
social constructionist framework.  
  
  128 
6. Limitations, Implications for Future Research, and Reflexivity 
 
In this section, through a process of reflexivity, I consider the methodological and theoretical 
limitations to this study. Below, I first consider the shortcomings in my methods of data 
collection and analysis, and how addressing these weaknesses could have implications for 
future research. I then look at the importance of reflexivity when doing social constructionist 
research.  This is followed by a critical reflection on my theoretical position, and how this 
influenced my analysis. I then consider my personal biases and how my social location 
possibly influenced my reading of the texts. 
 
6.1 Limitations of the research study   
When looking at the method used to collect data, a limitation is evident in terms of how the 
newspaper articles were sourced, the number of articles collected, and the time span imposed 
on the articles. Data was collected using the search functions on The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph websites.  The search functions differed between the two, with The Guardian‘s 
being easier to use. This meant that more articles were found from The Guardian. The data 
collection method used also yielded 65 articles which could be considered too few. To 
address these limitations the study could be improved by including more newspaper 
publications as this would possibly reduce the reliance on one newspaper and increase the 
number of articles available. The number of articles was also limited by the time frame 
which, if increased to more than one and a half years, would also have resulted in more 
articles. Increasing the time span could also have allowed for a more thorough application of 
Fouc ult‘s concepts of  rch eology  nd gene logy (Kend ll & Wickh m, 1999) which would 
allow for the historicity and processual nature of discourses surrounding Muslims to be 
examined. Increasing the number of newspapers, articles and time span however, presents a 
tension of depth versus bre dth in the  n lysis. For   M ster‘s thesis, the time  nd sp ce 
afforded to research can be seen as a limitation, and as such focusing on fewer newspapers 
and articles was considered more suitable and facilitative for an in-depth analysis and 
discussion.  
 
Time and space limitations also meant that media research with journalists was beyond the 
scope of this project. I feel my research findings would be improved by looking more closely 
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at the news-making process, and the audience of the broadsheet newspapers used here. 
H nyes, Devereux & Breen, (2004) suggest th t Thompson‘s trip rtite model (1990) be used 
when analysing newspaper discourse. The model considers the production context of media 
texts, with a focus on media organisation and media professionals (Hanyes et al., 2004). 
Secondly, it looks at the discursive content and construction of media texts (Hanyes et al., 
2004). And thirdly, the model investigates the hermeneutic dimension of texts, which is how 
audiences receive and interpret messages from the media (Hanyes et al., 2004). This study 
included the second element, which was to look at the discursive nature of newspaper texts. 
To improve on this research study the elements of production and reception could be 
incorporated by including interviews with media professionals and readers of The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph. Interviewing media professionals would allow for first-hand 
commentary on the news-making practices outlined earlier (e.g. Pietikäinen, 2003; van Dijk, 
1987; and Abbas, 2001) and would perhaps give some insight into how/why existing 
discourses on Muslims and Islam are selectively drawn on. Interviewing readers could help to 
identify the extent to which people‘s perceptions of Muslims  re influenced by these 
newspaper discourses. Hargrave  and Livingstone (2006) also suggest that with media 
research, it would be useful to speak to audience groups to assess their reaction to the content 
they have viewed. 
 
6.2 Discourse analysis and subjectivity, material reality and cognitive processes 
Interviewing audience groups about their experiences with media texts would be a 
complementary approach because it is argued that discourse alone is not enough to fully 
c pture  n individu l‘s subjectivity (Willig, 2008). Although Foucauldian discourse analysts 
suggest that it is possible to discern issues of subjectivity, ideology and power through an 
analysis of texts, addressing these issues brings up theoretic l questions ― bout the extent to 
which we can theorize subjectivity on the basis of discourse alone‖ (Willig, 2008, p. 123). In 
this study I focused on newspaper texts alone and did not have any human participants. As 
such, accessing a detailed account of individualised experiences was not required. I did 
however, offer tentative suggestions as to what Muslims could experience from being 
constructed or positioned in a particular way. To do this I drew on van Langenhove and 
H rr ‘s (1999) positioning theory. With positioning theory it is believed that subjectivity 
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originates from discourses, meaning that subject positions taken up in discourses can become 
internalised leading to emotional/subjective experiences (Willig, 2000). 
 
In addition to subjectivity, another critique of discourse analysis is that it neglects material 
reality. Since reality is seen as mediated through language, the question is whether reality can 
exist outside of discourse, and if discourses be constrained by social and material structures 
(Willig, 2008). For relativists, reality cannot exist outside of discourse, it is only through 
language that we are able to construct and access even the material world (Willig, 2008). For 
critical realists like Parker though, while our knowledge is mediated through language, there 
 re ―underlying structures  nd mech nisms th t gener te phenomen ‖ (Willig, 2008, p. 130). 
Discursive constructions  re therefore ―grounded in soci l  nd m teri l structures‖ (Willig, 
2008, p. 130).  
 
The influence of social and material structures appears to be particularly important when 
considering the ‗isol tionist‘  nd ‗self-segreg ting‘ discourses surrounding British Muslims. 
Phillips (2006), in her study on discourses that accuse British Muslims of isolationism and 
self-segregation, found th t these discourses underpl yed the ―power of structur l constr ints 
(economic and institutional racism) and popular racism to shape minority ethnic housing and 
neighbourhood choices‖ (p. 29). Phillips (2006) suggests that these discourses favour 
―discussions  bout ethnicity  nd cultur l difference  t the expense of r ci lised inequalities in 
power  nd st tus‖ (p. 38). This means that the material effects of social structures such as 
economic systems and/or institutionalised racism are overlooked. While it was again beyond 
the scope of this study, it would be useful to look more closely at the structural nature of 
politics, race and institutional discrimination within Britain, and how these might influence 
media discourses on Muslims. 
 
Discourse  n lysis  lso represents   ―r dic lly non-cognitive form of soci l psychology‖ 
where ment l st tes  nd cognitive processes  re   ―nonissue‖ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 
178-180). It is not suggested by Potter  nd Wetherell (1987) however, th t ―‗ment l st tes‘ or 
‗cognitive processes‘  re necessarily redund nt concepts‖ (Willig, 2008, p. 106). As such, 
while this study favoured a rhetorical approach (Billig, 1985), and focused on the discursive 
nature of identity and prejudice, cognitive processes are not entirely dismissed. To do so 
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would result in   ―kind of linguistic imperi lism which denies significance to cognitive 
processes‖ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 180). This would  lso go  g inst the postmodern 
assumption of multiplicities of truths (Sardar, 1998).  
 
6.3 Importance of reflexivity 
Before looking more closely at my postmodern position, I briefly discuss the importance of 
reflexivity here. In postmodern, social constructionist work, ―the p rti l, provision l  nd 
perspectiv l n ture of knowledge cl ims is recognised‖ (M uthner & Doucet, 2003, p. 416). 
This means that attention is paid to how knowledge is always linguistically, contextually and 
historic lly situ ted, with   definitive underst nding th t the rese rcher‘s situ ted  nd 
subjective presence is always embedded within the text (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003). 
Accordingly, reports produced by a researcher are taken as discursive constructions and 
should not be considered outside of   discursive fr mework bec use the rese rcher ― uthors, 
r ther th n discovers, knowledge‖ (Willig, 2008, p. 126). This necessitated a reflexive 
awareness on my part, throughout the research process, of the problematic status of my own 
knowledge claims (Willig, 2008). Reflexivity is thus an exercise undertaken by researchers in 
which they acknowledge, reflect on, and account for their commitment to particular readings, 
analyses and interpretations (Gill, 1995, cited in Harper, 1999).  
 
6.4 Reflecting on postmodernism and social constructionism  
Postmodernism theory was deemed suitable because its concern with variety and multiplicity 
supports the argument for more equal representation and enables a critique against the 
positing of Western culture as superior (Sardar, 1998). Similarly, social constructionism was 
favoured because it puts forward the idea that reality can be constructed through language in 
different ways, and that dominant discourses can be deconstructed (Burr, 1998). The 
application of postmodernism and social constructionism presented some problems though. 
For instance, the concept of relativism which underlies both theories suggests that there is no 
ultimate reality behind things and that what we perceive to be real is culturally and 
historically located (Sardar, 1998). While this research study uses a social constructionist 
p r digm, rooted in postmodernism, I  rgue th t it is not ―inherently  nd exclusively 
rel tivist‖ (Cromby & Nighting le, 1999, p. 7). This is bec use   purely rel tivist  ppro ch 
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would tre t  ll views  s equ lly v lid, with ―no grounds for caring one way or another, on 
anything moral, political or factual‖ (Edw rds, Ashmore & Potter, 1995, p. 39). To argue for 
something would therefore present a dilemma because it means caring, and being positioned, 
which are non-relativist (Edwards et al., 1999). In arguing against xeno-racist constructions 
of Muslims, I have accordingly taken a non-relativist position. In addition, because scholarly 
discourse is itself recognised as a social construction, Richardson (2007) argues that research 
is socio-politic lly situ ted whether we like it or not. In this c se, ― c demic neutr lity‖ 
(Richardson, 2007, p. 2) when it comes to racial/ethnic/religious prejudice could be seen as 
contributing to the perpetuation of social injustices. Therefore, while I use postmodern theory 
I do not take a purely relativist stance, but instead understand relativism here as a 
―quintessenti lly  c demic position‖ that enables critique, scepticism, resistance and the 
denial of taken for granted truths (Edwards et al., 1999, p. 37).  
 
6.4.1 Practical concerns with applying theory.  Other problems I encountered 
were the practical application of postmodern and social constructionist concepts into my 
analysis and discussion. Applying the postmodern concept of doubt (Sardar, 1998) into my 
discussion proved difficult, but during the analysis stage the principle was apparent in the 
difficulty that I experienced when trying to justify a particular reading of the text because 
multiple readings seemed possible. This is why at times I offered alternative or tentative 
explanations/interpretations for particular extracts. I also encountered doubt when doing the 
analysis because the subjective nature of discourse analysis means that guidelines 
―necess rily f ll short of concrete ‗how-you-do-it‘ instructions‖ (Burr, 1995, p. 163). As 
such, I was at times unsure how to go about the analysis, and Harper (1999) sums the 
experience up  s ―  continual movement between feeling I had nothing to say or feeling there 
w s too much  nd th t I would not be  ble to structure   coherent  nd line r  rgument‖ (p. 
290). This process made clear that discourse analysis work is itself a construction (Burr, 
1995).  
 
Accordingly, a common critique of discourse analysis is that discourses do not emerge from 
the data, but are instead constructed by the analyst (Harper, 1999). While my reading of the 
articles was guided by existing literature and theory, and I tried to pick discourses that were 
common throughout the articles, this did not detract from my need as analyst to select which 
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issues and discourses to focus on. It is possible that this selection, and my subsequent 
analyses and interpretations, were influenced by my own biases. Therefore identifying 
personal biases is important because it enables the reader to judge for him-/herself the extent 
of the rese rcher‘s bi s. 
 
6.5 Personal biases. 
 To begin with, I am a practising female Muslim and consider my religious identity to be 
particularly salient. More specifically, I am a Sunni Muslim, and in practice I follow the 
Hanafi School of thought. Within the Sunni denomination of Islam there are four main 
juristic schools and although these four classical schools differ in their interpretation of 
Islamic law, they are all accepted as justifiable and well-founded. This respect for difference 
in opinion within Islam means that I can appreciate the tolerance of multiple truths and the 
critical thinking that postmodernism advocates. At the same time though, in agreement with 
Ahmed (1992) and Sardar (1998) I feel th t postmodernism‘s cynicism  nd irony pose   
threat to Islam, and/or other truths. The threat is that Islam will be knowable only through a 
postmodern lens and not be allowed an authentic voice. I therefore experienced some 
difficulty reconciling my position as researcher, with my Muslim status initially. This is 
because as a Muslim, I believe in God, and Islam, as absolute truths and I am not comfortable 
with their deconstruction. This could account for why I was comfortable working within a 
postmodern, social constructionist paradigm but without taking a thoroughly relativist 
approach.  
 
The above nuances in my belief and practice have possibly led to bias in my work. For 
instance, where I account for Muslim practices, these are offered from within my context of 
understanding, and this could mean that interpretations/analyses would differ for other 
researchers. Although I used academic references, by both Muslim and non-Muslim writers, 
it is also possible that I chose readings which matched or affirmed the 
knowledge/understanding of Islam that I already held. That said however, I feel my position 
as a Muslim was useful at times because I already had some insight into, and understanding 
of, Islam/Muslims. I was therefore able to focus on issues in more depth, and was perhaps 
more alert to misconceptions or distortions of Islam and Muslims within the articles. It is also 
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possible that these misconceptions, distortions, or instances of prejudice directed at Muslims 
in the data evoked a stronger reaction from me than they would have for someone else. At 
times I felt I was trying too hard to justify or denounce particular positionings or 
constructions of Muslims. But at other times, I felt the need to explain, defend, or provide an 
 uthentic Muslim perspective, especi lly in light of S id‘s (1978) expl n tion th t groups 
such as Muslims are more liable to technical and ideological constructions because their 
concepts, peoples, and cultures are poorly known. 
 
This ‗ uthentic perspective‘, or bi s, w s  g in present in my  n lysis  nd discussion on 
Muslim women. This is because of my own identity as a Muslim woman, but also because I 
recently started wearing the headscarf myself. For me, the practice of hijab was yet another 
act of worship that I could do in obedience to God. When done properly, I feel the practice of 
hijab guards against vanity based on physical appearance, encourages decency and modesty 
in behaviour, and provides a space for contemplation. My decision to adopt the hijab was 
therefore based solely on a desire to obey God and to realise the values of humility, decency 
and consciousness that Islam encourages. This possibly influenced my decision to show that 
the practice of hijab by Muslim women is done for reasons other than cultural or political 
ones. I have also since come to appreciate the hijab as multi-faceted in meaning. For one, it 
outwardly affirms my Muslim identity. That said though, I do not consider the headscarf to 
be the most important part of my identity, nor of my faith. In wearing the headscarf, I also 
experienced this as an act of agency. I was at university and made the decision on my own 
without any patriarchal or familial influence. For this reason, I found discussions on Muslim 
women to be incredibly reductive and essentialist, reducing them to little more than their 
clothing and/or their experience of gendered oppression.  
 
I am aware that my lived experience of Islam is unique. For one, I have never had any 
exposure to ‗extremists‘ or ‗fund ment lists‘  nd prior to this study did not know much about 
‗politic l Isl m‘  nd ‗Isl mists‘. I h ve  lso not experienced  ny prejudice or victimis tion 
based on my religious beliefs. I have however, experienced prejudice based on my ethnicity. I 
am Zimbabwean by birth, but of Indian descent, and as a result have always lived as part of a 
minority group. Living in Zimbabwe my Indian identity has always had more resonance for 
others than my religious and national identities, whereas the reverse is true for me, and this 
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has made me aware of the inconsistencies between internal and external definitions of 
identity. Being able to identify myself as female, Muslim, Indian and Zimbabwean has also 
made me aware of the complexities of identity formation. And finally, growing up and living 
in Zimbabwe, and now studying in South Africa, I am alert to the histories of colonialism and 
apartheid, and how deeply institutionalised racism or prejudice can become entrenched.  
 
6.6 Reflecting on the writing of a research report  
A final criterion of reflexivity suggested by Harper (1999) is that of linearity. As discussed 
e rlier, when doing discourse  n lysis, discourses do not come ―ne tly p ck ged‖,  nd so the 
researcher is required to construct a linear, coherent argument from the data (Phillips & 
Hardy, 2002, p. 74). In doing this, the researcher has to produce a plausible, persuasive 
written account, but in putting together a well-grounded argument, there is always the 
acknowledgment that much is left out (Harper, 1999). As such any report produced is 
considered partial and subjective, and implicit in this is the realisation that it is only one way 
of seeing things (Harper, 1999). Keeping these points in mind, I ask that this research study 
be read as a single account. And without making any claims to truth, it is hoped that through 
outlining the personal biases that I brought to the reading of texts an authentic, honest 
approach to the research has been achieved.  
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8. Appendix A: Newspaper Articles 
 
Article for Extract 1 
Radical Muslim jailed for calling for jihad against MPs 
Judge describes Bilal Zaheer Ahmad as a viper in our midst before jailing him for 12 years 
for threats on websites 
 Caroline Davies 
 guardian.co.uk, Friday 29 July 2011 20.08 BST 
An IT graduate who wrote messages on an Islamic extremist website calling on Muslims to 
"raise the knife of jihad" and attack and kill British MPs who voted in favour of the war in 
Iraq has been jailed for 12 years. 
Bilal Zaheer Ahmad, 24, posted the threats on the US-based RevolutionMuslim.com website 
with a full list of all MPs who had voted in the House of Commons in favour of the war and 
links providing personal contact details. 
He called on them to emulate Roshonara Choudhry, who had attempted to murder the Labour 
MP Stephen Timms with a knife at his East Ham constituency surgery six months previously, 
Bristol crown court heard. 
Ahmad, who worked for an insurance company in Telford, Shropshire, also posted a link to 
the Tesco website listing cheap knives, urging would-be fanatics to use them to carry out 
attacks. 
Jailing him for 12 years, with an additional five years' extended period on licence, Mr Justice 
Royce said: "You became a viper in our midst willing to go as far as possible to strike at the 
heart of our system." 
Ahmad, who holds British and Pakistani passports, had purported to be a British citizen, said 
Royce. "But what you stand for is totally alien to what we stand for in our country." He added 
that his views were "corrosively dangerous". 
"It's important MPs can hold constituency surgeries without the threat of someone pulling out 
a knife and trying to kill them. You were intent on striking at the heart of our democracy and 
if our politicians are to be at risk from those like you, then the message must go out loud and 
clear that this country will not tolerate such threats to its democratic processes." 
Ahmad posted his threat on 3 November, the day after Choudhry, a 21-year-old university 
student, was jailed for life for the knife attack on Timms in May last year. She stabbed him 
twice with a six-inch knife, damaging his liver and perforating his stomach. She later said she 
had been influenced by the radical sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemen-based preacher 
and al-Qaida leader. 
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Police arrested Ahmad, at the time living in Dunstall, Wolverhampton, on 10 November. He 
pleaded guilty at an earlier hearing to soliciting murder, publishing written material with 
intent to stir up religious hatred and three counts under Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, 
which covers collecting information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism. 
Mark Dennis QC, prosecuting, said as well as providing the list of MPs he advised "that the 
best place to 'encounter them in person' was at their constituency surgery". He attached a link 
to The book of Jihad, a source of inspiration for Choudhry, calling for a renewed attack upon 
Timms and the "destruction" of not only the MP but also the judge who sentenced Choudhry. 
The website was an established source of information for Muslims holding extreme views 
and those who wanted to carry our their threats, added Dennis. 
The day before Choudhry was sentenced Ahmad posted on Facebook: "This sister has put us 
men to shame. WE SHOULD BE DOING THIS." 
On arrest, Ahmad confessed responsibility for the posting. He said: "I shouldn't have let my 
emotions get away from me. It was completely irrational. It was tongue in cheek, I'm not in a 
cell or anything like that." 
Dennis said: "He claimed that he had never intended to incite anyone to injure anyone else." 
Ahmad, now of Wollaton, Nottingham, was born in Warwickshire and studied for A-levels at 
Wolverhampton College. He became radicalised as a teenager and was an active contributor 
to RevolutionMuslim, Islam4UK and IslamicAwakening websites. He graduated from the 
University of Central England with a 2:2 degree in business information technology and 
worked for a year as a junior development analyst at the Dorset County hospital in 
Dorchester. 
The court heard he had also posted on Facebook a link to YouTube where he recorded a 
video saying: "My message to the West. You are all going to die." He was in possession of 
electronic copies of books called 39 ways to serve and participate in jihad and Zaad-e-
Mujahid: Essential provisions of a mujahadid as well as a magazine, Inspire, which instructs 
English-speaking young Muslims in how to train and organise violent jihad at home. 
Imran Khan, defending, said Ahmad had fallen in with members of al-Muhajiroun when aged 
16 at college because he felt excluded from mainstream society. His growing interest in Islam 
had been at odds with the non-religious upbringing of his parents. 
"During the period that someone has been indoctrinated they lose the ability to know right 
from wrong. 
"It was wrong, it was perverted and it's one he now absolves himself from completely. He 
was a follower and not a leader," said Khan. 
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Article for Extract 2 
White Muslim one of six arrested over ‘terror plot' 
White Muslim convert Richard Dart and a former police community support officer 
were among six people arrested for allegedly plotting a terror attack in Britain.  
By Tom Whitehead, Martin Evans and Sam Marsden 
10:00PM BST 05 Jul 2012 
Richard Dart, who was radicalised by the cleric Anjem Choudary, was held following police 
raids in east and west London.  
A former PCSO and two of his brothers, who were living just over a mile from the Olympic 
site in Stratford, were also among those detained during the police and MI5 operation to 
prevent a suspected terror assault.  
One of the brothers was Tasered by officers. Counter-terrorism police had first searched their 
home last November.  
The Daily Telegraph understands the police moved over fears that a group had obtained a 
sword which could potentially be used in a terrorist attack.  
Mr Dart, 29, the son of Dorset teachers, featured in a BBC documentary last year filmed by 
his own brother about his conversion. During the film, called My Brother the Islamist, he was 
seen protesting  bout British soldiers in Afgh nist n  nd  ccused them of being ―murderers‖.  
He also called for Sharia law to be established in Britain, as well as saying that one of his 
friends used to be ―in the police‖, but is not  ny more. Mr D rt h s ch nged his n me to 
Salahuddin al Britani. Salahuddin comes from the medieval leader who drove King Richard I 
from Jerusalem during the Crusades.  
It emerged last year that the former BBC security guard was living off state benefits in a 
luxury flat in Mile End, east London.  
Anjem Choudary said he had converted Mr Dart but had not been in contact with him for 
more than a year.  
The six, which included one woman, were arrested on suspicion of the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism after police raids during the early hours of 
Thursday, July 5.  
Neighbours in Stratford said one of the brothers was Jahangir Alom, 26, who served as a 
former Metropolitan community support officer between May 2007 and September 2009. He 
is understood to also go under the name of Abu Khalid.  
In 2010, Mr Khalid appeared in a YouTube video to say why he had stopped being a PCSO 
and had become an Islamic fundamentalist.  
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In the film he explains th t he re lized he w s le ding   ―misguided‖ life  fter meeting with 
some ―brothers‖. He s id  s   PCSO he w s involved in stop  nd se rches  nd th t he now 
re lised he w s ―implementing kuffur (enemies of Isl m) l w on the streets of London‖.  
The other two brothers arrested are understood to be Mohammed Alomgir, 24, and Moybur 
Alom, 18. Mr Alomgir was hit with a police Taser during the arrests but did not require 
hospital treatment.  
At the same time, in Ealing, west London, a 29-year-old man, believed to be Mr Dart, was 
arrested in the street, while a 21-year-old man and a 30-year-old woman were held at separate 
residential premises.  
Police insisted that the arrests were not linked to the Olympics and that an attack was not 
believed to be imminent.  
The suspects had been monitored by counter-terrorism officers and MI5 for some time and 
the arrests were part of a pre-planned intelligence operation.  
Mr D rt‘s stepf ther Thom s Leech, spe king from the f mily‘s home in Weymouth, Dorset, 
confirmed that Mr Dart had been arrested but said the family did not wish to comment 
further.  
In Str tford,  nother neighbour s id th t the three brothers h d been ―getting more religious 
throughout the ye rs‖. Another s id he w s ―confused‖ bec use the ―big one‖ used to be a 
PCSO, so the events h d left him ―very surprised‖.  
Neighbours said the father of the family had left their mother to bring up three sons and one 
daughter on her own.  
During the raid at the Abbey Road address in Stratford, the front door of the house was 
smashed, leaving debris lying on the doorstep and a red curtain draped over the entrance. 
Police erected a blue tent in front of the door as officers visited and left the property 
throughout the day.  
A neighbour said the street lights had been extinguished and the road blocked off to traffic 
just before the arrest.  
He s id: ―It seemed like it w s synchronised by the police. There were no sirens. However,  t 
around 4.10am we heard a big blast. I saw from the window that the door of the house flew 
off.  
―It w sn‘t   b ttering r m th t the police used, it w s  n explosion th t went, ‗b ng‘ four 
times. It was dark. The only thing I could see was the officers all in black in helmets and with 
riot shields.‖ 
Reje Rahman, 32, a child protection worker, said her 12-year-old daughter was so scared by 
the r id th t she ―couldn‘t get to sleep  fterw rds‖  nd thought th t the ―building w s going 
to coll pse‖.  
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Article for extracts 3 and 4 
David Cameron tells Muslim Britain: stop tolerating extremists  
PM says those who don't hold 'British' values will be shunned by government 
 Patrick Wintour 
 The Guardian, Saturday 5 February 2011 
David Cameron will today signal a sea-change in the government fight against home-grown 
terrorism, saying the state must confront, and not consort with, the non-violent Muslim 
groups that are ambiguous about British values such as equality between sexes, democracy 
and integration. 
To belong in Britain is to believe in these values, he will say. Claiming the previous 
government had been the victim of fear and muddled thinking by backing a state-sponsored 
form of multiculturalism, the prime minister will state that his government "will no longer 
fund or share platforms with organisations that, while non-violent, are certainly in some cases 
part of the problem". 
In a major speech to a security conference in Munich, he will demand: "We need a lot less of 
the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism." 
He will say that "some organisations that seek to present themselves as a gateway to the 
Muslim community are showered with public money while doing little to combat extremism. 
This is like turning to a rightwing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist 
movement." 
Cameron's aides, aware the speech may prove highly controversial, refused to identify the 
organisations in his sights, but it is clear one target is the Muslim Council of Britain. 
Last night some Muslim groups criticised the prime minister for making the speech on the 
same day that the English Defence League is holding its biggest ever demonstration, in 
Luton. 
Cameron will also make clear that his tougher stance extends to unambiguous support for the 
democracy movement in Egypt: "I simply don't accept that there's a dead-end choice between 
a security state and Islamist resistance." 
His remarks suggest that a Home Office-led review into the government Prevent programme, 
being overseen by Lord Carlile, is going to lead to major changes. 
It also suggests that he has sided unambiguously with figures such as Michael Gove inside 
his cabinet rather than his party chairman, Lady Warsi, who has complained of fashionable 
Islamophobia. 
Cameron will argue many young men have been drawn to extremism due to a rootlessness 
created by the weakening of a clear collective British cultural identity. 
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He will say: "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to 
provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. 
"We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to 
our values. So when a white person holds objectionable views – racism, for example – we 
rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices have come from 
someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious, frankly even fearful, to stand up to them." 
He will warn his audience: "Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own 
countries. We need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie – 
and that is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism." 
This ideology he says, is entirely separate from Islam, and "at the furthest end includes those 
who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist realm, governed by an 
interpretation of sharia". 
But he adds: "Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but 
who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility towards western 
democracy and liberal values. 
"If we are to defeat this threat, he says, its time to turn the page on on the failed policies of 
the past. So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we as governments and societies 
have got to confront it in all its forms." 
Echoing Tony Blair after 9/11, he rounds on the soft left that "lump all Muslims together, 
compiling a list of grievances and arguing if only governments addressed them, this terrorism 
would stop". 
Inayat Bunglawala, chair of an anti-extremist group called Muslims4Uk, said: "Mr Cameron's 
remarks are ill-judged and deeply patronising. The overwhelming majority of UK Muslims 
are proud to be British and are appalled by the antics of a tiny group of extremists and so will 
hardly be pleased with his lecture on integration. 
"Ironically, the PM's comments come on a day when the viciously Islamophobic English 
Defence League are to stage their biggest demonstration yet on our streets. Integration works 
both ways and we would expect Mr Cameron and his government to be openly challenging 
these EDL extremists. Instead, he and his senior ministers have to date remained totally mute. 
It is disgraceful." 
In opposition the Tories began considering the policy on Muslims, which critics say risks 
branding many as extremists even though they do not espouse violence. 
Critics say it is based on flawed neo-Conservative thinking and risks backfiring, while 
supporters say it is necessary to tackle those who are fellow travellers with violent extremists. 
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Article for Extract 5 
Cameron's scapegoating will have a chilling, toxic impact 
Blaming Islamists and multiculturalism for the backlash from US and British wars risks 
fuelling violence on the streets 
 Seumas Milne 
 guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 9 February 2011 21.30 GMT 
 
In parts of Britain, Muslims are effectively under siege. They are routinely spat at and abused 
in the street. Over the past couple of months there have been arson and other attacks on 
mosques in Hemel Hempstead, Leicester, Scunthorpe, Stoke and Kingston, as well as 
desecration of a Muslim graveyard and fire-bombing of a halal shop. 
Most of these outrages weren't even reported in the national media, let alone the occasion for 
a supportive visit from a government minister. As elsewhere in Europe, far-right 
organisations such as the British National party have increasingly switched the focus of their 
hatred from Jews and migrant populations in general to Muslims. More than half the 
"significant demonstrations" in the past 18 months, according to the Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, were mounted by the English Defence League, which only targets Muslims, 
smashing shop windows and assaulting passers-by whenever it manages to break through 
police lines in mainly Muslim areas. 
As the Conservative party chairwoman Sayeeda Warsi said last month – and was roundly 
abused for doing so – Islamophobia has also "now crossed the threshold of middle-class 
respectability". It is the last socially acceptable form of bigotry, often dressed up in the 
clothes of liberalism. 
So when the EDL organised a "homecoming" march last weekend in Luton, did the prime 
minister use the opportunity to condemn the racially inflamed provocation of a gang of 
Muslim-baiters and show solidarity with fellow British citizens under threat? Not a bit of it. 
He didn't even mention what was going on in Luton. Speaking the same day in Munich, of all 
places, he turned his fire instead on "Islamists", "state multiculturalism" and "non-violent 
extremists" in the Muslim community. 
Muslims must embrace "British" values of freedom, democracy and equal rights, he declared, 
as if the vast majority didn't do so already. Jihadist terror attacks were not driven by British 
and US wars in the Muslim world, he insisted – in the face of his own intelligence reports – 
but by an "extremist ideology" rooted in problems of "identity". 
And, grotesquely comparing non-violent Islamists to "rightwing fascists", he warned that 
there would be a strict checklist of Muslim bodies the government would not now work with 
or fund (including the umbrella Muslim Council of Britain). He did criticise Islamophobia, 
but that passing comment was drowned out by the drumbeat of condemnation targeted at 
Muslims and their political organisations. 
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Not surprisingly his speech has been hailed by the far right. The BNP leader Nick Griffin 
called it a "huge leap for our ideas into the political mainstream". EDL activists, who 
constantly echo the established political and media discourse about "extremism", and 
"Islamism", were jubilant that Cameron had "come round to our way of thinking". 
It also represents a decisive and dangerous victory for the neoconservative group in the Tory 
leadership, including Michael Gove, William Hague, George Osborne and Liam Fox. Backed 
by the government-funded Quilliam Foundation and their media cheerleaders, the neocons 
have pressed tirelessly to end residual official engagement with mainstream nonviolent 
Islamist groups, hitherto aimed at isolating the genuinely extreme groups actually in the 
business of blowing up buses and tubes. 
On the other side, one-nation Tories and Liberal Democrats such as Warsi, Dominic Grieve 
and Nick Clegg have tried to hold the line for a more inclusive approach towards the kind of 
Muslim political activism you might imagine would be welcome in the prime minister's 
world of British values. 
Cameron himself warned three years ago about the "lazy" use of terms such as "Islamist" that 
risked demonising the Muslim community, as Warsi did about "extremism". He's now carried 
out a U-turn, just in time to give a dog whistle to Tory supporters drifting away under the 
barrage of coalition cuts – and to a party for the most part yet to come to terms with 
multicultural Britain at all. 
The silence from the Lib Dems, who dined off Muslim votes in the aftermath of the Iraq war, 
has been deafening. Labour's Sadiq Khan accused Cameron of "writing propaganda for the 
EDL", but much of the ground for Cameron's neocon turn was laid by Tony Blair and New 
Labour – and politicians such as Phil Woolas, who unsuccessfully tried to play the 
Islamophobic card to save his skin. 
By blaming the threat of terrorism on multiculturalism, Cameron has signalled that ethnic 
minority policy will now be driven by an alarmingly skewed conception of state security. By 
groundlessly claiming that "we" have held back from condemning forced marriages among 
Muslims because they're not white, he's feeding racist prejudice. 
And by branding political Islam as extremist, he's playing on the ignorance of those for 
whom Muslim and Islamist are as good as indistinguishable. What is called Islamism 
includes a wide spectrum of political trends, peaceful and violent, socially conservative and 
progressive, from Turkey's ruling party to al-Qaida. Mainstream Islamists, certainly including 
almost all the groups Cameron is now casting into outer darkness, are in fact committed to 
democratic freedoms. 
What Cameron and the bulk of the British political class cannot acknowledge is that their 
continued support for the war on terror and occupation of Afghanistan, far from keeping the 
streets safe, is the crucial factor in the continuing threat of terrorism in Britain. 
The revolutionary upheavals taking place in Tunisia and Egypt should offer the western 
powers a chance to change direction. After all, backing for despots across the Arab worlds 
such as Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak has long been one of the central 
grievances at the heart of Islamist (and nationalist) politics, in the region and beyond. It 
would be bizarre if just as the British and other western governments are having to come to 
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terms with Islamist movements in the Middle East, they were treating their counterparts at 
home as enemies of the state. 
The practical policy consequences of Cameron's neocon turn may be modest. But its wider 
impact is likely to be chilling and poisonous. If the government's message is that peaceful 
independent Muslim political activism is beyond the pale, it won't just be regarded as 
hypocritical and undemocratic – it will strengthen the hand of those committed to violence. 
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Article for Extract 6 
Egyptian Islamists put sharia law on agenda after election gains 
Muslim Brotherhood and radical Salafists appear to take majority of seats in first round of 
Egypt's parliamentary elections 
 Associated Press 
 guardian.co.uk, Friday 2 December 2011 18.33 GMT 
Egypt's Islamist party plans to push for a stricter religious code after claiming strong gains in 
the first round of parliamentary elections. 
Islamists led by the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Salafists appear to have taken a majority 
of seats in the first round of Egypt's first parliamentary vote since the ousting of Mubarak. 
Egypt's election commission announced few results, but said turnout was 62%, the highest in 
the country's modern history. 
Leaked preliminary counts indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm took the 
largest share of votes. Following closely behind was the ultra-conservative Islamist Nour 
party and a liberal coalition, according to unofficial counts. 
Spokesman Yousseri Hamad said the Salafi Nour party, which wants sharia law to be an 
integral part of Egypt's new constitution, expected to get 30% of the vote and was leading the 
polls in the rural Nile delta province of Kafr el-Sheik, known for high rates of illiteracy and 
poverty, and in parts of its longtime stronghold of Alexandria. 
Hamad said the party faced its toughest challenge in Cairo because of the small presence of 
Salafi supporters there but polling elsewhere has put it in a strong position to influence 
policy, although it'sit is unclear how much power the new parliament will have with the 
ruling generals still in powercharge. Hamad said his party was willing to co-operate with 
secular, liberal and Islamist forces "if it will serve the interest of the nation". 
As votes were being counted in nine provinces, accounting for about 30% of the 498 seats in 
parliament's lower house, anti-military protests continued in Cairo. Two more rounds, ending 
in January, will cover Egypt's other 18 provinces. 
The new parliament, in theory, will select a 100-member panel to draft Egypt's new 
constitution. 
The al-Nour party is the main political arm of the hard-line Salafi movement which, unlike 
the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, is a new player on Egypt's political scene. 
Guided by a Saudi-inspired school of thought, Salafists have long shunned the concept of 
democracy, saying it allows man's law to override God's. But they decided to form parties 
and enter politics after the exit of Mubarak in February. 
Salafi groups speak confidently about their ambition to turn Egypt into a state where personal 
freedoms, including freedom of speech, women's dress and art, are constrained by sharia. 
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"In the land of Islam, I can't let people decide what is permissible or what is prohibited. It's 
God who gives the answers as to what is right and what is wrong," Hamad said. "If God tells 
me you can drink whatever you want except for alcohol, you don't leave the million things 
permitted and ask about the prohibited." 
The showing in Egypt, long considered a linchpin of regional stability, would be the clearest 
signal yet that parties and candidates connected to political Islam will emerge as the main 
beneficiaries of the Arab spring. 
Tunisia and Morocco have both elected Islamist majorities to parliament and, while Libya has 
yet to announce dates for its first elections, Islamist groups have emerged as a strong force 
since rebels overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in August. They also play a strong opposition role 
in Yemen 
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Article for Extract 7  
Nigerian president admits Islamists have secret backers in government 
Goodluck Jonathan says Boko Haram violence is country's greatest security threat since 1967 
civil war 
 Monica Mark 
 guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 January 2012 18.32 GMT 
The Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, has confirmed for the first time that the Islamist 
group Boko Haram has secret backers among government and security officials. 
Jonathan said Boko Haram presents Nigeria's greatest security challenge since the 1967 
Biafra civil war, when a three-year campaign by the Igbo people to secede from the country's 
150 other tribes left a million dead. 
The organisation, whose name means "non-Islamic education is sacrilege", is fighting to 
impose a strict interpretation of sharia law across Africa's most populous country. A 
simmering low-level insurgency erupted on Christmas Day with four co-ordinated attacks 
that killed at least 30 people as they poured out of church services. Since then, a spree of 
violence at churches has claimed dozens of lives, prompting a state of emergency in the 
group's northern homebase states and threatening to ignite a sectarian conflict in a country 
split evenly between Muslims and Christians. 
"During the civil war we knew and we could even predict where the enemy was coming 
from. But the challenge we have today is more complicated," Jonathan said. 
Now, Boko Haram backers and sympathisers are "in the executive arm of the government; 
some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of the government, while some are 
even in the legislative arm. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security 
agencies," he said at a three-day literary service attended by authors Chinua Achebe and 
Wole Soyinka. 
Achebe and Soyinka, both giants of the Nigerian literary scene, urged the population to 
refrain from retaliatory attacks amid reports of Christians fleeing the north, where Muslims 
are a majority, and vice-versa. 
But less than a day later, they took to the streets along with tens of thousands of ordinary 
citizens to protest at the end to fuel subsidies in the oil-rich state – highlighting the other key 
challenge faced by state officials. 
As a labour union strike and huge protests paralysed much of the country, analysts said 
Jonathan's admission was worrying given the size of the security budget, which this year was 
$5.7bn. 
"The security angle explains why the group are often one step ahead of the government. It is 
also one of the reasons why members of the group have been floating around freely. The 
population are afraid to step forward as they think their security can't be guaranteed by 
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security officials," said Shehu Sani, who heads the Civil Rights Congress of Nigeria and 
maintains close contact with the group. 
In December, the US Congress said the group had morphed from homegrown criminals into 
terrorists capable of forging international links. Members of the group claim to have travelled 
to Somalia to share techniques and funding with al-Shabaab militants. 
 
  
  172 
Article for Extract 8 
Muslims 'must embrace democracy' says David Cameron 
Muslims must embrace democracy and respect the rights of Christians around the 
world, David Cameron will say. 
By Rowena Mason, Political Correspondent, in Jakarta 
6:30AM BST 12 Apr 2012 
Spe king in Indonesi , the world‘s l rgest Isl mic country, the Prime Minister will urge 
young Muslims to  b ndon ―the de d-end choice of dict torship  nd extremism‖ by forcing 
their countries to hold elections. 
He will cl im it would be ―the gre test defe t th t Al Q ed  could ever suffer,‖ if more rebel 
and follow the lead of the young Muslims who sparked the Arab Spring. 
Mr Cameron will express his concern for the rights of millions of Christians, especially in 
Egypt, where the Coptic minority say they are facing increasing persecution. In a strong 
rebuke to Egypt‘s powerful Muslim Brotherhood p rty, Mr C meron will dem nd it does not 
―deny the rights of religious minorities who do not sh re their specific religious views‖. 
Egypt‘s Coptic community, which  ccounts for 10 per cent of the country‘s 80 million 
population, has been subjected to a continuous campaign of sectarian attacks since the 
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak last February. Thirteen were killed last May and another 10 two 
months before in attacks by suspected Islamists. 
Addressing students at Al Azhar University, Mr Cameron will use Indonesia as an example 
of how Islam and democracy can go hand in hand. The country became a democracy in 1998 
after years of a military dictatorship. It has successfully fought extremism since a bomb in 
Bali killed more than 200 in 2002. 
While pr ising Indonesi ‘s efforts to modernise, he will  rgue th t there  re still four big 
―opponents who thre ten our sh red interests‖ – authoritarian leaders, corrupt elites, 
extremists and tribalists. 
He will s y democr cy h s the  bility to defe t these ―d ngerous foes‖, such  s the 
murderous  uthorit ri n regime in Syri , even though they will ―do everything in their power 
to defeat us‖. 
Mr Cameron will become the first Western leader to visit Myanmar since the country began 
to openup. Ahead of his historic visit, the Prime Minister will pay tribute in the speech to its 
president, Thein Sein, for paving the way for free elections. 
He will  lso pr ise the ―inspir tion l‖ Aung S n Suu Kyi, the democr cy c mp igner who 
has been voted into parliament after many years under house arrest. 
Mr Cameron will face an awkward situation during the visit, as he will take business leaders 
to Myanmar despite sanctions prohibiting trade with the Asian country. 
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The chief executives will h ve to be tre ted ―like tourists‖, r ther th n t king p rt in 
meetings. 
Before heading to Myanmar, the Prime Minister will make a stop in Malaysia to promote 
British business, especially education, as many British universities have campuses in the 
country. 
M l ysi , once   British colony, h d   slog n of ―Buy British l st‖ in the 1980s  fter   row 
over trade — the Prime Minister will be working hard to overturn any negative sentiment that 
might remain. 
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Article for Extract 9 
Christian worker loses her job after being 'targeted' by Islamic extremists  
A Christian worker has launched a landmark legal action after she lost her job when 
she blew the whistle on what she says was a campaign of "race hate" by fundmentalist 
Muslims. 
Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Religious Affairs Correspondent 
7:30AM GMT 27 Nov 2011 
Nohad Halawi, who worked at Heathrow Airport, is suing her former employers for unfair 
dismissal, claiming that she and other Christian staff at the airport were victims of systematic 
harassment because of their religion.  
She claims that she was told that she would go to Hell for her religion, that Jews were 
responsible for the September 11th terror attacks, and that a friend was reduced to tears 
having been bullied for wearing a cross.  
Mrs Halawi, who came to Britain from Lebanon in 1977, worked in the duty-free section as a 
perfume saleswoman of the airport for 13 years but was dismissed in July.  
Her case is being supported by the Christian Legal Centre, who say it raises important legal 
issues and also questions over whether Muslims and Christians are treated differently by 
employers.  
It comes amid growing concern among some Christians that their faith is being marginalised 
and follows calls from Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, for Christians to be 
given greater legal protection in the wake of a series of cases where they have been 
disciplined or dismissed for practising their faith.  
It also raises further questions over race relations at Heathrow Airport.  
Last week, Arieh Zucker, a Jewish businessman, complained that he has been repeatedly 
singled out for full-body scans by Muslim security staff at the airport.  
The 41-year-old mortgage broker from London has accused them of "race hate" and is 
threatening to sue for racial discrimination after being made to "feel like a criminal" while 
being scanned.  
Mrs Halawi's case centres on whether she was treated unfairly when she lost her job in World 
Duty Free in Terminal 3 after she spoke out over what she described as bullying and 
intimidation by her Muslim colleagues of her and other Christians.  
She said that she was the subject of a complaint by an Islamic colleague which was specious 
and that when she raised her own concerns as a Christian, she was the one who was 
dismissed.  
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Now she is distraught at losing her job on allegations made by what she describes as a small 
group of "extremist" Muslims.  
Mrs Halawi, 47, said: "I have been sacked on the basis of unsubstantiated complaints so there 
is now great fear amongst my former colleagues that the same could happen to them if one of 
the Muslims turns on them.  
"This is supposed to be a Christian country, but the law seems to be on the side of the 
Muslims." 
A mother of two, she says that she had always got on well with her Muslim colleagues and 
relations between staff of different faiths had been good in the past, but that the atmosphere 
became increasingly uncomfortable with a growing number of employees espousing 
"fundamentalist Islam".  
She says they harassed Christians at work by making fun of them for wearing crosses, 
ridiculing Jesus and telling them they would go to Hell if they did not convert to Islam.  
"One man brought in the Koran to work and insisted I read it and another brought in Islamic 
leaflets and handed them out to other employees," she said.  
"They said that 9/11 served the Americans right and that they hated the West, but that they 
had come here because they want to convert people to Islam.  
"They say that Jesus is s***** [shitty] and bullied a Christian friend of mine so much for 
wearing her crosses that she came to me crying." 
Mrs Halawi says she was targeted by the fundamentalists after she stood up for her friend, 
who is 62 and who she is keeping anonymous because she still works at the terminal.  
In May, five of her Muslim colleagues complained to David Tunnicliffe, the trading manager 
at World Duty Free, accusing her of being anti-Islamic following a heated conversation in the 
store.  
The row had stemmed from her description of a Muslim colleague as an allawhi, which 
means 'man of God' in Arabic. Another Muslim overheard this and thought she said Alawi, 
which was his branch of Islam.  
Following the complaints she was suspended immediately, but was not told the grounds for 
her suspension until she met Mr Tunnicliffe in July.  
Two days after the meeting she received a letter, which said the "store approval" - the 
Heathrow security pass - needed to work at World Duty Free was being removed because her 
behaviour was deemed to be unacceptable.  
"I believe that the breakdown in relationship between yourself and some of your colleagues 
has contributed to this situation and has led to a number of inappropriate conversations taking 
place," the letter said.  
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"Whilst I do not believe that you may have meant to be offensive, I believe that it was not 
unreasonable for the individuals who either heard these comments, or who they were directed 
at to find them offensive, and they are extremely inappropriate." 
However, the only comments she made which Mr Tunnicliffe claimed were offensive relate 
to her accusing a Muslim colleague of having "extremist leaflets" and asking another Muslim 
why Jesus was being described as "s*****".  
She was paid on a freelance basis by Caroline South Associates, a fragrance and cosmetics 
agency that provides staff to work in World Duty Free, and was told that she would not be 
able to continue working without her pass.  
A petition signed by 28 colleagues, some of them Muslims, argued that she has been 
dismissed on the basis of "malicious lies", but failed to see her reinstated.  
Andrea Minichiello Williams, founder and director of the Christian Legal Centre, said that 
the case is one of the most serious they have handled.  
"It raises huge issues," she said.  
"First, there is the level of Islamic fundamentalism prevalent at our main point of entry to the 
UK.  
"Then there are very real issues of religious discrimination, which it would appear those in 
authority are turning a blind eye to, using the current loop-holes in employment law as an 
excuse."  
The centre has instructed Paul Diamond, a leading human rights barrister, to represent Mrs 
Halawi in taking both Caroline South Associates and Autogrill Retail UK Limited, which 
trades as World Duty Free, to an employment tribunal.  
They hope that the case will set a precedent for thousands of people like Mrs Halaoui who 
would appear to be employees from the working relationship, but actually have no rights 
because of their self-employed status.  
A lawyer acting for CSA said: "The case is still pending so the company is not in a position 
to comment, but as far as the company is concerned she's never been an employee and has 
never been dismissed." 
A spokesman for World Duty Free said they were unable to comment because the matter is 
subject to "ongoing legal proceedings".  
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Article for Extract 10 
Tablighi Jamaat mosque accused of encouraging Muslim isolationism 
The Islamic group Tablighi Jamaat, which is fighting to keep its east London mosque, is 
described as a supremacist movement at a planning inquiry 
 Riazat Butt, religious affairs correspondent 
 guardian.co.uk, Friday 18 February 2011 18.32 GMT 
 
An Islamic group fighting to keep its east London mosque, near to the Olympics site, has 
been described by opponents as a "supremacist movement" that encourages isolationism from 
wider British society. 
Tablighi Jamaat, a global proselytising movement with tens of thousands of members in the 
UK, is trying to overturn an enforcement notice on its mosque, called the Riverine Centre, 
after temporary planning permission expired in 2006. 
A planning inquiry at Newham town hall will determine whether the group can continue to 
use the modest collection of buildings. On Thursday it heard that followers of Tablighi 
Jamaat were taught to "shun integration with all unbelievers in order to be uncontaminated 
Muslims and to isolate themselves from wider society". 
According to evidence from Dr Taj Hargey, an imam who runs a progressive Islamic 
educational centre in Oxford, the "isolationist dynamic" of Tablighi Jamaat has caused the 
growth of a "separatist Muslim enclave" in the streets around its Dewsbury headquarters. 
Hargey was called as a witness by Newham Concern, a local campaign group which has long 
opposed Tablighi Jamaat and its ambitions to expand its facilities. The group is behind plans 
to build a much larger facility at the site, dubbed a "megamosque" by the media, although it 
currently has no planning application in place. 
Hargey told the inquiry that Tablighi Jamaat had "achieved very little for the community" and 
rejected the group's assertions that closing the mosque would lead to the marginalisation of 
Muslim youth. 
He said: "Over the past 14 years that TJ has occupied the site it has furnished no proven track 
record of opening their facilities to the wider Muslim community, let alone non-Muslim 
community. In that time they have not even managed to create any facilities for women. The 
facility itself currently contributes substantially to marginalisation". He described it as a 
"supremacist movement with adverse implications for the government's community cohesion 
policies". 
Newham Concern also called Tehmina Kazi, from the group British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy, as a witness. 
Kazi, speaking in a personal capacity, said the government's national planning policy sought 
to promote "mixed and balanced communities" and that Tablighi Jamaat was "particularly 
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inward-looking" because it only engaged with other Muslims. "The main issue is not that 
they are a socially conservative movement, but the fact they have been reluctant to engage in 
dialogue with people who are different." 
Newham council has said it wants to shut the mosque down over concerns about traffic 
levels, land contamination and visual impact. 
The inquiry continues. 
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Article for Extracts 11 and 29 
British Muslims must step outside this anti-war comfort zone 
British Muslims have too long defined politics by the Middle East. We have an obligation to 
engage with the national debate 
 Mehdi Hasan 
 The Guardian, Monday 2 April 2012 
It was the Muslims wot won it. To pretend otherwise is naive if not disingenuous. George 
Galloway could not have triumphed in the Bradford West byelection, with the biggest swing 
in modern British political history, had it not been for the loud, passionate and overwhelming 
support of the constituency's big Muslim population. "All praise to Allah!" the new Respect 
party MP gratefully proclaimed, via loudspeaker, to his supporters on Saturday. 
The British Muslim community has had a tortured relationship with politicians in recent 
years. That it has become a cliche to say that young British Muslims are alienated, estranged 
and marginalised from the political process doesn't make it any less true. Muslims are 
woefully under-represented in public life: the number of Muslim MPs, for instance, stands at 
eight out of 650. 
Ironically, Labour's candidate in the Bradford West byelection, Imran Hussain, was on the 
verge of becoming the ninth such MP. But Hussain seems to have been out-Muslimed by the 
Catholic Galloway. "God KNOWS who is a Muslim," said a leaflet sent out to voters. "And 
he KNOWS who is not. Instinctively, so do you ... I, George Galloway, do not drink alcohol 
and never have. Ask yourself if you believe the other candidate in this election can say that 
truthfully." 
The Respect party leader, Salma Yacoub, tells me this leaflet was a response to a smear 
campaign by the local Labour party, allegedly telling Bradford's Muslims not to vote for 
Galloway because he was a sharabi ("drunk"). 
But there is a much bigger question at stake here: why is it that most British Muslims get so 
excited and aroused by foreign affairs, yet seem so bored by and uninterested in domestic 
politics and the economy? 
From the march against the Iraq war in 2003 to the demonstrations against the Danish 
cartoons in 2006 and the protests against Israel's attack on Gaza in 2009, British Muslims 
have shown themselves perfectly willing to take to the streets to make their voices heard. But 
how many times have they, individually or collectively, joined rallies over issues that affect 
our daily lives: from the reforms of the NHS to the future of local schools; from the lack of 
social housing to rising energy bills and train fares? 
It is far too easy to lay the blame for such indifference at the door of community 
organisations. Yet the much-maligned Muslim Council of Britain, for example, has tried 
repeatedly to rally support for issues like child poverty and climate change – with little 
success. The MCB also backed last year's March for the Alternative against the government's 
spending cuts. But from my own vantage point on the platform at Hyde Park that afternoon, I 
was disappointed to see few beards or hijabs among the sea of faces in the crowd – despite 
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the fact that deprived Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities will be hit hardest by the 
coalition's cuts to public services. 
Of course, Galloway has said it was his anti-austerity agenda, not just his anti-war message, 
that helped him to victory in Bradford West. I have my doubts. Furqan Naeem, chair of the 
University of Bradford Student Union, says the hundreds of young British Muslim activists 
who campaigned for the Respect candidate "were oblivious of Galloway's track record 
beyond the war". 
It has been nine years since the attack on Iraq and 11 years since the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Don't get me wrong: these wars still matter. They are, in the words of Labour's Diane Abbott, 
"unforgotten and unforgiven". But for how long will they continue to be the only or even the 
deciding factor whenever an election is held in a seat with a big Muslim population? 
It isn't just a combination of anti-terror laws and media demonisation that has hindered efforts 
at Muslim integration into mainstream British society. So, too, has the reluctance of many 
British Muslims to step outside the political comfort zone of the anti-war movement. When 
we only talk of foreign affairs, is it any wonder that we seem to come across as foreigners? 
Muslims do not lack for opponents or antagonists; those who want to portray us as foreign, 
alien, un-British, are growing in number. We should not be handing them a club with which 
to beat us. In fact, the best way of overcoming Islamophobia and suspicion is for British 
Muslims to broaden, not narrow, our political horizons, to get involved in our local 
communities, to show our fellow citizens that we care not just about events in Palestine and 
Pakistan, but Portsmouth and Paisley too. 
How can Muslims complain about our rights, our freedoms, our collective future, if we aren't 
engaged in the political process across the board as active British citizens? We have an 
obligation, as Britons and as Muslims, to fully participate in local and national debates and 
not to stand idly by. 
We have allowed ourselves to be defined only by foreign policy and, in particular, by events 
in the Middle East for far too long. British Muslims can make a positive contribution to 
British society, but first we have to stop our navel-gazing and victim mentality. We must let 
the people, press and politicians of this country know that we are as British as we are 
Muslim, and we care about our shared future. 
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Bill limiting sharia law is motivated by 'concern for Muslim women' 
Lady Cox, the proposer, says aim is to prevent discrimination against Muslim women and 
'jurisdiction creep' in Islamic tribunals 
 Karen McVeigh and Amelia Hill 
 guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 June 2011 21.06 BST 
Islamic courts would be forced to acknowledge the primacy of English law under a bill being 
introduced in the House of Lords. 
The bill, proposed by Lady Cox and backed by women's rights groups and the National 
Secular Society, was drawn up because of "deep concerns" that Muslim women are suffering 
discrimination within closed sharia law councils. 
The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill will introduce an offence carrying a 
five-year jail sentence for anyone falsely claiming or implying that sharia courts or councils 
have legal jurisdiction over family or criminal law. The bill, which will apply to all 
arbitration tribunals if passed, aims to tackle discrimination, which its supporters say is 
inherent in the courts, by banning the sharia practice of giving woman's testimony only half 
the weight of men's. 
Cox said: "Equality under the law is a core value of British justice. My bill seeks to preserve 
that standard" 
In a similar way to Jewish Beth Din courts, sharia tribunals can make verdicts in cases 
involving financial and property issues which, under the 1996 Arbitration Act, are 
enforceable by county courts or the high court. 
The tribunals should only be deciding civil disputes but two years ago the think-tank Civitas 
claimed sharia courts, some 85 of which operate in Birmingham, London, Bradford and 
Manchester, had crossed the proper limits of their jurisdiction and were regularly giving 
illegal advice on marriage and divorce. 
Cox said they are increasingly ruling on family and criminal cases, including child custody 
and domestic violence. Jurisdiction "creep" had caused considerable suffering among women 
compelled to return to abusive husbands, or to give up children and property. 
Diana Nammi, of the Iranian and Kurdish Women's Rights Organisation, said: "Women and 
children are very vulnerable members of the community and under sharia law they become 
invisible. Women and children are the most vulnerable in minority communities where 
religion tradition and culture has become the identity taking precedence over the human 
rights and women's rights that are protected under civil, UK law." 
The bill requires public bodies to inform women they have fewer legal rights if their marriage 
is unrecognised in English law. Cox said she had found "considerable evidence" of women, 
some of whom are brought to Britain speaking little English and kept ignorant of their legal 
rights, suffering domestic violence or unequal access to divorce, due to discriminatory 
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decisions made. "We cannot continue to condone this situation. Many women say: 'We came 
to this country to escape these practices only to find the situation is worse here.' " 
Cox said she would be asking the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, who 
caused a row last year when he said a recognised role for sharia law seemed unavoidable, to 
back her bill. She said: "By appearing to condone this inherent discrimination system which 
is causing real suffering to women, he has failed to recognise that suffering. He is appearing 
to forward the acceptability and validity of Sharia law in this country." 
Keith Porteous Wood, executive director of the National Secular Society, said: "Laws should 
not impinge on religious freedoms, nor should courts judge on theological matters. By the 
same token, democratically determined and human rights compliant law must take 
precedence over the law of any religion." 
Aina Khan, a solicitor who advises on sharia law, said: "It is good in parts. I would like to see 
best practice in sharia councils, like in the Beth Din model and I would like some legislation. 
I don't want somebody opening up a sharia board in their front room. Of course sex 
discrimination laws must apply. But there are some alarmist tones in the bill. Where she goes 
wrong is assuming that some sort of misogyny and discrimination goes on. Eighty per cent of 
its users are women." 
Khurshid Drabu, adviser on constitutional affairs to the Muslim Council of Britain, said: 
"Bills of this kind don't help anybody. They don't appear to understand that we live in a free 
country where people can make free choices. Yet again, it appears to be a total 
misunderstanding of the concept that underpins these arbitration councils. Sharia councils 
operate under consent. If there is a woman who suffers as a result of a decision by one of 
these councils a woman is free to go to the British courts." 
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Article for Extracts 13, 17, 18, 30 
Why banning the veil would only cover up the real problems for British Muslims  
British Muslim women tell Andrew Gilligan why they wear the veil as debate mounts 
over the French "burka ban".  
Andrew Gilligan 
9:00PM BST 16 Apr 2011 
In some ways, they were like any other young women, waiting at the bus stop for the 25 to 
Ilford, clutching their mobile phones and small bottles of water. But thanks to Europe's most 
controversial item of millinery, you could see nothing of Muna Jama and her friend but their 
eyes. 
This was the week that France banned the niqab, the Islamic full-face veil. The law's 
principal author called it a way to "eradicate [a] minority of fundamentalists" who 
"instrumentalise Islam for political reasons." President Nicolas Sarkozy said the niqab was "a 
sign of debasement and subservience;" for another minister, it was a male-imposed "prison." 
But is any of that true? 
The French parliamentary inquiry which recommended the ban lasted six months and heard 
211 witnesses. Yet just one of those was a niqab-wearing woman – and even she was seen 
only after she repeatedly insisted. The commission's report runs to 658 pages. A total of one 
paragraph is devoted to this woman's testimony. 
The Sunday Telegraph decided to do something which virtually nobody involved in the 
debate, either here or across the Channel, seems to have bothered with – talk to people 
wearing the niqab and ask them why they do it. The answers may surprise you. 
The vast majority of the twenty women I approached on the streets of Tower Hamlets, 
London's main Muslim area, were more than happy to talk to a non-Muslim man – in several 
cases, the problem was shutting them up. Most were not stereotypically repressed or un-
Westernised, but young and articulate. 
From behind the black cloth came, for the most part, accents indistinguishable from those of 
any other Londoner. Above all, they passionately insisted, nobody had forced them to wear 
the veil. It was their choice. 
"I used to go clubbing, I used to drink, I used to wear skinny jeans," said Ms Jama, who is 28 
and from Barking. "But I just got thinking it wasn't right. I had lots of men and I never got 
anything out of it. They would use me and then leave me. They would look at me like a piece 
of meat, and this [the niqab] stops all that. 
"It is hard in other ways. I live near Essex, and people are sometimes hostile. But it's still 
better. It gives me confidence." 
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Ms Jama's friend, who did not want to be named, said: "We do it because there's a higher 
reward. There's a lot of things [Islamic obligations] we're not capable of doing but we can do 
this." 
Many of the women insisted that wearing the veil was an act not of repression but of self-
assertion. "I am doing it to assert my identity as a Muslim," said another young woman, 
Karima. "My parents hate it, actually. My father keeps threatening to throw me out." I got a 
strong sense that for at least some of them it was part of finding an identity in the same way 
that a white teenager might dye her hair or become a goth. 
One male Tower Hamlets councillor I talked to described going into a flat on the local Robin 
Hood Gardens estate, just above the Blackwall Tunnel, and finding a family where the wife 
was not covered, the elder daughter wore western clothes, but the younger daughter was in 
the full shroud. 
Yet the theological basis for the veil is notoriously shaky. The Quran does not mention it. 
Most interpretations of the holy book, including the very first, by Imam Tabari, state that 
"there is a consensus that women are not obliged to cover the face and the hands." 
The niqab is banned not just in France, but in Islam's holiest place, Mecca. Women 
performing the pilgrimage are not allowed to wear it – even though they mix freely with men, 
and even though it is a strict legal obligation in the rest of Saudi Arabia. 
The vast majority of Tower Hamlets Muslims are originally from Bangladesh, an 
overwhelmingly Muslim country. But the niqab, a Saudi garment, is almost completely 
unknown there. In supposedly backward, monocultural Dhaka, the capital, you will never see 
it on the streets. In supposedly liberal, multicultural London, I saw perhaps twenty niqabi 
women in half an hour. 
"I grew up in what people would call a Muslim ghetto, in Rochdale," says Haras Rafiq, 
director of the moderate Muslim think-tank Centri. "I never even saw a niqab until I was 19. 
They have grown enormously." 
Tower Hamlets is headquarters to a particularly pernicious form of Islamic radicalism. Over 
us in the Whitechapel Road towered the East London Mosque, funded by Saudi Arabia and 
controlled by the hardline Islamic Forum of Europe, accused by the local Labour MP of 
infiltrating his party to further its declared goal of a sharia state in Europe. 
One of the IFE's secondary objectives, as a Sunday Telegraph investigation last year 
established, is to "Islamicise" its area. And though I believed the niqabi women I met when 
they said they weren't forced, there is no doubt that some others locally do feel strong 
pressure to conform. 
A shopkeeper, who did not want to give her name, said several of her customers, men and 
women, had verbally attacked her for not covering her head. They had tried to have her 
dismissed, but her Muslim boss had refused. Last year a local Labour councillor, Shiria 
Khatun, was the target of an 18-month hate campaign against her "Western" dress, including 
late-night obscene phone calls and cars following her in the street. No-one has been 
prosecuted for this. 
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At the private Madani Girls' School, just off the Whitechapel Road, all the children are forced 
to wear the niqab. It is a fair bet that some of them do not want to. Ofsted, the education 
inspectorate, did not mention the compulsory veil-wearing in its report into the school, 
instead praising it for leaving pupils "well-prepared for life in a multicultural society" – even 
though the Madani School's own website states that it "opposes the lifestyle of the West". 
During the last niqab controversy the Muslim Council of Britain, also dominated by the IFE, 
endorsed a chilling statement, unreported until now, warning Muslim women that not 
wearing the veil was a "shortcoming" which may lead to apostasy. It was, they said, an 
"Islamic practice" which was "not open to debate". All 27 signatories of the statement were 
male. The MCB was, until recently, treated by ministers as a mainstream interlocutor. 
Yet it is still too simplistic to say, as the French have done, that niqab-wearer equals Islamist 
radical. Many of the niqabi women we spoke to did feel that Islam was under attack – a key 
element of the Islamist worldview. But this did not usually translate into political activism. 
"It was not a political thing at all," said one woman. "It was personal." Surprisingly, some of 
the niqabi women we spoke to did not even go to the mosque. None said they were members 
of any organisation or group. At best, the niqab is a symptom, not a cause. 
"It's a red herring," says Haras Rafiq. "By devoting time and space to it, we're taking our eyes 
off what really matters."  
No-one serious in Britain wants a ban, which is probably just as well.  
"A ban would be manna from heaven for the extremists," says Rafiq. "It would reinforce the 
Islamist claim that society is picking on Muslims. People who don't wear it would take it up 
as a political cause." 
To know that Rafiq is right, you just have to imagine what would happen when the first 
British woman was jailed for refusing to remove her niqab. "It would be unenforceable, and if 
it was enforced it would lead to civil unrest," says Peter Golds, the Tory leader in Tower 
Hamlets, a man with a long track record of opposing local extremists. "It is not for 
governments to decide what people should wear." 
What the women of Tower Hamlets do, perhaps, need is not just the right to cover their heads 
– but the right not to. That is something that Britain's pusillanimous liberal regulators do not 
always seem terribly keen on enforcing. 
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Muslim basketball team shows India that Nagpada girls can jump 
Team from wrong side of the Mumbai tracks fight prejudice to compete for title 
 Jason Burke 
 guardian.co.uk, Friday 18 November 2011 16.35 GMT 
In the evening, when the temperature has dropped, it is the girls who take over Nagpada 
basketball court. A dozen or so, dressed in leggings or long shorts and T-shirts, train hard 
under the lights. Their efforts will intensify in coming weeks. In January they will face a 
crucial test: a tournament which for the first time the Nagpada girls' basketball team believe 
they have a chance of winning. 
The girls of Nagpada are making a name for themselves in Mumbai – and in their own tight-
knit, Muslim-dominated community. Though boys there have played basketball for decades, 
few girls ventured on to the court. "A lot of people here in the neighbourhood felt that girls 
shouldn't play," said Afreen Sheikh Rasheed, 18, one of the team's star players. 
"But attitudes are changing now. Some people are proud of us instead of criticising." 
The basketball court – one of few such public facilities in the city – is surrounded by 
makeshift huts where recent migrants live, a rubbish tip and overcrowded tenements. One of 
the new luxury apartment tower blocks being built all over Mumbai, which has some of the 
highest real estate prices in the world, overlooks streets where goats scavenge. A handful of 
battered balls lie in a rusty bin in a corner of the court. A seating area has no seats. 
The girls are fiercely protective of their court, however. "These are some of the best facilities 
in the city. And anyway, it's all we need," said Afreen. 
For many years Nagpada has had a reputation as both deeply conservative and crime-ridden. 
So beyond their neighbourhood too, the girls' team have changed attitudes. Travelling all over 
the city, they often play teams from private schools – and win. Indian news magazine 
Tehelka reported one recent game in which they vanquished a team from the wealthy Colaba 
district "with coloured hair, Nike sneakers and short shorts [who] were no m tch for the … 
Nagpada girls" wearing cheap, locally made trainers. 
"At our ground we believe in hard work and discipline. When the training is over, the girls go 
straight home," said the head coach of the team, businessman Noor Khan. 
Afreen and her sister Sumaiya were both encouraged to play by their father, a taxi driver who 
had been a keen player when he was young. Most of the girls have some family connection to 
the sport. "My dad dreamed of being a player so he is very happy," Afreen said. 
Nida Feroz Khan, whose father is an estate agent, followed her older sister's example. Her 
grandfather played in Nagpada in the 1950s, she said. 
It is unlikely that their chosen sport will bring riches soon. Basketball has been played in 
India since 1930, but it has always been overshadowed by cricket and hockey. Prize money in 
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tournaments remains negligible, even for men's teams. Yet, as with many sports here, success 
can mean a secure state job with the police, army, railways or other agencies which have 
quotas allowing them to take promising athletes and sportsmen on to their payroll. For girls 
such as Afreen, Sumaiya and Nida, this means basketball could bring an escape from a life of 
grinding poverty. Not only does this bring a salary but lodgings too, a huge advantage in 
overcrowded Mumbai. 
"We can get good jobs through [the sport] and that could change everything," said Afreen. 
Despite the slow change, there is still significant resistance to the girls' basketball within 
Nagpada. Clerics regularly criticise the players in sermons. 
In the Zulfiqar restaurant, only a few metres from the training ground, the owner, Abdul Haq, 
said it was wrong that girls played basketball. "They should be indoors or at school at that 
age. It's not the right activity for them," he said. 
Ali Hassan, a 34-year-old medical technician, said there was nothing wrong with girls 
playing basketball but they should be "properly dressed". He suggested a full head-to-toe 
veil. Zulfiqar Haidar, a cobbler, thought that given the demands of the sport, some kind of 
adapted dress which would allow the girls to see would be preferable – though "definitely no 
shorts and no exposed hair". 
For Noor Khan and the club's other organisers, however, the immediate problem is not social, 
but financial. The tournament planned for January will only occur if funds can be found. But 
sponsors are far from forthcoming. Khan blames the migrant labourers who are living in 
shacks around the court, saying their presence puts off the big brands he hopes might be 
interested in some kind of involvement with the club. 
Saeed Bijapuri, a former national-level player from Nagpada, said it was the reputation of the 
neighbourhood itself. "No one wants to have their name associated with Mumbai number 8 
[the local postcode]," he told the Guardian. "Even if this is the best court around, with the 
most enthusiastic players and the most knowledgeable crowd. That doesn't seem to matter to 
the businessmen." 
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Article for Extracts 15 and 16 
New wave of well-off Pakistani women drawn to conservative Islam 
Wealthy, educated women are increasingly embracing the trend for religious inquiry and 
observance 
 Jason Burke 
 guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 April 2012 19.06 BST 
 
All the women working in the information technology division of the Bank of Punjab's 
headquarters in the western Pakistani city of Lahore wear headscarves tightly wound around 
their cheeks and chin, framing their faces as they tap at their keyboards. A year or so ago not 
one covered their heads with the hijab. 
"I was the first," says 28-year-old Shumaila, as she waited with some impatience in the city's 
iStore for her new £800 Apple MacBook to be loaded with the software she had ordered. 
"I started reading the Qur'an properly and praying five times a day. No one made me wear the 
hijab. That would be impossible," she laughs brightly. "I showed the way to the other girls at 
work." 
They are not alone. Though there are no statistics and most evidence is anecdotal, a new 
wave of interest in more conservative strands of Islam among wealthier and better educated 
women in Pakistan appears clear. 
It is part of a broader cultural and religious shift seen in the country over decades but which 
observers say has accelerated in the past 10 years. 
"The other girls who were working with us left." Shumaila said. "They found the new 
environment a bit unfriendly." 
One indication of the trend is the growing proportion of women within the conservative 
religious political organisation Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Syed Munawar Hassan, the leader of JI 
in Pakistan, said that women made up an increasing proportion of the organisation's 6 million 
members and 30,000 organisers. "Our women's wing is doing very well," he said. "They are 
some of our best organisers." 
JI, like its counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world, has traditionally recruited among the 
lower middle class, swollen in recent decades in Pakistan by rapid urbanisation and economic 
growth. But the new wave of devotion is now touching the elite in a new way. Al-Huda (The 
Guidance), an organisation set up in 1994 to spread a new and often rigorous piety among 
Pakistani women, has gained a foothold among the upper reaches of society. 
The group, which critics accuse of encouraging intolerant strands of Islam influenced by 
those practised in Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, has grown from an initial 
single small centre in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, to a presence in every city, and is 
expanding among the Pakistani diaspora abroad. 
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Members attend intensive courses in Qur'anic studies and Arabic and are directed to do social 
welfare work, too. Not all enjoy the experience of al-Huda, however. 
"I found it very limiting and rigid. But it is very popular among women from very wealthy 
families that are quite conservative. Recently there are a lot of young women coming to a 
very traditional Islam. There is a deep desire for learning," said Maha Jehangir, a 30-year-old 
consultant and former al-Huda member. 
Jehangir, who lives in a large house in one of the most exclusive parts of Islamabad, said 
questions posed by the events of the past decade were particularly important for young 
women. 
"People who grew up within the war on terror are asking, what does it mean to be a Nato 
ally? Is India our worst enemy? We are bombarded by all this information and there is a deep 
need for answers. That leads to religious inquiry," Jehangir said. 
Many found the answers in conservative strands of religious practice, she said. 
Other influences that underpin the new piety among wealthy women include the experience 
of many Pakistanis who have spent time in the Gulf. 
Amna, a 21-year-old business student whose father was a manager for a major firm in Saudi 
Arabia, said that it was wrong to think that women who were richer or more educated would 
inevitably be more secular. 
"Everything we learn comes from the Qur'an. Maths, computers, banking – the Qur'an 
contains everything," said Amna, who wears a Saudi-style full veil covering all but her eyes 
even at the all-female college in Islamabad where she studies. 
However, if there is a demand for more rigorous, literalist strands of Islamic practice among 
wealthy and educated women, there is also an interest in more tolerant varieties. 
In Lahore, the al-Mawrid institute is attracting more and more "educated ladies, doctors, 
professors, housewives who do not know about Islam", says Kaukab Shehzad, a 43-year-old 
teacher. 
The institute, in the wealthy suburb of Model Town, was set up three years ago but had to 
move after receiving threats from radical scholars, she said. "We read the Qur'an in detail but 
we discuss other religions too. We were attacked for saying that the niqab [Saudi-style veil] is 
not justified in the Qur'anic teachings and for arguing against their interpretation of the idea 
of jihad," she said. 
Though solidarity with Muslim communities overseas is encouraged by many conservative 
practitioners, many of the new devout shun such a global vision and identity. Shumaila, the 
bank worker and Apple enthusiast, says she is not interested in events in the Middle East: 
"We've enough going on here." 
Jahangir, the former al-Huda member in Islamabad, recently spent two years studying in a 
religious school of the Deobandi branch of Islam, also followed by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. A graduate of both Massachusetts and London Universities, she too said that 
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political activism was of little interest: "I don't try to make sense of the Taliban. I find [them] 
obscure and irrelevant. For me, [the Deobandi school of Islam] is far more of a route to 
spirituality than a political ideology." 
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Article for Extracts 19 and 26 
Living with 9/11: the Muslim American 
Linda Sarsour lives in Brooklyn and is from a Palestinian American family. She has become 
increasingly involved in community activism since the September 11 attacks 
 Paul Harris 
 guardian.co.uk, Monday 5 September 2011 20.00 BST 
Linda Sarsour, 31, remembers the exact moment when it dawned on her that the terrible 
events of September 11, 2001, would change her world. Sarsour, then a student at a local 
college in Brooklyn, had grown up in the tight-knit Arab American community of Bay Ridge 
in the suburbs of New York city. She was from a Palestinian American family and fiercely 
proud of both sides of her identity. 
But as she rushed into her home just a few hours after the attacks she was stunned to see her 
mother hurrying out of the house with her hair uncovered. Even through the shock of the 
morning's events, it was still an arresting sight to see her mother not wearing a headscarf in 
public. "I bumped into her," Sarsour says. "I was: 'Mom! You forgot to wear your hijab.' And 
she said: 'We can't wear it.' She was going to pick up my brother from middle school. My 
brother looks like a white kid with dark hair and she didn't want to wear a hijab so that people 
would not know he was a Muslim. I was speechless." 
Ten years later Sarsour, who as a young student was not especially interested in community 
activism, is director of the Arab American Association of New York (AAANY). She sits, 
wearing a hijab herself, in a back room of the AAANY office off Bay Ridge's busy main 
drag. Sarsour is a petite woman with a strong Brooklyn accent. She is calm and composed , 
even though the interview is constantly interrupted by people seeking help and advice. That is 
normal. The AAANY is a lifeline to the community of Bay Ridge and beyond. It offers legal 
advice, help on immigration and summer classes for young kids. Today, the lobby is packed 
with Muslim women eager to sign up for English language courses. "It's just the normal 
everyday chaos," Sarsour says. 
She joined the organisation in 2002 when she was asked to help the AAANY cope with the 
fears of a Muslim American community increasingly under suspicion in a country terrified of 
another attack and about to go to war in Iraq. "I had women that would come and say the FBI 
had been. Sometimes it was actually NYPD or immigration but our community always called 
them FBI," Sarsour says. "They would say: 'In the morning they came to my house and they 
took my husband.' They had no information about where their husband was or where they 
were taken. I started thinking to myself: 'I have to learn more about this and what is going 
on.'" 
What Sarsour realised was that Muslim Americans – and Arab Americans in particular – 
were about to become America's latest ethnic scapegoat. Many groups had been there before 
them. When the Irish first came to America in the 19th century they were feared and 
discriminated against. Later, mass immigration by Italians and Jews saw them suffer the same 
indignities. Roman Catholics, including John F Kennedy, were once seen as potentially 
dangerous elements, subject to the influence of a foreign power. Japanese Americans were 
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interned in their thousands during the second world war. Now, over the past decade, Sarsour 
believes, Muslim Americans have suffered from similar prejudice and suspicion. 
Since she saw her mother shed her hijab to collect her brother from school she thinks things 
have only got worse. "It has happened to other communities before ours," she says. "But we 
are the victims now." 
Sarsour lists the problems in the New York region. There was a knife attack on a cab driver 
last year after his passenger asked him if he was Muslim – and then slashed him when he 
replied that he was. There are bullying incidents in schools that she hears about from her 
friends and family. There was the furore over the so-called "Ground Zero mosque" in lower 
Manhattan. That was followed by other attempts, some successful, to prevent mosques being 
built in and around the city. 
Finally, there was the fuss over Florida preacher Terry Jones and his decision to burn a 
Qur'an. For Sarsour it seemed Islam itself was questioned by her fellow Americans. "It makes 
me feel foreign when I am not foreign," she says. She tells a story of being verbally abused in 
a Bay Ridge bank by a fellow customer who disliked her headscarf. 
She speaks of a young Muslim boy at a summer camp who was afraid to admit his faith out 
of a fear he would be stabbed, just like the taxi driver. "It makes me sad that our kids are 
growing up in a country where they are American, but in a sense, have to prove it. They can't 
just be who they are like everyone else. Who they are is something suspicious, something 
scary, something misunderstood," she says. 
But Sarsour believes she can embody her two identities: that of a Muslim of Palestinian 
descent, and that of an American woman born and bred in Brooklyn. "My American side 
marries my Palestinian side well. Americans in general, we are very steadfast people, we 
know what we want, we get what we want. My American side makes me fearless." 
Which is perhaps why Sarsour's ambitions lie beyond the AAANY. She has already flung 
herself into local Democratic politics by organising voter drives in Brooklyn. She believes 
that through hard work and campaigning she can persuade not only the Muslim Americans of 
Bay Ridge to vote for her, but also the rest of the community: the Italian Americans, the Irish 
Americans and the Russians. Anyone, really, regardless of faith. She aims to stand for office 
one day, wearing her hijab. "I care about affordable housing, I care about bus routes, I care 
about small business, I care about schools. These are not Muslim issues. Even protection of 
civil rights – that's not just a Muslim issue. That is for everyone." 
Ten years after 9/11, perhaps one of the least expected outcomes of that terrible day will be a 
headscarf-wearing Arab American woman hitting the streets of Brooklyn and asking her 
fellow citizens for their votes. 
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Article for Extract 20 
Muslim women: beyond the stereotype 
They run workshops combating al-Qaida propaganda and face personal danger promoting 
moderate Islam. Haroon Siddique meets the Muslim women confronting prejudice in their 
fight against extremism 
 Haroon Siddique 
 The Guardian, Friday 29 April 2011 
Tehmina Kazi wears modest western dress and believes in plurality and diversity within her 
faith, Islam. For her pains, she has been labelled a whore, admonished for not wearing the 
hijab and accused, inaccurately, of wearing short skirts by people she has never met, writing 
online. 
When she defended Usama Hasan, the London imam who faced death threats and was 
suspended from Leyton mosque last month after he said evolution was compatible with 
Islam, she had to go to police after receiving threats of her own. 
Despite this, Kazi, the director of British Muslims for Secular Democracy, remains defiant in 
her role as one of the small but growing number of British Muslim women challenging and 
combating Islamic extremism. Campaigning against any extremism is not for the faint-
hearted, but for Muslim women it requires a special kind of resolve. "It takes a lot more 
courage to do this if you're a woman because the type of criticism you get is very different," 
she says, highlighting the personal nature of the abuse. "They always talk about what you 
wear." 
Kazi believes women should be free to wear whatever they choose – it is stereotypes about 
Muslim women that she aims to confront. BMSD, which, despite not being a women's 
organisation, has always had female leadership after being founded by columnist Yasmin 
Alibhai Brown – supports a young Muslim leadership programme, counter-demonstrates 
against extremist groups, such as Anjem Choudary's Islam4UK, and attempts to get moderate 
voices heard in debates about Islam. The group emphasises the underutilised weapon of 
humour in taking the fight to the extremists. In one video on the BMSD website, an 
archetypal "angry young Muslim" begins ominously, "I have a message for those who insult 
Islam," before adding: "Let's agree to disagree." 
It campaigns against both Islamic extremism and Islamophobia – Kazi cites the example of 
"the preacher going to the mosque and saying women who wear perfume are adulterers", as 
well as stereotypes of Muslims that suggests all women are marginalised. 
These views are echoed by Sara Khan who set up Inspire two years ago because she felt there 
was no organisation helping Muslim women to achieve their potential. "It's quite patronising. 
To say Muslim women are oppressed or don't contribute is just so patronising – no 
community wants to be stereotyped." 
Khan makes no attempt to hide her frustration as she rails against the wider perception of 
Muslim women, which, for her, manifests itself in the media preoccupation with the hijab. 
Khan wore the hijab for 15 years before she tired of the "obsession" surrounding it. Despite 
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Khan's frustration at stereotyping, she is not blind to the fact that not all Muslim women have 
had the same freedom and opportunities as she has, recognising that there are "Muslim 
women not allowed to go out of the house". 
Khan, who sat on the Home Office working group tackling extremism and radicalisation, and 
Inspire are behind an event at City Hall for 200 activists, academics and policy-makers called 
Speaking in God's Name: Re-examining Gender in Islam next month, in which religious 
experts will aim to debunk restrictions conservative Muslims seek to place on women. Khan 
says it is the first event of its kind. "Let's have a real debate about the role of women," she 
says. "That debate is not happening. You get the same 'No sister, you're not allowed to travel 
on your own'." 
She blames the lack of Islamic literature for female followers and provisions for women at 
mosques for what she describes as an increasing terrorist threat from women. Citing the 
student who stabbed the MP Stephen Timms, she says: "It's not surprising Roshonara 
Chaudhry learned her faith from the internet." Khan argues that the government's much-
criticised preventing violent terrorism scheme, now being revamped, suffered from a lack of 
female involvement. 
She makes a compelling case for women to be central in the battle against extremism. 
"Women shape values in children," she says. Inspire runs workshops to educate mothers in 
countering al-Qaida propaganda, arming them with religious texts they can use to rebut the 
arguments of extremists that their children may hear. 
Like Kazi and Khan, Houriya Ahmed, who until last month worked for the Centre for Social 
Cohesion – a thinktank that issues briefing papers on radicalisation and extremism – has had 
insults about not wearing the hijab, or as she puts it "not being Muslim enough". But she is 
less inclined to attribute them to gender, believing anyone who challenges extremists is likely 
to face abuse. 
As she works not for a Muslim organisation but for the CSC, her experiences are different 
from the other Muslim women interviewed. "I don't want to be seen as a Muslim woman 
doing this," says Ahmed, who sees her religion as a private matter that is irrelevant to her job. 
Other campaigners disagree. Rabia Mirza, who is involved with Cheerleaders Against 
Everything speaks about how involvement in fighting extremism has strengthened her faith. 
A disparate group with an anarchic sense of humour, reflected in its title, it has managed to 
get under the skin of both Islamic extremists and leftwingers. As well as mounting counter-
demonstrations against extremists groups, its members go on extremist forums to argue their 
case. 
Cheerleaders has informal links with Kazia's BMSD as well as, controversially, the English 
Defence League. Ex-EDL members, who remain committed to challenging extremism but 
quit the far-right group because of a belief it was indiscriminate in its attacks on Islam, have 
joined with the Cheerleaders to form an organisation called the Nice Ones. Mirza says the 
idea is to link with those – "very few" – within the EDL whose goal is to combat Islamic 
extremism, rather than just oppose Islam. 
However one views such an association, it is unarguable that this type of alliance would be 
unthinkable to the Muslim groups usually rolled out as constituting the frontline in the fight 
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against extremism. Despite breaking the mould, Mirza accepts that women need the co-
operation of people who the extremists can identify with more readily. "If we formed a group 
of women who are highly liberated, it will annoy them, so we need a middle ground," she 
says. 
"We Muslims need to take a bit of an active role," says Mirza. "We need to educate our 
women, liberate women and that will lead the way. Every country where they have educated 
their women, the country has thrived." 
There is a big gulf in the level of experience of Mirza, who is at university, and someone such 
as Khan in trying to shake up the way Muslim leaders respond to the issues affecting British 
Muslims, but they are equally convinced of the need for change. Khan says she is sick of 
traditional male-led Muslim organisations failing to come up with solutions, and responding 
to each controversy with the mantra "Islam is a religion of peace". She is working for change 
and hopes others will join her. "Muslim women are so frustrated with the leadership," she 
says. "We need the discourse of women – they will bring a whole new dimension to it." 
But ultimately it is not just the conservative male Muslim leadership that Muslim women 
want to change their ways. They want society as a whole to see what Muslim women can do 
if people will only set the stereotypes aside. "There's a perception that Muslim woman are 
sitting at home, not doing anything," says Khan, "but that's not the case at all." 
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Article for Extract 21 
UK's first course in women, Islam and the media launched 
University of East Anglia degree module will cover topics including veil wearing, 'honour' 
crimes and arranged marriages 
 David Shariatmadari 
 guardian.co.uk, Thursday 19 January 2012 10.02 GMT 
Women, Islam and the media are topics often found in close conjunction, and not always in 
the happiest of circumstances. So in a canny move, the University of East Anglia (UEA), 
which often gives better-known institutions a run for their money in terms of column inches, 
has developed a course entitled exactly that. 
The 12-week module, which the university claims is the first of its kind in the UK, will cover 
the often inflammatory topics of veil wearing, arranged marriage and "honour" crimes – 
looking at how they are portrayed in contemporary film, TV and other media, and how this 
reflects cultural biases in both the east and west. 
It launches this week and 18 third-year students have enrolled. Roughly equal numbers of 
men and women have signed up. 
The course was developed by Dr Eylem Atakav, a graduate of Ankara University and lecturer 
at UEA. "Lots of people have written about women and Islam, lots of people have written 
about Islam and media or women and media, but they haven't been brought together before," 
she said. 
Atakav said the course would be an important way of changing perceptions of Islam. Study 
materials include films and TV programmes from around the world, including Iran, the US, 
Turkey and China. "We will look at how the media talk about 'honour'-based violence, for 
example. If it's a Middle Eastern woman who happens also to be a Muslim woman it's called 
an 'honour crime'. But if it's a British woman who was killed because her husband was 
jealous because she was having an affair with another man, it's called murder. 
"These crimes happen everywhere in the world, it's not just a Muslim, or just a Middle 
Eastern thing." 
Journalist and broadcaster Nabila Ramdani agrees there is a need to challenge stereotypes. 
"The media caricatures [Muslim women]. It is the same kind of media treatment which sees 
Muslim men portrayed as swarthy types with beards or – at worst – potential terrorists," she 
said. 
Atakav said the course had added relevance in the light of the Arab spring and new forms of 
political activism by women. 
This week Germany's first university department of Islamic theology opened in the city of 
Tübingen. Three further institutions are planned across the country, designed to train future 
imams and teachers. Germany's education minister, Annette Schavan, hailed the scheme as an 
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antidote to "hate preachers", according to Deutsche Presse-Agentur. Thirty-six students have 
enrolled for bachelor degrees. 
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Article for Extract 22, 25 and 31 
Can Jean-François Copé save France from anti-Muslim extremism? 
The secretary-general of French president Nicolas Sarkozy's party may have the most 
difficult job in the country 
 Angelique Chrisafis in Paris 
 guardian.co.uk, Thursday 24 March 2011 15.00 GMT 
Jean-François Copé leans back and contemplates the Zorro-masked crusader figurine on his 
desk. "My mother bought it for me when I joined the government," he says. "Because Zorro 
fights injustice and when he's knocked off his horse, he gets straight back on. And now I've 
got Napoleon next to him," he adds, rearranging a plastic Bonaparte. 
Copé, dubbed Sarkozilla for his killer political ambition, is the man with the most difficult 
task in France. 
He holds the key to whether the country can lift itself out of the gloom-ridden, 
scaremongering, anti-Muslim, nationalistic extremism which intellectuals warn has taken 
over mainstream debate. 
Secretary general of Nicolas Sarkozy's rightwing ruling UMP party, humiliated in local 
elections this week when the extreme-right Front National virtually equalled its score, he 
must convince the classic French right to resist the onslaught of Marine Le Pen. 
Yet he is unabashed about appropriating far-right topics. He is the man behind the "burqa 
ban", which means from next month women in niqab, or Muslim full-face coverings, will be 
banned from all public places. 
He is about to lead a controversial national "debate" on Islam to decide the place of Muslims 
in the secular state. 
A friend of David Cameron and William Hague, he has declared he will run for the French 
presidency in 2017. In the meantime, he must try to stop the UMP collapsing and Sarkozy 
being eliminated from next year's presidential race. 
"He and Sarkozy were rivals for years, their personalities, and egos, are so similar," said one 
party member in Paris. "But now we're seriously looking to Copé to get us out of this terrible 
mess." 
Copé is an MP with a bulldozer reputation for rebelling against Sarkozy as head of the UMP 
parliament group. He's as interested as the president in targeting "national identity", 
integrating immigrants and blasting crime. 
His family, Jews originally from eastern Europe, were saved from the Nazi concentration 
camp roundups by a French family who hid them. As mayor of Meaux outside Paris, he 
proudly dynamited the town's tower-block ghettos. 
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He is a rigid product of France's exclusive postgraduate school for civil servants, ENA. But 
his father, a top surgeon, has retrained as an actor and appeared in France's biggest TV soap 
opera, the Marseille-based Plus Belle La Vie – the equivalent of George Osborne's dad taking 
a cameo in Coronation Street. 
Why are record numbers of French people now voting Front National? 
"Fear," he says with a sigh. "People are afraid of everything. There has been a banking crisis, 
a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis, a geostrategic crisis and an 
environmental crisis. 
"That's considerable in a country that's used to being protected. But the Front National doesn't 
have any answers." 
Copé claims the UMP's best tactic is "solutions" such as the niqab ban. It's about women's 
rights and the notion of living together, he argues. "If you meet a woman in a burqa, she can't 
reply to your smile. It's a denial of identity." 
The UMP – a broad coalition party of moderate centrists and rightwingers created by Jacques 
Chirac in 2002 – is tearing itself apart over the debate on Islam ordered by Sarkozy. 
Some in the party complain of a lurch to the right and the stigmatisation of France's estimated 
5 million Muslims just to gain populist appeal. Copé, who will lead the debate on 5 April, is 
defiant. 
Topics include the building of mosques – a few overcrowded, makeshift prayer-rooms spill 
on to the street – as well as Sarkozy's drive to ban halal food in secular school canteens and 
define how French imams should preach. 
Sarkozy's former diversity adviser, sacked for denouncing the debate, called Copé an 
Islamophobe. 
Copé dismisses this outright. He argues that fundamentalists are creating a "deformed 
caricature" of Islam and stoking tension in France. 
"There are a certain number of extreme behaviours led by fundamentalists who are using 
their religion for political ends and use extremist techniques," he says, citing street prayers, 
the niqab, women refusing to be treated by male doctors and girls banned by their parents 
from mixed swimming sessions. 
"None of these phenomena existed 10 years ago. They have developed today with 
fundamentalism. The Front National is seizing on them to caricature Muslims and exacerbate 
tensions. 
"All this is happening with a backdrop in France of a social crisis, and an identity crisis for 
some recent immigrant families who haven't been able to integrate for various reasons: they 
were put in ghettos, they have education or professional problems, crime or they can't make 
ends meet." 
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The 1905 French law separating church and state predated the arrival of most Muslims, he 
argues, so now "Islam in France" must be defined. "We have to remind of the rules of 
secularism and come up with concrete measures." 
To him, French people crave one thing: "a future". France's main problem is that "people 
think they have no prospects". 
He blames French pessimism on the "weakening of the value of work", and wants to abolish 
the 35-hour week, which has created "two Frances", one which toils very long hours and 
another, largely public sector, which does not. Both feel discouraged and unable to make 
ends meet. 
The UMP is riven with infighting over how to direct voters away from Front National 
candidates in Sunday's local election final round. Sarkozy's poll ratings are historically low. 
Copé, with an eye on his own future presidential ambitions, has been touring party meetings 
promising that hard times bring "the most beautiful battles". 
"I've never known a presidential race to be easy," he says, rising from his desk to firefight the 
next controversy. 
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Article for Extracts 23 and 24 
Muslim women protest on first day of France's face veil ban 
Muslims take to the streets of Paris in protest at new French law banning the wearing of 
niqabs and burqas in public 
 Angelique Chrisafis in Paris 
 guardian.co.uk, Monday 11 April 2011 21.22 BST 
Kenza Drider stood defiantly outside Notre Dame, adjusting her niqab to reveal only a 
glimpse of her eyes. Scores of police with a riot van and several lorries stood by as she and 
another woman in a niqab staged a peaceful protest for the right "to dress as they please". On 
the first day of France's ban on full Islamic face-coverings, this was the first test. 
"I'm not here to provoke, but to defend my civil liberties as a French citizen," said Drider, a 
32-year-old mother-of-four from Avignon, accompanied by around 10 supporters. Japanese 
tourists and Spanish schoolchildren fought their way through TV crews to get a picture of the 
spectacle. Then police swooped. 
Drider had not been stopped on her train journey into Paris. But as she spoke to journalists at 
Notre Dame, she was led off by plainclothes police and driven away along with two protest 
organisers. Next a woman in a niqab in her 40s from a Paris suburb was grabbed by a 
plainclothes officer, who gripped her tightly and frog-marched her to another police bus. 
Officers said the women were not detained for their niqabs but because their protest had not 
been authorised. 
Under the law promoted by Nicolas Sarkozy, any Muslim woman wearing a face veil is now 
banned from all public places in France, including when walking down the street, taking a 
train, going to hospital or collecting her children from school. Women in niqabs will be 
effectively under house arrest, allowed only inside a place of worship or a private car, 
although they risk being stopped by traffic police if they drive. 
But several French police unions yesterday warned that the law was almost impossible to 
enforce and that they would not make it a priority to stop women in full veils walking down 
the street. 
Halima, a 53-year-old mother from Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, who wears a headscarf, was 
detained by police for standing silently with the niqab-wearers at Notre Dame. She said: 
"This is the first time I've ever protested over anything. I'm not in favour of the niqab, I don't 
wear it myself. But it's wrong for the government to ban women from dressing how they 
want. Islamophobia is on the rise in France. First it's the niqab, then they'll ban the jilbab, 
then it will be plain headscarves outlawed." 
Rachid Nekkaz, a property developer and rights campaigner from the Paris suburbs, was 
detained outside the Elysée palace with a woman in a niqab. Nekkaz, who organised the 
Notre Dame protest, had offered to pay niqab wearers' fines for breaking the law. He said 
police had not wanted to formally caution the woman for wearing a niqab. 
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Women in f ce veils risk   €150 (£132) fine or citizenship lessons. Police cannot forcibly 
remove face coverings in the street but can order women to a police station to check their 
identity. The government estimates between 350 and 2,000 women cover their faces in 
France, out of a total Muslim population between four and six million. 
Some niqab-wearers – many of them French converts – vowed to continue going out and to 
take their cases to the European court of human rights if stopped by police. Others have 
moved abroad, while just one woman told French papers she had permanently removed her 
face covering. 
Another niqab wearer said women she knew would wear bird-flu-style medical face masks 
and say they were ill in order to get round the law against covering your face. 
Shop-owners said luxury fashion boutiques near the Champs Elysées were unlikely to call the 
police to detain female tourists in niqabs from the Gulf. This would create a two-tier system 
between rich tourists and poor French people, one trader complained. Emmanuel Roux from 
the police union, Syndicat des Commissaires de la Police Nationale, said the law would be 
"infinitely difficult to apply" and "infinitely little applied". 
Sarkozy, whose polls are at record lows with next year's presidential election looming, has 
been accused of stigmatising Muslims to boost his support among far-right voters. Since he 
declared in 2009 that the burqa was "not welcome in France", women in all forms of veils 
and head coverings said verbal abuse against them had increased. Recently the interior 
minister, Claude Gueant, suggested the growing number of Muslims in France was a 
problem. Religious groups have likened current Islamophobia in France to anti-Jewish feeling 
before the second world war. 
France has a strict separation of church and state and banned headscarves and all religious 
symbols in schools in 2004. 
Samy Debah, head of the French Collective against Islamophobia, said: "The niqab law is a 
pretext to reduce the visibility of Muslims in public spaces. It exposes an old French colonial 
reflex, that 'Arabs and blacks' only understand force and you can't talk to them." 
• This  rticle w s  mended on 12 April 2011 to remove the phr se 'norm l he dsc rf' in the 
sixth paragraph 
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Article for Extract 27 
Masked gunmen kill three as Islamist militants target £9bn ski resorts plan 
Russian forces tighten security after attack on minibus and cable car explosion in troubled 
North Causasus 
 Tom Parfitt in Nalchik 
 guardian.co.uk, Sunday 20 February 2011 19.34 GMT 
A wave of killings is sweeping the Russian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria as Islamist 
insurgents expand their battle across the strife-ridden North Caucasus. Security forces 
introduced a strict anti-terrorism regime near the ski mountain of Elbrus, after masked 
gunmen shot dead three Muscovite tourists and injured two others travelling by minibus 
towards the resort area on Friday. 
It comes a fortnight after Doku Umarov, the insurgents' Chechen leader who ordered the 
Domodedovo airport bombing that killed 36 people in January, promised Russia a "year of 
blood and tears". The murder of the tourists was almost certainly organised with the aim of 
discrediting Kremlin plans to develop a £9bn chain of ski resorts across the North Caucasus, 
announced by President Dmitry Medvedev at the Davos World Economic Forum last month. 
Television pictures showed the tourists' bullet-riddled vehicle as security operatives 
introduced a curfew and identity checks near Elbrus – the main resort in Medvedev's plan. 
An explosion at one of the resort's cable cars, also on Friday, brought several cabins crashing 
to the ground. No-one was hurt in that incident but three more bombs were defused at the 
resort on Saturday. 
The attacks were most likely orchestrated by Islamist militants who have carried out a spate 
of murders in the republic in the last three months. Kabardino-Balkaria's mufti, Anas 
Pshikhachev and Aslan Tsipinov, a prominent ethnographer who the militants accused of 
promoting paganism, were assassinated in December. 
The head of administration of a town near the capital, Nalchik, was shot dead last month and 
five policemen were machine-gunned in a cafe three weeks ago. Several other officers and 
state officials have died in separate incidents. 
Violence in the North Caucasus is rooted in two largely secular wars for independence 
between Chechen separatists and the Russian army in the 1990s. It has since mutated into a 
region-wide Islamist insurgency whose leaders are bent on establishing a caliphate under 
sharia law. 
In the last two years the militants have organised a series of large-scale terror attacks, 
culminating in the attack by two "black widow" suicide bombers that killed 40 people in the 
Moscow metro last year, and the Domodedovo blast. Targeted murders of specific civilians 
are also on the increase. "The fighters of the Islamic underground have reached a level of 
radicalism and intolerance which wasn't apparent five years ago," said Valery Khatazhukov, a 
human rights activist in Nalchik. 
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A series of traditional healers have been killed in the North Caucasus. Kabardino-Balkaria 
was especially shocked by the murder of Tsipinov, 51, a respected anthropologist and 
beekeeper who organised festivals to celebrate the traditions of Kabardin people, the largest 
national group in the republic. 
The militants claimed responsibility on their website after two men gunned Tsipinov down at 
his gate in the village of Shalushka, near Nalchik. They condemned him as a "mushrik" 
(idolator) who revived pagan customs. 
"It was a totally senseless death," his wife, Khalimat, told the Guardian, sitting in a basement 
room full of her husband's collection of Kabardin artefacts, including copper ewers and a 
horse-hair lasso. "He was a scholar, a father and a Muslim believer who loved his people and 
their history and had nothing to do with politics or conflict." 
The tourists were killed on Friday after a group of men in a black car with no number plates 
stopped them on a road leading toward Elbrus in Baksan district. The men demanded 
documents and then opened fire, killing two men and one woman, and injuring two other 
passengers. 
In Nalchik, a smart town of tree-lined boulevards, there is a palpable sense of fear. 
Albert, a taxi driver who declined to give his surname, said: "Every other day someone is 
exterminated. The beardies [extremists] leave leaflets around town threatening, 'don't go to 
this doctor, don't get your hair cut by a woman.'" 
He added: "There was a fortune teller in our district, a Greek. He made predictions by 
looking at coffee dregs. Innocent guy. They killed him, just like that." 
Militants in the republic have said they were driven to violence after police and security 
forces repeatedly detained and beat conservative Muslims and closed their mosques, 
especially in the run-up to the 2005 Nalchik raid. The violence near Elbrus will raise fears 
that bloodshed is creeping toward the Black Sea coast, where Russia will hold the Winter 
Olympics in three years' time. 
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Article for Extract 28 
Gaddafi son declares allegiance to Islamists 
Saif al-Islam suggests Libya could become Islamic state – months after branding Islamists as 
conspirators in rebellion 
 Martin Chulov and Chris Stephen in Misrata 
 guardian.co.uk, Thursday 4 August 2011 19.42 BST 
The one-time alternative face of Colonel Gaddafi's regime, his son, Saif al-Islam, has 
declared allegiance to Islamists whom he had previously branded as lead-conspirators in the 
five-month rebellion that has crippled Libya. The move is a departure from five months of 
rhetoric by Gaddafi junior and his father, both of whom had repeatedly cast the five-month 
uprising as a putsch by Islamists with a jihad agenda. 
Now, Saif Gaddafi has suggested he is prepared to help Islamic groups oust any secular 
movements in Libya and even suggested Libya could emerge from civil war as an Islamic 
state. 
"You want us to make a compromise. OK," he said in an interview with the New York 
Times. "You want us to share the pot. OK, but with who? The Islamists are the real force on 
the ground." 
Gaddafi, who has only twice agreed to be interviewed since the rebel uprising in Libya in 
February, had transformed his appearance. He wore a beard which was characteristic of the 
fundamentalist salafist, or wahabi interpretation of Islam during the interview, and reportedly 
carried Islamic prayer beads. 
Before the uprising he was often seen in the elite clubs and hotels of Europe, where he had 
cultivated a reputation as a cultivated, western-orientated heir apparent to the four decades of 
often oppressive rule of his father. 
Now, according to the man he described as the "spiritual leader" of the Islamists in eastern 
Liby , "secul r people … h ve no pl ce here in Liby ". Citing  n Isl mist figure, Ali S ll bi, 
Gaddafi said: "These are our common enemies, those nice people with jackets and ties, flying 
in on private jets from Paris and London." 
The apparent about-turn could be an attempt to play to common concerns among Arab states 
that fundamental Islamists may use the vacuum created by the fall of decades-old 
dictatorships to push for the introduction of Islamic law and societies that disavow any notion 
of plural democracies. 
The Muslim Brotherhood movements in Egypt and Jordan both espouse a literal 
interpretation of Qur'anic teachings and were perceived as subversive threats in Hosni 
Mubarak's Egypt and also in Syria, where the troubled regime of Bashar al-Assad is 
attempting to portray the uprising there as an Islamic conspiracy supported by the US and 
Israel. 
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North Africa has been a front for several Islamic insurrections in recent years and Libya's 
rebellion does have a strong Islamist element, which has formed an alliance with more liberal 
members of the Benghazi establishment, as well as elements of Colonel Gaddafi's army 
which defected in large numbers in February. 
The secular side of the rebels has so far been satisfied that the Islamists share a common goal 
of ousting Colonel Gaddafi and would not stand in the way of plans to democratise Libya if 
the regime falls. But in Tripoli regime propaganda has cast the country's Islamists as al-Qaida 
operatives. Posters in Green Square, which remains a government stronghold, show bearded 
men whom they brand as al-Qaida fighters in cahoots with the US. 
Gaddafi said: "We don't trust them [Islamists]. But we have to deal with them." 
In Misrata many said Saif-Al-Islam's comments were an admission that Tripoli supports 
terrorism. "We have said it before, we say it to the whole world, Gaddafi is behind every 
terrorist group," said Khalid Alwafi, a criminal lawyer and war crimes investigator. "Now he 
has admitted it himself, through his son." 
Other rebels say they are incredulous, pointing out that for months the Gaddafi regime has 
publicly blamed the rebellion on al-Qaida and Islamic fundamentalists, but now appears to 
have reversed course by embracing them. 
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Article for Extract 32 
Maher Zain: 'My music is a message of Islam' 
Maher Zain's rise to prominence is emblematic of the Arab revolutions, in which young 
Muslims who don't want to choose between Islam and modernity have played a leading role 
 Omar Shahid 
 guardian.co.uk, Thursday 15 December 2011 22.04 GMT 
In 2007, the Lebanese-born Swedish musician Maher Zain was in the US, preparing for the 
next stage of his career. He was working with chart-topping artists and recording with the 
Grammy-winning music producer RedOne, himself a Swede of Moroccan heritage. Success 
was almost within his grasp. Even so, he could feel something was wrong. 
"I felt that the music business was very empty," Zain says from a hotel room in Cairo, over 
Skype. "In the west, all the songs are about love and getting hurt, but there's more to life than 
that." After making some new Muslim friends in Sweden and finding solace in going to the 
mosque, he began to practise Islam seriously. But music was something he had loved from a 
young age and he didn't want to abandon it. Instead, he made a transition: he swapped secular 
music for something more religious. 
In the process, he ended up finding celebrity status anyway. His debut album, Thank You 
Allah, released in late 2009, became a worldwide sensation: the record took top position on 
Amazon.com's world music chart, and was the best-selling album of the decade in Malaysia. 
In Indonesia, it even knocked Justin Bieber off the leading spot. 
Zain has been criticised by some Muslims for using musical instruments – a contentious issue 
in Islamic jurisprudence, with many scholars insisting the voice should take minimal 
accompaniment. However, Zain's use of music represents the nuances of his faith, and there 
are other scholars who argue that activities should be considered permissible unless explicitly 
forbidden in the Qur'an, which music is not. 
"I grew up with music and thus using musical instruments was just natural," Zain says. "I did 
fear a reaction [to using music]. I spoke to some people and they clarified that it's just a 
matter of difference of opinion amongst Muslim scholars and that as long as the content is 
positive and clean, then it will be fine. My music is a message of Islam. But I want people to 
understand what Islam is about. It's a message of peace, brotherhood, humanity, respect and 
love." 
The fusion of east and west permeates Zain's music. In his videos, including Insha'Allah and 
The Chosen One – which have almost 25m YouTube views between them – we see him 
wearing western attire but reflecting on Islamic topics. The supposed contrast between the 
two ways of life is challenged in the videos. "I've learned that Islam doesn't contradict with 
anyone or anytime. It's for everywhere and all times," he says. 
His rise to prominence is emblematic of the Arab revolutions, in which young Muslims who 
don't want to choose between Islam and modernity have played a leading role. Zain's latest 
single, Freedom, was inspired by the uprisings: "Freedom comes from what happened in 
Tunis and then in Egypt. We hope it carries on in a peaceful way for freedom to prevail." He 
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is now working on his second album. With Islamophobia such a problem in America and 
Europe, could Zain's music make an impact in changing people's perceptions of Islam? "I've 
seen that people want to hear good music but with a positive message. I think it can reach out 
to new people, given the topics and the quality we are hoping to produce." 
Does he think more Muslim artists such as him will emerge? "I hope I will inspire others with 
my style of music for people to do the same thing. It's all very expensive to make something 
at this level. This is one of the challenges in the Islamic music industry: not many people 
want to support this. I'm just a regular guy, but I hope my music can inspire others, 
insh'allah," he says with smile. 
Omar Shahid is the political editor of Live magazine. 
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Article for Extracts 33, 34 and 35 
Prejudices about Islam will be shaken by this show 
The hajj, subject of a new exhibition at the British Museum, shows that a respect for other 
faiths is central to Muslim tradition 
Karen Armstrong 
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 22 January 2012 22.45 GMT 
Ever since the Crusades, when Christians from western Europe were fighting holy wars 
against Muslims in the near east, western people have often perceived Islam as a violent and 
intolerant faith – even though when this prejudice took root Islam had a better record of 
tolerance than Christianity. Recent terrorist atrocities have seemed to confirm this received 
idea. But if we want a peaceful world, we urgently need a more balanced view. We cannot 
hope to win the "battle for hearts and minds" unless we know what is actually in them. Nor 
can we expect Muslims to be impressed by our liberal values if they see us succumbing 
unquestioningly to a medieval prejudice born in a time of extreme Christian belligerence. 
Like Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, Sikhs and secularists, some Muslims have 
undoubtedly been violent and intolerant, but the new exhibition at the British Museum – Hajj: 
Journey to the Heart of Islam – is a timely reminder that this is not the whole story. The hajj 
is one of the five essential practices of Islam; when they make the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
Muslims ritually act out the central principles of their faith. Equating religion with "belief" is 
a modern western aberration. Like swimming or driving, religious knowledge is practically 
acquired. You learn only by doing. The ancient rituals of the hajj, which Arabs performed for 
centuries before Islam, have helped pilgrims to form habits of heart and mind that – pace the 
western stereotype – are non-violent and inclusive. 
In the holy city of Mecca, violence of any kind was forbidden. From the moment they left 
home, pilgrims were not permitted to carry weapons, to swat an insect or speak an angry 
word, a discipline that introduced them to a new way of living. At a climactic moment of his 
prophetic career, Muhammad drew on this tradition. Fleeing persecution in Mecca in 622, he 
and the Muslim community (the umma) had migrated to Medina, 250 miles to the north. 
Mecca was determined to destroy the umma and a bitter conflict ensued. But eventually 
Muhammad broke the deadly cycle of warfare with an audacious non-violent initiative. 
In March 628, to general astonishment, he announced that he was going to make the hajj. 
This meant that he had to ride unarmed into enemy territory, yet 1,000 Muslims accompanied 
him. The pilgrim party narrowly escaped being massacred by the Meccan cavalry, and 
eventually entered the sacred territory of Mecca where they simply sat down beside their 
camels and refused to move. Knowing that they would lose all credibility if they slaughtered 
pilgrims on this holy ground, the Meccans negotiated a truce and Muhammad accepted 
humiliating conditions that filled the Muslims with dismay. But the Qur'an proclaimed that 
this apparent defeat was a "clear triumph" because, like Jews and Christians, the Muslims had 
acted in a spirit of peace, self-restraint and forbearance. Two years later, hostilities ceased 
and the Meccans voluntarily opened their gates to the prophet. 
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Clearly the Qur'an did not despise Jews and Christians; this affinity with "the people of the 
book" was also central to the Muslim cult of Mecca. The Arabs firmly believed that they, too, 
were children of Abraham, because they were the descendants of his eldest son Ishmael – a 
regional view shared by the Bible. It was said that Abraham and Ishmael had rebuilt the 
Ka'bah, the sacred shrine of Mecca, when it had fallen into disrepair, had dedicated it to their 
God, and then performed the rites of the hajj. Many Arabs thought that Allah, their high God, 
was the God worshipped by the people of the book, and Christian Arabs used to make the hajj 
pilgrimage to the Ka'bah alongside the pagans. 
The Arabs had no conception of an exclusive religious tradition, so they were deeply shocked 
when they discovered that most Jews and Christians refused to consider them as part of the 
Abrahamic family. The Qur'an still urged Muslims to respect the people of the book and 
revere their prophets, but decreed that instead of facing Jerusalem when they prayed, as 
hitherto, they should turn towards the Ka'bah built by Abraham. 
Like Abraham, who had not belonged to a closed-off cult, they would take no pride in an 
established institution and, as Abraham had done, focus on the worship of God alone. Hence 
the Muslim hajj is all about the Abrahamic family – not Muhammad himself. Pilgrims re-
enact the story of Hagar and Ishmael, symbolically returning to the era that preceded 
religious chauvinism. 
Alas, all traditions lose their primal purity and we all fail our founders. But the British 
Museum's beautiful presentation of the hajj can help us understand how the vast majority of 
the world's Muslims understand their faith. Socrates, founder of the western rational tradition, 
insisted that the exercise of reason required us constantly and stringently to question received 
ideas and entrenched certainties. The new exhibition can indeed become a journey to the 
heart of Islam and also, perhaps, to a more authentic and respectful western rational identity. 
• Members of Guardian Extra are invited to an evening viewing of the exhibition followed by 
a two-course meal plus a curator's talk and Q&A session in the Great Court restaurant. The 
event takes place on 3 February at 5.30pm. For more information, go to guardian.co.uk/extra 
 
 
 
